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ABSTRACT
In 2002 the South African Law Commission published a report in which amendments
to the existing rules of criminal procedure and evidence were proposed. A number of
these recommendations have since been included in a Bill that was tabled before
Parliament in 2003. The proposed amendments largely reflect values which underlie
the "Victims' Rights" movement. The aim of this thesis is to consider the possible
influence of these amendments on the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of
the accused. The study focuses on those amendments that play a role in the
prosecution of alleged sexual offences against children, and shows that although the
recognition of victims' rights is important, it should not be done at the expense of a
fair trial. Dangers inherent to the proposed amendments are therefore highlighted. The
rights of the accused are used to test the desirability or not of the proposed
amendments. Foreign authority is used to support the argument made in the thesis.
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OPSOMMING
In 2002 het die Suid-Afrikaanse Regskommissie 'n verslag gepubliseer waann
veranderings aan die huidige strafprosesreg- en bewysregreëls voorgestel word. 'n
Aantal van hierdie voorgestelde wysigings is intussen opgeneem in 'n Wetsontwerp
wat in Augustus 2003 voor die Parlement gedien het. Die voorgestelde wysigings
reflekteer tot 'n groot mate waardes wat die "Victims' rights" beweging onderlê. Die
doel van hierdie tesis is om die moontlike invloed van hierdie wysigings op die
grondwetlik verskanste billike verhoor regte van die beskuldigde te ondersoek. Die
ondersoek fokus op daardie veranderinge wat 'n rol speel in die vervolging van
beweerde geslagsmisdade teen kinders. Daar word aangetoon dat alhoewel die
erkenning van regte vir slagoffers belangrik is, dit nie ten koste van 'n regverdige
verhoor gedoen kan word nie. Gevare verbonde aan die voorgestelde wysigings word
dus uitgewys. Die regte van die beskuldigde word deurgaans gebruik om die
wenslikheid al dan nie van die voorgestelde wysigings aan te toon. Buitelandse gesag
word aangewend om die betoog te ondersteun.
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Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow
Between the desire
And the spasm
Between the potency
And the existence
Between the essence
And the descent
Falls the Shadow
v
For Thine is the Kingdom
Life is very long
For Thine is the Kingdom
T.S. Eliot
The Hollow Men, 1925
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11 Introduction
Although much has been written about sexual abuse of children and child-
witnesses, studies in this field tend to focus on the position of the child while
largely disregarding the position of the accused. However, the fair trial rights of the
accused are equally worthy of protection. This study seeks to use the interests of
society as a mechanism through which a balance between the rights and interests of
the child victim and the rights of the accused can be found.
It is debatable whether the instances of sexual abuse of children, and particularly
those of young children, are on the increase or whether the public has merely
become more aware of these cases. I Be that as it may, the statistics are shocking.
I Lyon & De Cruz Child Abuse (1990) 1.
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During the period between January 1996 and December of the same year, for
example, 20,099 cases of rape or attempted rape of children under the age of 18
years were reported to the South African Police Service (SAPS). In addition, 2,511
cases of indecent assault of a girl under the age of 18 and 702 involving a boy were
reported. A further 215 cases of incest involving a child under the age of 18 years
were documented. Added to this were 581 cases of sexual intercourse with a
female under the prescribed age2 and 169 cases of indecent acts with a male under
the prescribed age'' and 2,022 instances of abduction.
While 1997 showed an increase in cases reported, 1998 showed a slight decrease in
these figures. However, 1999 showed a marked increase again and, despite the
already high number of cases reported in this year, the figures for the following
year showed yet another increase with 21,438 reported cases of rape or attempted
rape, 2,400 cases of indecent assault of a girl, 1,672 cases of indecent assault of a
boy, 113 cases of incest, 531 cases of intercourse with a girl under the prescribed
age, and 79 cases of indecent acts with boys under the prescribed age and 2,219
cases of abduction.
Unfortunately statistics of specific types of sexual offences against children since
1999 are not available. However, reported cases of rape and indecent assault in
general have increased markedly, as have reported cases of "child abuse". For
example, in the period April 1999 - March 2000 49,679 cases of rape, 4,968 cases
of sexual assault and 2,497 cases of child abuse were reported, while statistics for
April 2003 - March 2004 indicate that 52,425 cases of rape, 9,302 cases of
indecent assault and 6,504 cases of child abuse were reported. SAPS statistics
indicate an increase of 111.9% in reported cases of child abuse between April 1994
and March 2004. In light of this, it can be argued that the incidence of sexual abuse
of children would have increased accordingly.
As societies and laws differ in this regard, it is difficult to compare these figures
with those of other countries, particularly developing countries. In societies that
place a taboo on the mention of sexual matters, for example, very little is known
2 As set out in S 14 (1) Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957.
3 As set out in S 14(3) Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957.
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about whether and how sexual abuse occurs. In addition, not all countries have a
culture of reporting such abuse. However, figures such as those provided above,
cannot be ignored. Children must be protected by the law.
Relevant here is that section 28 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of children
and provides inter alia that every child has the right to be protected from
maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation." This right is a municipal
reinforcement of art 19(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child,5 which requires states parties to
"take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to
protect children from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse,
neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse ..
"
These measures are not limited to legislative measures. Art 19(2) of the
Convention makes it clear that they should include effective procedures for the
establishment of social programmes to provide the necessary support for the child
and for judicial involvement, while section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that
"a child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning
the child."
Since the operation of section 28(2) is not limited by its wording, it is inevitable
that situations will arise where the child's right to be protected from abuse and
maltreatment will conflict with the rights of other individuals. For example, section
35(3) of the Constitution provides that the accused has the right to a fair trial. This
right includes the right to a public trial before an ordinary court," the right to be
present when being tried," the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and
not to testify at proceedings.f the right to challenge and adduce evidence," and the
right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence.!" It is a residual
right, which includes, but is not limited to, the rights listed in sections 35(3)(a)-
4 S 28(1)(d).
5 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 4th ed (2001) 464. The Convention was
ratified by South Africa on 16 July 1995.
6 S 35(3)(c).
7 S 35(3)(e).
8 S 35(3)(h).
9 S 35(3)(i).
10 S 35(3)(j).
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(0 ).11 In referring to this right as set out in section 25(3) of the Interim
Constitution.V the court in S v Zuma, 13per Kentridge AJ, found that the provision
was broader than the rights enumerated in the subsections of the right to a fair trial.
This approach was confirmed in S v Dzukudal4 where the Constitutional Court
considered the right to a fair trial and found that it is a comprehensive and
integrated rightl5 that embraces the concept of substantive fairness." The rights
listed in subsections (a)-(o) of section 35(3) should therefore, according to the
court, be seen as mere elements of the right and not as an exhaustive specification
of what the right entails"
While both children and accused persons have rights that are constitutionally
enshrined, the question is whether section 28(2) should have absolute application.
In other words, should the rights of the accused be limited on the basis of section
28(2)? While the courts have not explicitly discussed this tension, Pantazis and
Mosikatsana'" are of the opinion that some limit must be placed on the
applicability of the "best interests" provision, even if the limitation pertains only to
its applicability in a particular case.
The reasons for the abuse of children are multi-fold and complex.!" Kalisch20
divides the main causes of child abuse into four categories, namely (1) cultural
factors, (2) psychological factors, (3) pregnancy and the period after birth and (4)
dysfunctional families. Pretorius;" on the other hand, suggests five groups: (1)
factors relating to the (social) environment, (2) factors relating to the parents of the
child, (3) factors relating to the child, (4) crisis factors and (5) cultural factors.
II Snyekers "Criminal Procedure" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz, Woolman
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 27-60B.
12200 of 1993.
1319952 SA 642 (CC).
14S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 20004 SA 1078 (CC).
15§ [9] 1091C. See also S v Zuma 19952 SA 642 (CC).
16§ [9] 1091C.
17§ [9] 1091C.
18Pantazis & Mosikatsana "Children's Rights" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz,
Woolman Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 33-20.
19Le Roux & Engelbrecht "The Sexually Abused Child as Witness" in Davel (ed) Introduction to
Child Law in South Africa (2000) 343.
20Kalisch Child Abuse and Neglect - An Annotated Bibliography (1978) Ill.
21Pretorius Opvoeding, Samelewing, Jeug: 'n Sosiopedagogiekkleerboek (1988) 235.
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Whatever the reasons underlying the high incidence of child abuse in South Africa,
abusers of children must be prosecuted.v'
In light of estimates=' that the success rate in the prosecution of all reported cases
of child abuse in South Africa stands at a mere 5%24and that only 30% of all child
abuse cases are reported to professional welfare organizations.i'' the natural
reaction of South African society has been to disregard the rights of an accused
person and even, as has been reported, to kill the alleged offender.26 It is not in the
long-term best interest of a society to allow such action. Since the South African
legal system is based on the supremacy of the Constitutiorr'Ï and the rule of law,28
all legislative or common law provisions have to comply with it. This includes
measures designed to protect children who have been victimised. As Meintjies-van
der Walt aptly states:
"The failure of the criminal justice system to provide effective answers to crime and
to respect of victims' rights should be rectified by addressing the social and economic
conditions conducive to crime and by establishing a legislative and institutional
infrastructure that meets the requirements of a constitutional state, and not through
the abandonment of principles of procedural fairness". 29
While the enhancement of Victims' Rights will promote the establishment an
infrastructure that meets the requirements of a constitutional state, procedural
fairness and the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of the accused cannot
be sacrificed to achieve this goal. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the possible
22This thesis does not purport to offer a solution to the problem of child abuse, but merely seeks to
investigate and evaluate the legal system within which prosecutions take place.
23Van Niekerk "Behavioural Patterns and Risk Assessment" in Van Niekerk, Skelton, Muntingh,
Katz-Levin, Le Roux, Els, Saayman, Du Plessis, Scholtz, Potgieter, Van Niekerk, Mellis, Schutte,
Meintjies, King & Govender Child Law Manualfor Prosecutors C2-2.
24 SAPS statistics for the period January 1996 to December 2000 indicates that of the 124,414
reported sexual offences against children (rape, attempted rape, indecent assault, incest and
statutory crimes) a conviction was secured in 12,866 cases. On average 10.341% of cases resulted
in a conviction. Of the 62,736 cases which were referred to court by the investigating authority
12,866 resulted in convictions, putting the average success rate at 20.508%.
25Zellman "Child abuse reporting and failure to report among mandated reporters" 1990 Journal of
Interpersonal Violence 5.
2~gobeni, Mabe & Maphumulo "Law breaks down in Mamelodi" Mail and Guardian Il August
2000; Ngobeni "Vigilante group sweeps the suburbs" Mail and Guardian 21 January 2000.
27 108 of 1996.
28 S l(c).
29 Meintjies-van der Walt "Towards victims' empowerment strategies in the criminal justice
process" 1998 SAC! 157159.
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impact of measures aimed at enhancing Victims' Rights on the fair trial rights of
the accused.
1 2 Internal tensions in the criminal justice system and the need to
balance values
Society has an interest in, on the one hand, in the effective enforcement of the
criminal law and the protection of victims and potential victims of crime and, on
the other, the protection and preservation of the common law, and statutory and
constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals.3o These two interests compete,
cause tension and call for reconciliation.
In any criminal justice system competing interests result in internal tensions. Many
examples of such tensions can be found in the South African criminal justice
system." Most of these tensions affect the system in general, but some are unique
to the prosecution of sexual offenders and more particularly, those who offend
against children. The latter being the topic of this study. The balancing of these
internal tensions and the values that underlie the criminal justice system is a
difficult but necessary task. Should they not be balanced, a failure of justice will
necessarily follow. The following tensions in the South African criminal justice
system serve as a background to the problem that gave rise to this study:
1 2 1 Securing a conviction vs protecting the innocent
The first tension exists as a result of the fact that procedural rules apply to all
persons accused of committing a crime. However, the reality is that innocent
people also get drawn into the criminal justice system. Therefore, it can be said that
the rules of criminal procedure apply to both guilty and innocent people, especially
during the pre-trial investigation phase. As a result, strict rules of procedure aimed
at securing a conviction could create the risk of convicting innocent people. Here
there is a tension between the need to secure as many convictions as possible and
the need to protect innocent people from wrong convictions.
30 Bekker, Geldenhuys, Joubert, Swanepoel, Terblanche & Van der Merwe Criminal Procedure
Handbook 6th ed (2003) 4.
31 Bekkker et al Criminal Procedure 5ff.
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1 2 2 Protecting the innocent vs acquittal of the guilty
The balancing process with regard to the tension between the need to secure
convictions and the need to protect innocent people from wrong convictions
necessarily leads to the existence of a second tension. This tension exists between
the need to protect the innocent individual against conviction''t and the reality that
measures that prevent the conviction of innocent people create the risk of acquittal
of guilty persona."
There are many examples of rules of evidence that seek to protect the innocent
individual against conviction, even at the expense of securing a conviction of the
factually guilty. One such example is the presumption of innocence, which requires
that the state prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by proving the
elements of the crimer'" If the state fails to prove each and every element of the
crime beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, despite the
fact that he may be factually guilty. In Nortje v Attorney-General Cape,35 the court,
per Marais J, discussed this tension. It found that the presumption of innocence
does not mean that the court cannot "entertain the possibility that persons charged
with crime may indeed be guilty,,,36 nor does it mean that care should not be taken
to avoid laying down principles of criminal procedure that are open to
manipulation and abuser" The court found, instead, that principles of criminal
procedure should be seen as a "carefully constructed compromise" designed to
-
accommodate two objectives between which tension exists. The aims referred to by
the court are, firstly, the need to eliminate the risk of an innocent person being
wrongly convicted and, secondly, the need to avoid making successful prosecution
of the guilty so difficult to achieve that it leads to apathy or cynicism in society.
32 Ashworth "Concepts of Criminal Justice" 1979 Crim LR 412 416.
33 Darnaska "Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and the Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A
Comparative Study" 1973 U Pa L Rev 506 576.
34 The presumption of innocence is discussed below. For a general discussion see Schwikkard
Presumption of Innocence (1999) and Dlamini "The Duty to Prove Each and Every Element of the
Offence" 2001 SACJ 20.
35 Nortje v Attorney-General, Cape 1995 2 SA 460 (C).
36 469F. Emphasis in original.
37469F.
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The court adid, however, acknowledge that it was impossible to achieve a perfect
reconciliation between these conflicting aims."
1 2 3 State powers vs individual rights
A third tension exists between absolute powers of the state and absolute rights of
individuals. If the state were to have absolute powers, it is obvious that the state
would be able to curb criminality. However, this would result in society living
under tyranny of the state. If the rights of the individual were absolute, the state
would be powerless to curb criminality and society would suffer harm. It is
obvious that although the limitation of state power is essential, it is equally
essential to limit the rights of individuals in certain circumstances.r"
124 Negative regulation of state powers vs positive regulation of
state powers
The fourth tension relates to the need to regulate state power. In the previous
paragraph it was shown that limitation of state power is necessary. This limitation
can be described as negative regulation. However, if state power were to be
regulated in the negative sense only, the state would become powerless to curb
criminality. Therefore, positive regulation of state power is equally necessary.
Naturally, this gives rise to a tension between the positive regulation and negative
regulation of state power. On the one hand, the state must be empowered to
perform certain acts, while, on the other, the power of the state to perform those
acts must be limited. For example, it is important from the perspective of society
38469I.
39 Fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute and it is generally recognised that public order,
safety, health and democratic values justify the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of
fundamental rights. Erasmus "Limitation and Suspension" in Van Wyk Rights and
Constitutionalism (1994) 629. S 36 of the Constitution allows for constitutionally permissible
limitation of fundamental rights, provided that such limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. See for example, S v
Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 2 SA 464 (CC); S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC); Investigations
Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 545
(CC); Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC).
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that the Constitution expressly sanctions deprivation of freedom by way of arrest,
but it is equally important that people are not deprived of freedom arbitrarily."
125 Admission of evidence vs fundamental rights
The fifth tension can be found between the need to admit all relevant evidence
during the prosecution of alleged criminals and the need to protect the fundamental
rights of individuals. This tension becomes clear when there is a question about the
admission of evidence obtained in a manner inconsistent with the fundamental
rights of the accused." As Zeffertt puts it:
"[T]he fundamental reason for excluding improperly obtained statements is that they
are unreliable. Another approach is to look at the matter from what is good or bad for
society. It is not in the interest of society to try a man on such evidence, because it
would be unfair to do so - it is socially malignant to get a conviction by recklessly
disregarding whether the accused is truly guilty. But there is another reason for
getting rid of the tainted results of violence and deceit. A just society cannot exist if
its policemen are violent, sadistic and corrupt. If courts were to receive improperly
obtained statements, they would encourage policemen to resort to vicious and evil
practices" 42
The Constitutional Assembly recognised the tension between the need to protect
the fundamental rights of the accused and the need to admit all relevant evidence.
For this reason, a qualified exclusionary rule was incorporated in section 35. In
terms of section 35(5), evidence obtained in a manner that violates a right in the
Bill of Rights, must be excluded if admission of that evidence would render the
trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice. In these
circumstances, the court has a duty to exclude the evidence.Y However, the court is
vested with the discretion to decide whether the admission of the evidence would
result in one of these two consequences."
40 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra: Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 6th ed (2002) 89.
41 Zeffertt "Pointing Out" in Kahn (ed) Fiat Justitia: Essays in Memory of Oliver Deneys Schreiner
(1983) 395
42 Zeffertt in Kahn (ed) Fiat Justitia 395
43 See in general S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E) 394f; S v Mphala 1998 1 SACR 645 (W); S v
Naidoo 1998 1 SACR 479 (N); S v Cloete 19992 SACR 137 (C); S v Nombewu 19962 SACR 396
(E).
44 S v Lottering 1999 12 BCLR 1478 (N) 1483B; S v Ngcobo 1998 10 BCLR 1248 (N); S v Seseane
20002 SACR 225 (0); S v Cloete 1999 2 SACR 137 (C); S v M 20022 SACR 411 (A).
UNIVtRSfT8TmLlENOOSCH
BIBLIOTEEK
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Kriegler J, in Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division,45 expressed the
following view with regard to the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence:
"In any democratic criminal justice system there is a tension between, on the one
hand, the public interest in bringing criminals to book and, on the other, the equally
great public interest in ensuring that justice is manifestly done to all, even those
suspected of conduct which would put them beyond the pale. To be sure, a prominent
feature of that tension is the universal and unceasing endeavour by international
human rights bodies, enlightened legislatures and courts to prevent or curtail
excessive zeal by state agencies in the prevention, investigation or prosecution of
crime. But none of this means sympathy for the crime and its perpetrators. Nor does it
mean a predilection for technical niceties and ingenious legal stratagems. What the
Constitution demands is that the accused be given a fair trial... At times fairness
might require that evidence unconstitutionally obtained be excluded. But there will
also be times when fairness will require that evidence, albeit obtained
unconstitutionally, nevertheless be admitted."
It is clear that the tension between the admission of all relevant evidence and the
protection of fundamental rights continues to exist, despite the inclusion of the
qualified exclusionary rule in the Constitution.
1 2 6 Rights of the accused vs rights of the child
The sixth tension that is identifiable is particularly relevant in the prosecution of
people accused of having committed sexual offences against children. The Due
Process presumption of innocence entitles the accused to be granted bail pending
trial. However, section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that every child has
the right to parental or family care. Where the accused is a family member of the
victim, the granting of bail would often result in the accused returning to the family
home and having contact with the victim. Should the victim's right to parental or
family care be enforced, bail would be denied, or the accused would be prohibited
from returning to the family home.l'' This is so, despite the fact that at this stage the
accused is still presumed innocent. The tension here therefore exists between the
Due Process rights ofthe accused and Victims' Rights values."
45 Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division 19964 SA 187 (CC) § [13] 195G-196B.
46 See, for example, S v H 19991 SACR 72 (W).
47 As explained in Chapter 2 below.
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1 2 7 Rights of the accused vs victims' rights
The tension that gave rise to the research question in this study exists between
protection of the fair trial rights of accused persons and protection of the victims of
crime from further harm that may potentially be caused by their participation in the
prosecution of the alleged offender. This tension often occurs in the prosecution of
sexual offenders. The accused has the right to challenge and adduce evidence,
which includes the right to challenge the credibility of the witness. However, the
victim-witness has the right to dignity, which is also worthy of protection."
Attempts to protect the victim's right to dignity could, however, negatively impact
on the right of the accused to challenge and adduce evidence. This tension relates
particularly to the tension between the accused's Due Process right to challenge
and adduce evidence and Victims' Rights values, which demand that the victim be
protected from secondary victimisation during participation in the prosecution of
the accused.
With regard to procedural matters Snyckers'" remarks that
"[a]ctivity in court which is premised on the guilt of the accused threatens the
presumption of innocence. Procedures which are designed to protect victims of crime
from further victimization place considerable strain upon the presumption of
innocence, since the difficult suspension of disbelief entailed by respect for the
presumption becomes almost impossible where the procedures adopted assume the
accused is guilty as charged. ,,50
In essence, this remark by Snyekers defines the research question of this study.
Firstly, do the procedures designed for the protection of victims indeed threaten the
fair trial rights of the accused (including the presumption of innocence) and, if so,
how can this infringement on the rights of the accused be justified?
1 3 Balancing tensions
The values that underlie the South African criminal justice system include, but are
not limited to, Due Process, Crime Control and Victims' Rights. The outcome of
48 S v M 1999 1 SACR 664 (C) 673g-j.
49 Snyekers in Chaskalson et. al. (eds) Constitutional Law 27-86.
50 For a discussion on the procedural aspects with regard to the prosecution of sexual offences
against children and the possible implications for the right to be presumed innocent, see Chapter 4
below.
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the balancing of tensions in the criminal justice process discussed above depends
largely on which of these underlying values dominate in a particular system. For
example, where Due Process is the dominant value in a system, the outcome of the
balancing process tends to favour the rights of the accused. On the other hand, if
Victims' Rights is the dominant value in a particular system, infringement of the
rights of the accused is more readily accepted, provided that the infringement
serves a Victims' Rights purpose. The values that dominate in South Africa are
examined in Chapter Two.
14 Rationale
The internal tensions and the values that compete in the criminal justice process
become particularly important when the desirability and acceptability of legislative
changes to the criminal justice process are evaluated. Recently the South African
Law Commission published a report on Sexual Offences." The report contains a
draft Bill,52 which, if passed by Parliament, could have a drastic impact on the
criminal justice process in so far as the prosecution of sexual offenders is
concerned. In an attempt to curb the incidents of sexual offences and to protect the
interests of the victims of sexual offences, the Law Commission recommended that
certain rules of evidence and procedure be amended. Some examples of these
proposed legislative amendments include the abolition of cautionary rules that
apply to the evidence of children; the amendment of the requirements for the
admissibility of previous consistent statements made by victims of sexual offences;
the adjustment of the requirements for the appointment of intermediaries in terms
of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act and amendment of the requirements
set for leave, in terms of section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act, to testify via
closed circuit television. Some of these amendments proposed by the South
African Law Commission have the potential to infringe the rights of the accused in
one way or another.
51 SA Law Conunission Sexual Offences Project 107 Report (2002).
52 The draft Bill proposed by the Law Conunission has since been tabled before Parliament as the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill BSO-2003. Further reference to the Bill will be
reference to the latter.
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The aim of this study is to highlight the possible impact of measures aimed at the
enhancement of Victims' Rights on the fair trial rights of the accused. It will be
shown that, while the enhancement of Victims' Rights is an important
consideration, the fair trial rights of the accused should be protected. Therefore, the
study aims to identify ways in which Victims' Rights and the fair trial rights of the
accused can be balanced. While the current position is influenced very strongly by
the accused's right to a fair trial, the proposed amendments contained in the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill53 indicate that Victims' Rights
could in future outweigh the rights of the accused. The question is whether this
about face is in the interest of society. Does the interest of society dictate that the
rights of the accused outweigh the rights of the complainant and child victim, as is
the case at present? Or does the interest of society require an infringement of the
rights of the accused in favour of the rights of the child-complainant?
This study is based on the premise that neither of these extremes poses a solution.
It has been argued that entrenchment of constitutional fair trial rights in the Bill of
Rights" has led to a belief that entrenchment of fundamental rights and freedoms
facilitates criminal conduct because accused persons have successfully challenged
statutory provisions and procedures on the basis of an infringement of these
rights.55 Followers of this viewpoint propose the curtailment or abrogation of fair
trial rights in the interests of public safety and victims of crime.i" However, fair
procedures are for the benefit of both parties and for this reason victims' rights
cannot be promoted at the cost of the curtailment of fair trial rights. 57 What is
needed is a balance between the rights of the accused person and those of the
victims of crime. 58 The legitimacy of the criminal justice system lies in its ability
to protect the fundamental rights of all citizens.i" A fair criminal procedure takes
53 B50-2003.
54 S 35 Constitution.
55 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157 158-159. See for example, S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642
(CC); S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388 (CC); S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 19962 SA 464
(CC); S v Julies 19962 SACR 108 (CC); Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape; S v Coetzee
19972 SA 368 (CC).
56 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157 159.
57 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157 159. See also Snyman "The victim impact statement as a
means of addressing the victim's needs for rights" 1995 Acta Criminologica 30.
58 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157 159.
59 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157159. See § 4 3 1 below.
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due account of the competing rights and interests, and requires that such rights and
interests be balanced. Against the backdrop of the internal tensions and underlying
values found in the criminal justice process, the study therefore evaluates
procedures that are of particular importance during the prosecution of people
accused of having committed sexual offences against children.
It is accepted that the existing framework within which alleged child abuse
offenders are prosecuted does not sufficiently take cognisance of Victims' Rights.
However, underlying the research question of this study is the concern that the
amendments proposed in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bi1160
will not have the desired effect, namely the effective prosecution of alleged child
abuse offenders. It may, quite possibly, rather have the effect of infringing on the
rights of the accused to a fair trial and consequently be contrary to the interests of
society.
While society has a very real interest in the protection of the rights of the child, it
should also have an interest in the protection of all fundamental rights, one of
which is the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial. Equilibrium between
these two interests must be achieved. If the rights or the interests of one or more
parties outweigh the rights and/or interests of another, this equilibrium is disturbed
with the result that the principles of justice are infringed, or worse, broken down
completely. Justice is, to a large extent, found in procedural fairness, which in tum
is found in the effective balancing of the internal tensions in the criminal justice
system."
60 B50-2003.
61 The principle of justice is to be found in the various checks and balances that are present at the
different levels of the entire process, which will ultimately lead to either conviction or acquittal of
the accused. On one level substantive criminal law requires that the various elements of an offence
be proven beyond reasonable doubt as having been factually and as a matter of law committed by
the accused. On a second level the rules of procedure determine how the elements prescribed by
substantive law are to be proven (or not, as the case may be) to the satisfaction of the court. On a
third level, the law of evidence determines how what has to be proven may be brought to the
attention of the court, and in this regard, exclusionary and cautionary rules are of paramount
importance in establishing the factual and legal guilt or innocence of the accused. As is evident,
justice as a concept is capable of definition only with reference to these various aspects that are
multi-dimensional and interrelated. For purposes of this study, the issue of procedural fairness,
however, as it interrelates with the rules of evidence, are of primary interest. See § 2 4 below.
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15 Methodology, limitations and sequence of argument
In this study the existing legal framework and the framework proposed by the
Sexual Offences Bill are evaluated critically against the background of the
hypothesis from which it proceeds and the underlying values of the criminal justice
process. The study is limited to investigating the position regarding the sexually
abused child. While mention is made of the abuse of children in general, the
procedures and mechanisms considered here are mainly those that have an impact
on the child as the complainant in offences of a sexual nature. Although it is true
that children are often sexual offenders themselves.f the balancing of interests in
such cases are more complex and cannot be investigated fully within the scope of
this study. Since the thesis is therefore limited to the identification of legal
problems that arise in the course of prosecution of people accused of having
committed sexual offences against children, any social and psychological problems
that are addressed are limited to those that influence the prosecutorial framework.
Chapter Two is devoted to a discussion of the values that underlie the South
African Criminal Justice Process. Some models that represent these underlying
values are analysed as they exist in the South African legal system. Specific
attention is given to the Due Process Model and the Punitive Victims' Rights
Model. It is indicated that, although the South African criminal justice process is to
a large extent based on the Due Process Model, certain existing and proposed
procedures and rules are based on values that underlie the other models. It is
therefore necessary to pay special attention to constitutional provisions that
guarantee the Due Process rights of the accused as well as proposed legislative
provisions aimed at providing protection for Victims' Rights.
Chapter Three focuses on the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of the
accused. The discussion is limited to those rights which are important in the
62 Redpath "South Africa's Heart of Darkness: Sex Crimes and Child Offenders: Some Remarks"
2003 SA Crime Quarterly.
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prosecution of alleged sexual offenders and which may be infringed by provisions
of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bil1.63
Chapter Four is dedicated to a discussion of Victims' Rights. In this chapter the
need to recognise Victims' Rights is considered along with arguments in favour of
such recognition. Attention is then drawn to existing provisions aimed at enhancing
Victims' Rights. In this chapter it is indicated that Victims' Rights can function on
different levels, namely Extra-trial Level and Trial Level, and that the rights serve
various different purposes. At trial level Victims' Rights serve two purposes,
namely the enhancement of victim participation in the criminal justice process and
the protection of victims of secondary victimisation caused by their involvement in
the criminal justice process. The latter two functions form the basis for the division
of Chapters Five and Six.
Chapters Five and Six entail an investigation of specific procedures and rules of
evidence that are important in the prosecution of people accused of having
committed sexual offences against children. While Chapter Five focuses on
measures aimed at enhancing victim participation at trial level, Chapter Six
examines measures aimed at protecting victims from secondary victimisation by
the criminal justice system. The basis for each of these measures is evaluated in
terms of the values that underlie the different models of the criminal justice process
and the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of the accused.
In the concluding chapter arguments made in the course of Chapters Five and Six
are discussed and the dangers of enhancement of Victims' Rights highlighted.
63 B50-2003.
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2 1 Introduction
In the introductory chapter, attention was drawn to the possible competing rights of
sexual offenders and child victims. A number of internal tensions that exist in any
criminal justice process were identified and it was argued that the outcome of the
balancing process of these tensions depends on the values that underlie the
particular criminal justice system.
In this chapter, attention is given to two different models of criminal procedure that
represent different value systems. These models are the Due Process Model and the
Punitive Victims' rights Model. Various other models of the criminal justice
process have been identified, for example, the Crime Control and the Non-Punitive
Victims' Rights Model. However, due to the limited scope of this study the
discussion will be limited to the Due Process and Punitive Victims' Rights Models.
2 2 Models of the criminal justice process
Packer64 identified two normative models that represent an attempt to abstract
separate value systems that compete for priority in the operation of the criminal
process. He called these models the Crime Control Model and the Due Process
64 Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 153.
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Model. Pointing out that these two models are a "distortion of reality",65 he also
argued that no criminal justice system completely subscribes to all the
characteristics of one model to the exclusion of the other. 66 Although the two
models represent the two ends of a spectrum, they are not necessarily rival models,
since both seek to vindicate the goals of the substantive criminal law, although they
do so along different routes.Ï" The polarity of the models is therefore not
absolute.68
Since Herbert Packer published his seminal discussion about the models
underlying the criminal justice process in 1968, he has attracted not only support
and following " but also dissent and criticism.Ï" There have been writers who have
tried to either add to or replace the two models of Packer", but as Roach so
succinctly puts it: "None have enjoyed his success and durability"."
Based on the criticism of other authors and the emerging trend towards the
consideration of victims' rights in the criminal justice process, Roach73 developed
two alternative models of criminal justice. Roach calls these two models the Non-
Punitive Model of Victims' Rights and the Punitive Victims' Rights Model.
For the purpose of this study only one of his models of the criminal justice process
is discussed, namely the Punitive Victims' rights Model. This model has been
selected because the values that underlie it are evident in the amendments to the
65 Packer Criminal Sanction 153.
66 Roach "Four Models of the Criminal Process" 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 671 672; Sanders
"From Suspect to Trial" in Maguire, Morgan & Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology
2nd ed (1997) 1051-1052. See also Packer Criminal Sanction 154.
67 Bekkker et al Criminal Procedure 5.
68 Sanders in Maguire et. al. (eds) Handbook of Criminology 1052.
69 Smith "Case Construction and the Goals of Criminal Process" 1997 BJ. Crim. 319; Duff "Crime
Control, Due Process and 'The Case for the Prosecution'" 1998 BJ. Crim. 611; Goldstein
"Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure" 1974 Stan. L.
Rev 1009.
70 Ericson & Baranek The Ordering of Justice: A Study of the Accused Persons as Dependants in
the Criminal Process (1982)
71 See for example Arnella "Re-thinking the functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies" 1983 Geo. LJ. 185; Darnaska "Evidentiary Barriers to
Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study" 1973 U. PA. L. Rev
506; Feeley "Two Models of Criminal Process: An Organizational Perspective" 1973 L.& Soc'y
Rev. 407; Ericson & Baranek Ordering of Justice; Smith 1997 BJ. Crim. 319; Duff 1998 BJ. Crim.
611; Goldstein 1974 Stan. L. Rev 1009.
72 Roach 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 676.
73 Roach 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 699jJ.
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law of evidence and criminal procedure proposed by the South African Law
Commission in its report on Sexual Offences.Ï"
2 3 Common ground between different models
Since it is unwise to attempt to construct models that exist in an institutional
vacuum, it is important to keep in mind that the criminal justice system must
adhere to minimum limits. These limits are underpinned by a number of
assumptions which form the common ground between the different models of the
criminal justice process. The difference between the models with regard to these
assumptions is merely a matter of emphasis. 75
Packer points out that the first two assumptions are inter-related and are merely
two sides of the same coin.Ï" The first assumption is that the function of defining
conduct that may be treated as criminal is separate from the process of identifying
an individual as a criminal and dealing with him or her accordingly. Furthermore,
the former function must precede the latter process." In South African law this
assumption is embodied in the principle of legality." This principle is, in tum,
embodied in two maxims: nullum crimen sine lege79 and nulla poena sine lege.8o
Section 35(3)(1) of the Constitution expressly lists this principle in the right to a
fair trial.
The second assumption is that the criminal process should ordinarily be invoked by
the organs responsible for the administration of criminal justice when it appears
74 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Project 107 Report (2002)
75 Bekkker et al Criminal Procedure 5.
76 Packer Criminal Sanction 156.
77 Packer Criminal Sanction 155.
78 S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC) § [13] 393H; S v Malgas 2001 2 SA 1222 (A). For a discussion on
the principle of legality, see Snyman Criminal Law 4th ed (2002) 39jJ; Burchell & Milton Principles
of Criminal Law 20d ed (1997) 57jJ; Dig 50.16.131; De Wet & Swanepoel Die Suid-Afrikaanse
Strafreg 2nd ed (1960) 43 - 45; Du Toit Strafin Suid-Afrika (1981) xxiv; Van Zyl-Smit "Sentencing
and Punishment" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz, Woolman (eds) Constitutional
Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 28-2.
79 Freely translated: There is no crime unless there is a law that has been contravened.
80 Freely translated: Where no law exists which affixes punishment to a certain act, there is no crime
in law. See Dig. 50.16.131; De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg 43-45; Du Toit Strafxxiv; Van Zyl-Smit
in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 28-2.
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that a crime has been committed and that there IS a reasonable prospect of
apprehending and convicting the perpetrator."
Thirdly, it is assumed that the powers of government to investigate and apprehend
suspected criminals must be limited.82 This assumption concerns the principle that
the security and privacy of individuals may not be invaded at will. It is clear from
its wording that section 35(5) of the Constitution, which creates a qualified
exclusionary rule in respect of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, read with
section 14, which guarantees the right to privacy, and section 12, which enshrines
the right to freedom and security of the person, is in line with the assumption that
the powers of government to investigate and apprehend suspected criminals must
be limited.83
The last assumption is that the alleged criminal forms an independent entity in the
criminal process who, if he so chooses, may actively participate in the process/"
This means that the criminal justice process has the potential to become an
adversarial struggle between the authorities and everyone who is subjected to it.85
In the South African law, this choice is embodied in section 35(3)(i), which
guarantees the right to challenge and adduce evidence and section 35(3)(h), which
guarantees the right to remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings. The
former rights can be referred to as "active defence rights", while the latter rights
can be referred to as "passive defence rights".86 Other "passive defence rights"
include the right to remain silent upon arrest,87 the right to be presumed innocentj"
and the right not to incriminate oneself.89
Despite the fact that any criminal justice system must adhere to minimum limits, .
the extent to which effect is given to these minimum limits depends on the values
that underlie the particular criminal justice system.
81 Packer Criminal Sanction 155.
82 Packer Criminal Sanction 156.
83 S v Mayekiso 19962 SACR 298 (C).
84 Packer Criminal Sanction 157.
85 Packer Criminal Sanction 157.
86 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2nd ed (2002) 30.
87 S 35(1)(a) Constitution.
88 S 35(3)(h) Constitution.
89 S 35(3)(j) Constitution.
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2 4 Values underlying the Due Process model
Although the Due Process Model acknowledges the importance of effective
criminal law enforcement, it is based on the principle that the primary function of
the criminal justice is not only to secure a conviction, but rather to ensure that the
outcome of the case is achieved in terms of rules that are designed to properly
acknowledge the rights of the individual at every critical stage from pre-arrest
investigation to post-trial proceedings.Ï" This principle was echoed by the court in
S v Nkabinde." where the court emphasised that the fairness of a trial is not
determined only by what takes place at the trial itself, but that fairness and a lack
of bias must also be reflected in pre-trial investigations.f De Waal et al express the
opinion that "[w]hile only' accused' persons have the right to a fair trial, violations
of the rights of arrested and detained persons ... may make the trial of the accused
person unfair".93
The Due Process Model is characterised by an insistence on formal", adjudicative,
adversary" fact-finding processes in which the factual case against the accused is
publicly" heard by an impartial tribunal'" and is evaluated only after the accused
has had full opportunity to discredit the case against him.98,The demand for finality
is relatively low in the Due Process Model, since it is recognised that human error
is a possibility." The Model therefore rejects the idea of efficiency In
circumstances where efficiency might result in a lack of reliability.l'"
90 Packer Criminal Sanction 163ff.
91 1998 8 BCLR 996 (N).
92 JOOIE.
93 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 4th ed (2001) 597.
94 See for example ss 144 - 149 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
95 SA Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness Project 71 Working Paper 28 (1985) 2
described the South African criminal justice process as follows:
"A criminal proceeding is in effect aimed at comparing two contradictory versions,
that of the State and that of the defence, against one another and to put both to the test
of harsh cross-examination"
96 S 35(3)( c).
97 S 165(2) Constitution.
98 S 151 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. S 51 provides for the leading of evidence by or on
behalf of the accused. Packer Criminal Sanction 163-164. See s 35(3)(i) Constitution.
99 Packer Criminal Sanction 164. S 35(3)(0) of the Constitution guarantees that as part of the fair
trial right, the accused has a right to appeal to, or review by, a higher court. Langa J, writing for a
unanimous court in S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 19962 SA 464 (CC), expressed the opinion that "[n]o
legal system can guarantee that no innocent person can ever be convicted. Indeed the provision of
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The Due Process Model places the emphasis on the primacy of the individual and
the complementary concept of limitation of official power.i'" It is accepted that
power is always subject to abuse, and because the individual is subject to the
coercive power of the state, the Due Process Model is prepared to accept a
substantial reduction in efficiency in the interest of preventing official oppression
of the individual.lo2
The emphasis of the Due Process Model is on the doctrine of legal guilt, rather
than a determination of factual guilt only.I03 Packerl04 explains:
"[A] person is not to be held guilty of a crime merely on a showing that in all
probability, based on reliable evidence, he did factually what he is said to have done.
Instead, he is to be held guilty if and only if these formal determinations are made in
procedurally regular fashion and by authorities acting within competences duly
allocated to them. Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even though the factual
determination is or might be adverse to him, if various rules designed to protect him
and safeguard the integrity of the process are not given effect..."
The principle of legal guilt can be found in South African law. For example, in S v
Lwanel05 Holmes JA held that
"[t]he pragmatists may say that the guilty should be punished and that if the accused
has previously confessed ... it is in the interests of society that he be convicted. The
answer is that between the individual and the day of judicial reckoning there are
interposed certain checks and balances in the interests of a fair trial and the due
administration of justice ... According to the high judicial tradition of this country it is
not in the interests of society that an accused should be convicted unless he has had a
fair trial in accordance with accepted tenets of adjudication". 106
The Due Process Model also includes deterrent rules that are designed to prevent
an abuse of power or abuse of the system by police and prosecutors.i'" The
corrective action by way of appeal or review procedures is an acknowledgement of the ever -present
possibility of judicial fallibility" § [10] 472F.
100Packer Criminal Sanction 165.
101Packer Criminal Sanction 165.
102Packer Criminal Sanction 166. The court in S v Mayekiso 19962 SACR 298 (C) 307Cexpressed
the view that the Bill of Rights is aimed, inter alia, at protecting the individual against an abuse of
state power and an eroding thereof can only be tolerated where the importance of the other interest
which is promoted by the limitation, requires such a limitation for compelling reasons.
103Packer Criminal Sanction 166. See S vMbatha; S v Prinsloo 19962 SA 464 (CC) § [20] 475Fff.;
Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 177.
104Packer Criminal Sanction 166.
10519662 SA 433 (A).
106444C_D.
107See for example, s 35(5) of the Constitution which provides for the exclusion of evidence which
was obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights in cases where the admission
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remedies could include the release of a factually guilty person In cases of
illegalities, even if, despite ignoring the irregularity, the fact finder would be
convinced of the person's guilt.I08
In S v Moodiel09 the court considered whether an irregularity would result in the
setting aside of a conviction and came to the following conclusion:
"1. The general rule in regard to irregularities is that the court will be satisfied
that there has in fact been a failure of justice if it cannot hold that a reasonable trial
Court would inevitably have convicted if there had been no irregularity.
2. In an exceptional case, where the irregularity consists of such a gross
departure from established rules of procedure that the accused has not been properly
tried, this is per se a failure of justice, and it is unnecessary to apply the test of
inquiring whether a reasonable trial court would inevitably have convicted if there
had been no irregularity.
3. Whether a case falls within (1) or (2) depends upon the nature and degree
of the irregularity."
In Klein v Attorney-General, Witwatersrand Local Division.i'" for example, Van
Schalkwyk J found:
"An investigation into the nature and degree of the irregularity would, in my view,
comprehend an investigation of the extent of the violation as well as the
circumstances under which it took place. A very serious violation of an accused's
legal professional privilege, for instance, might give rise to the conclusion that the
accused was per se thereby deprived of the right to fair trial, and the circumstances
under which the violation took place might then be of little or no consequence.
Conversely, a relatively trivial violation might have taken place under circumstances
so fundamentally inimical to the accused's constitutionally guaranteed rights that the
court will, as a matter of principle, refuse to uphold a conviction where the
proceedings were so tainted." III
In S v Mushimbal12 the secretary of the accused's attorney made certain evidence
available to the police. This evidence was later used to convict the accused. On
appeal it was found that the legal professional privilege of the accused was
of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of
justice.
108 Packer Criminal Sanction 168.
109 1961 4 SA 752 (A) 758E-G.
110 19952 SACR 210 (W).
111224c_d.
112 1977 2 SA 829 (A).
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infringed. This was found to have resulted in a failure of justice!!3 and therefore
the conviction was set aside.
In the South African system, prior to the coming into effect of the [interim]
Constitution !!4 and in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, !!5 a conviction could
only be set aside on appeal or review if an irregularity resulted in a "failure of
justice".!!6 A distinction was drawn between common irregularities, which would
not necessarily be fatal provided that there remained sufficient untainted evidence
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and exceptional irregularities, which
would as a result of the nature and degree of the irregularity necessarily be fatal.!!7
The post-constitutional position can be summarised as follows: The Supreme Court
of Appeal in S v Smile!!8 found that not every constitutional irregularity committed
by a trial court would justify setting aside a conviction. Also, whether there has
been a fair trial must ultimately be decided with regard to the particular
circumstances of each case.'!" The court in Smile!20 adopted the approach of
Namibian Chief Justice Mohamed" in S v Shikunga!22 where he found that
"[ e]ssentially the question one is asking in respect of constitutional and non-
constitutional irregularities is whether the verdict has been tainted by the irregularity.
Where the question is answered in the negative the verdict should stand. What one is
doing is attempting to balance two equally compelling claims - the claim that society
has that a guilty person should be convicted, and the claim that the integrity of the
judicial process should be upheld. Where the irregularity is of a fundamental nature
and where the irregularity, though less fundamental, taints the conviction the latter
interest prevails. Where the irregularity is such that it is not of a fundamental nature
and it does not taint the conviction the former interest prevails".123
1I3845E_F.
114200 of 1993.
11551 of 1977.
116S 332(1) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
117De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 661.
1181998 1 SACR 688 (A).
119De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 662.
1201998 1 SACR 688 (A).
121Acting in his capacity as Chief Justice ofNarnibia.
1222000 1 SA 616 (NrnS).
123629G_1.
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Equality is another value that underlies the Due Process Model. In terms of this
value, there is a public obligation to ensure that financial inability does not prohibit
the accused from asserting challenges to the process being invoked against him.124
From this it appears that the nature of ordinary proceedings in the South African
criminal procedure reflects a Due Process character. This character is especially
evident in the following provisions: the right to legal representation.V'' the right to
be given adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence.l'" the passive defence
right entailing the right to remain silent during the investigation phase127as well as
during the trial phase.128 The accused also has the right to apply for bail129 and to
be released from detention if the interests of justice allow.130 Further, the accused
has the right to access to an independent and impartial court, J3J the right to a public
trial,132and the right to be informed of the reason for his arrest,133while a detained
person has the right to invoke and rely on the interdictum de libero homine
exhibendo (writ habeas corpus).134 The right to be brought before a court as soon
as reasonably possiblel " is also based on Due Process values. The accused also has
the right to be informed of the charge with sufficient certainty to answer it,136the
124 Packer Criminal Sanction 168-169. See S 35(3)(g) which provides for the right of the accused to
have a legal practitioner assigned to him or her at state expense of substantial injustice would
otherwise result. In S v Huma (1) 1995 2 SACR 407 (W) 409F the court appointed an expert
witness on behalf of the indigent accused finding that the appointment of a ballistics expert is
analogous to the appointment of a medical expert to assist pro deo counsel. See also R v Linda 1959
1 SA 103 (N) and R vMfuduka 19604 SA 770 (C).
125 Ss 35(2)(a), 35(2)(c) and 35(3)(f) Constitution.
126 S 35(3 )(b) Constitution.
127 S 35(1)(a)-(c) Constitution.
128 S 35(3)(h) Constitution.
129 Ss 59 and 60 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
130 S 35(1)(f) Constitution. CJS 60(11) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which places a reverse
onus on the accused to prove that, in the case of a schedule 5 offence, the interests of justice permit
his release or, in the case of a schedule 6 offence, that there are exceptional circumstances which
justify his release in the interests of justice.
131 S 165(2) of the Constitution requires the courts to be independent and to apply the law
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. See also S 35(3)(c) where independence of the
court is assumed as part of the "normal" court requirement. For a discussion see Snyekers Criminal
Procedure in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz, Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of
South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 27-68 - 27-69.
132 S 35(3)(c) Constitution.
133 S 39(2) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
134 S 35(2)(d). See Schermbrucker v Klindt NO 1965 (4) SA 606 (A)
135 S 35(1)(d) Constitution.
136 S 35(3)(a) Constitution. This right may include the right to access to the police docket
(Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1996 1 SA 725 (CC); S v Fani 1994 3 SA 619 (E);
Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 3 SA 625 (SE); S v James 1994 3 SA 881 (E); S v
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right to be present when tried,137 the right to be informed of procedural rights by
the court,138and the right to challenge and adduce evidence,139 the right to a speedy
trial,140the right to testify at trial"" and the right not to testify at trial. 142The right
not to be tried for a crime of which the accused has previously been either
convicted or acquitted 143and the right not to be convicted of a crime in respect of
any act or omission which at the time of such act or omission was not a crime.l'"
further reflect the Due Process nature of the South African criminal procedure. In
addition to the above-mentioned rights, the accused has the right to the benefit of
the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the
offence has been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the
time of sentencing; 145the right to receive only such a sentence as is permitted by
law,146the right to finality, in other words, the right to demand a verdict,147 and the
right to address the court on the merits of the casel48 as well as on sentencing.V"
The accused also has the right not to be convicted unless guilt has been proved by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubtl50 on the basis of admissible evidence'<'
and in terms of a regular procedure.l'" There is also the right to appeal to a higher
court or to apply for review to a higher COurt.153
Smith 19943 SA 887 (SE); Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 19944 SA 218 (W); S v Majavu
19944 SA 268 (Ck); S v Botha 19944 SA 799 (W); S v Khoza 19942 SACR 611 (W); S v Sefadi
1995 1 SA 433 (D»; the right to consult with state witnesses (S v Xaba 1997 1 SACR 194 (W); S v
Makiti 1997 1 All SA 291 (B); S v Smile 1998 1 SACR 688 (A» and the right to information about
the charge (S v Manamela 19999 BCLR 994 (W); S v Chauke 1998 1 SACR 354 (V); S v Kester
19961 SACR 461 (B); S v Simxadi 19971 SACR 169 (C); S v Maseko 19969 BCLR 1137 (W».
137 S 35(3)(e) Constitution.
138 De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 622.
139 S 35(3)(i) Constitution.
140 S 35(3)( d) Constitution.
141 S 166(1) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
142 S 35(3)(h) Constitution.
143 S 35(3)(m).
144 S 35(3(1).
145 S 35(3)(n).
146 Burchell & Milton Criminal Law 61.
147 S 108 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as read with S 106(4) of the same Act.
148 S 175( 1) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
149 S 274(2) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
150 S 35(3)(h) Constitution. See the discussion below § 3 2 1.
151 R v Kirsten 19503 SA 659 (C).
152 S v Coetzee 1997 3 SA 527 (CC).
153 S 35(3)(0).
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25 Values underlying the Punitive Victims' rights Model
The Punitive Victims' Rights Model normatively stresses that the rights of crime
victims or even potential victims of crime are worthy of protection. The rights of
the crime victim therefore compete with the Due Process rights of the accused.i'"
The Punitive Victims' rights Model recognises high levels of unreported crime
which confirms the failure of the criminal justice system. Along with reports of
victims being maltreated in the criminal justice process, this leads to demands for
reform of the criminal justice process.l " Therefore, the Punitive Victims' rights
Model seeks to ensure reform by placing the criminal justice system under pressure
to improve itself by encouraging reporting of crime and preventing re-victimisation
within the criminal process.P?
Victims' rights advocacy groups often demand that the rights of victims be given
the same constitutional status as those of the accused. Bills of rights have been
proposed in which victims' rights are recognised in an attempt to match the rights
given to the accused, thereby creating a perceived equality between the victim and
the accused.l'" The Punitive Victims' Rights Model views plea bargaining with
suspicion because it does not generally include victims. The model measures its
success in terms of the satisfaction of victims.
The Punitive Victims' rights Model focuses on factual rather than legal guilt.158 It
is therefore opposed to the Due Process claims of the accused because these claims
divert the attention away from factual guilt and often allow the criminal to go free.
The model bases its objection to the Due Process claims of the accused on the need
to protect the rights of victims or potential victims of crime.
154 Fletcher With Justicefor Same: Victims' rights in Criminal Trials (1995) 152.
155 Roach 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 700.
156 Roach 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 701.
157 See generally Kgosimore "The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
and its application in the criminal justice system" 2000 Crime Research in South Africa, Moolman
"Victims' rights in Anglo-American and continental European countries: What can South Africa
learn?" 1997 SACJ 273; Visser & Potgieter "Some critical comments on South Africa's Bill of
Fundamental Human Rights" 1994 THRHR 493; Moolman "Rights of crime victims in South
Africa: An evaluation and future prospects" 1997 Acta Criminologica 67; Snyman "The victim
impact statement as a means of addressing the victim's needs for rights" 1995 Acta Criminologica
30.
158 Roach 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 702.
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The model assumes that the enactment of criminal law, prosecution of offenders
and punishment of the guilty control crime. Victim advocacy groups often focus on
creating new criminal laws and developing existing criminal laws in an attempt to
prevent future victimisation.159 This is evident from the drastic changes in rape
laws proposed in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill.16o For
example, according to the common law, rape is the unlawful and intentional
intercourse by a man with a woman without her consent.l'" The definition of the
crime is gender specific: only a man can be the perpetrator'I'' in rape and only a
woman can be raped. It is also necessary to consider that an act will only amount to
rape if there is penetration of the vagina by the penis. Anal penetration does not
classify as rape according to the common law, nor does vaginal penetration with an
object other than the genital organs of the rapist. In terms of section 3(7) of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill163 the common law crime of
rape will be repealed.l'" Rape will be defined as follows:
"[any unlawful and intentional] act which causes penetration to any extent
whatsoever by the genital organs of that person [committing the crime of rape] into or
beyond the anus or genital organs of another person, or any act which causes
penetration to any extent whatsoever by the genital organs of another gerson into or
beyond the anus or genital organs of the person committing the act ... " I
This provision makes the crime of rape gender-neutral in an attempt to protect
potential victims from victimisation. These changes are indicative of the perception
that changes in the law will protect possible victims of crime. However, this
perception is not necessarily correct, as will be indicated in subsequent chapters.
Elements of the Punitive Victims' rights Model can be found in the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill.166 For example, schedule 1 of the Bill, that
contains certain objectives that must be considered in the application of the
provisions, provides for the protection of the victims by, inter alia, prohibiting
159 Roach 1999 J. Crim. L & Criminology 702-703.
160 B50-2003.
161 Snyman Criminal Law 445.
162 A woman may be found guilty of being an accessory to rape.
163 B50-2003.
164 Save where an accused has, at the time of commencement of the act, already been charged, but
not yet convicted of rape in terms of the common law.
165 S 3(1) Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50-2003.
166 B50-2003.
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discrimination against complainants.P" Victim participation in the process is also
included as an objective of the Bill.168
The Bill attempts to match the Due Process rights of the accused by conferring
certain "rights" on the complainant. Schedule 1 refers specifically to the "rights" of
victims and complainants thereby creating the impression that these "rights" should
have the same status as the constitutionally guaranteed Due Process rights of the
accused.l'" Schedule 1(t) of the Bill states that "in addition to all due process and
constitutional rights, victims should have the following rights ..." This indicates that
the drafters of the Bill had the rights of the accused in mind when this section was
drafted, but that the drafters of the Bill found it necessary to pit the rights of the
accused against the rights of the victims of sexual offences, thereby creating the
need for a more intricate balancing process.
Some provisions of the Bill are aimed at the prevention of re-victimisation of
complainants in the criminal justice system. For example, in terms of section 15 of
the Bill, certain victims must be declared vulnerable witnesses and the court is
required to direct that such a witness be protected by one or more measures listed
in section 14(4).170
2 6 Concluding remarks
It has been shown that although the South African criminal justice system IS
largely based on Due Process values, values that underlie the Punitive Victims'
167 Schedule I(a).
168 See, for example, schedule I(d), (e), (f) and U).
169 For example, schedule I (d) states that the complainants must be informed of their rights and the
procedures within the criminal justice system which affect them. Schedule I(e) gives complainants
the right to express an opinion, to be informed of all decisions, and to have their opinion taken
seriously in any matter affecting them. Schedule I(f) confers the following rights on complainants:
to have present at all decisions affecting them a person or persons important to their lives; (ii) to
have matters explained to them in a clear, understandable manner appropriate to their age and in a
language and manner which they understand; (iii) to remain in the family, where appropriate,
during the investigation and whilst awaiting a final resolution of the matter and, if a child is
removed from the family, to have the placement periodically reviewed; (iv) to have procedures
dealt with expeditiously in time frames appropriate to the complainant and the offence. Schedule
I (g) gives the complainant in a sexual offence case the right to confidentiality and privacy.
170 The specific measures will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
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rights Model can be identified in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment
n.n.!"
In terms of section 36( 1) of the Constitution 172 the rights in the Bill of Rights may
be limited only by a law of general application and then only to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom. In deciding whether the limitation is
justifiable, the court must take certain factors into account, including the nature of
the right, the importance and purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the
limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether less
restrictive means by which the same purpose can be achieved exist. In terms of
section 36(2) no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights, except as
provided in section 36(1).
The question is whether a limitation of the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial
rights of the accused by legislative provisions based on Victims' rights values can
be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. In other words, should these
values, in the balancing process, be allowed to supersede the Due Process values
which underlie the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights? The extent to which
this can be allowed will be shown in the evaluation of the rules of evidence and
procedure which will be discussed in the following chapters.
171 B50-2003.
I72 108 of 1996.
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3 1 Introduction
This chapter deals with constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights relevant to the
topic of this thesis. An attempt is made to provide information necessary for the
evaluation of the rules of evidence and procedure that are discussed and evaluated
in subsequent chapters.
Section 35(3) of the Constitution guarantees the fair trial rights of the accused.l "
In order to judge their constitutional validity, all procedural rules and rules of
evidence that affect accused persons must therefore be tested against the fair trial
rights of the accused. For this reason it is important to take note of the content of
these rights.
173 S 35(3) states: "Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, .. "
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3 2 Fair trial rights of the accused
The right to a fair trial is a residual right, that includes but is not limited to the
enumerated rights in sections 35(3)( a)-(0 ).174 In S v Dzukuda 175the Constitutional
Court considered the right to a fair trial and found that it is a comprehensive and
integrated rightl76 that embraces the concept of substantive faimess.i " The rights
listed in subsections (a)-(o) of section 35(3) should therefore, according to the
court, be seen as mere elements of the right and not as an exhaustive specification
of what the right entails.178 The content of the right should, according to
Ackermann J, be established on a case to case basis.179 The court went on to find
that a fair trial cannot only be achieved by one specific system of criminal
procedure and that amendments to criminal procedure is acceptable provided that
the system effectively secures the right to a fair trial.I80
Although the right to a fair trial includes at least all the rights enumerated in
sections 35(3)( a)-(0), not all of these rights are relevant for purposes of this thesis.
Only the relevant rights will be discussed here and only in so far as is necessary.
3 2 1 The right to be presumed innocent
The right to be presumed innocent is central to a just criminal process.l'" It has
been described as a "golden thread" running through the criminal justice system,182
and as "a prime instrument reducing the risk of convictions based on factual
error".183 As such it is regarded as one of the most fundamental rights in any
criminal justice system.l'"
174 Snyekers "Criminal Procedure" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz, Woolman
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 27-60B.
175 S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 20004 SA 1078 (CC).
176 § [9] 1091C. See also S v Zuma 19952 SA 642 (CC).
177 § [9] 1091C.
178 § [9] 1091C.
179 § [9] 1091D.
180 § [10] 1091F.
181 S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice and Another Intervening) 2000 2 SA 425 (CC) § [15] 434E.
182 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions (1935) AC 462 (HL) 481; [1935] ALL ER Rep
1 8.
183 In re Winship 397 US 358 (1970) 364.
184 See, for example, R v Ndho/vu 1945 AD 369 380 and 385; Estelle v Williams 425 US 501 503
(1976) where Burger CJ expressed the view that "the presumption of innocence, ... , is a basic
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In S V Manamelal85 the Constitutional Court also described the purpose of the
presumption of innocence as an attempt to minimise the risk that innocent persons
may be convicted. However, in S v Dzukudal86 the same court argued that the
presumption of innocence arose primarily from considerations of dignity and
. d .. 187equality, rather than from the nee to avert a wrong conviction,
Whatever the basis for the existence of the presumption of innocence, its primary
function is to determine the burden and standard of proof for establishing the guilt
of the accused.l'" As has been reiterated by our courts, the presumption of
innocence requires that the state bear the onus to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.189 This requirement entails that the prosecution must prove all the essential
elements of the charge beyond reasonable doubt.190 It must therefore prove the
absence of a defence, excuse, justification or exception.i'"
As Schwikkard 192 puts it:
"The scope of the presumption of innocence as a constitutionally entrenched right in s
35(3)(h) of the Constitution, requiring the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial is restricted to proof of those elements of the state's case that
must be established in order to justify punishment. The relevance of evidence must
also be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to ensure the consistent application
of the reasonable doubt standard. The blameworthiness of the accused is the
underlying justification for punishment. Consequently, facts necessary to establish
legal guilt but not pertinent to blameworthiness need not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in terms of the presumption of innocence, which reflects society's
component of a fair trial"; R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 (SCC) 212 where Dickinson CJC
described the presumption of innocence as "a hollowed principle lying at the very heart of criminal
law"; S v Coetzee 1997 3 SA 527 (CC) § [122] 584C-D where Madala J held the view that the
presumption of innocence "plays a pivotal role in our criminal justice system"; S v Mbatha; S v
Prinsloo 19962 SA 464 (CC) § [19] 475E-F; R v Britz 19493 SA 293 (A) 302.
185 S vManamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) § [26] 16F-17A.
186 S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo 20004 SA 1078 (CC).
187 § [11] 1092C. This view is in line with the Canadian decision of R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th)
200 (SCC) where Dickinson CJC, opined that "[t]he presumption of innocence protects the
fundamental liberty and dignity of every person accused by the state ... ".
188 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Commentary on the Constitution of the Republic
o~South Africa (1998) 321.
I 9 See for example S v Boesak 2001 1 SA 912 (CC) § [16] 920E; S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996
1 SA 388 (CC) § [19] 396A; Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape; S v Coetzee 1997 2 SA
368 (CC) § [7] 3731-J; S v Baloyi (Minister of Justice and Another Intervening) 2000 2 SA 425
(CC) § [15] 434E; S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) §
[26] 16F; S v Strauss 19955 BCLR 623 (0) 6281
190 S vManamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) § [26] 16F.
191 Chaskalson "Evidence" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz, Woolman
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 26-8.
192 Schwikkard Presumption of Innocence (1999) 83-84.
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tolerance of erroneous acquittals in an attempt to ensure that only the blameworthy
are convicted. However, there may be circumstances where the value given to other
rights demands that the reasonable doubt rule be applied independently of the
presumption of innocence. The constitutional right to be presumed innocence (sic) is
specified in relation to the right to a fair trial. It therefore does not apply to
proceedings outside the definition of a criminal trial. However, when imprisonment
as a form of punishment is a possible result of 'other proceedings' the residual
content of the s 12(1) right to freedom and security, requiring procedural fairness,
may well require the application of the reasonable doubt standard".
Any rule or provision that either lowers the standard of proof required of the
prosecution or that places a burden of proof on the accused offends against the
presumption of innocence and will have to pass the scrutiny of the limitations
c1ausel93 in order to survive. It should be noted that a distinction can be drawn
between provisions that place an evidentiary burden on the accused 194 as opposed
to provisions that place a burden of proof on the accused or that create a rebuttable
presumption oflaw.195
The Constitutional Court has, on a number of occasions, been asked to consider the
constitutional validity of so-called "reverse onus provisions" .196 The reverse onus
provisions most often take on the form of a rebuttable presumption of law which
requires certain facts to be assumed until the contrary has been proven.l'" This
means that the presumed fact is taken as proven unless it is disproved on a balance
of probabilities. The reverse onus provisions relieve the prosecution of proving all
the elements of the charge beyond reasonable doubt and therefore lower the
standard of proof required of the prosecution. The result is that a finding of guilty
may follow in cases where reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused exists,
but where the accused has failed to disprove the presumed fact. This infringes the
right to be presumed innocent. 198 Although the court in Zuma 199 was at pains to
point out that not all reverse onus provisions would be unconstitutional, the
193 S 36 Constitution.
194 S v Zuma 19952 SA 642 (CC) § [41] 657H.
195 Chaskalson in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 26-9.
196 See for example S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC); S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388
(CC); S v Julies 19962 SACR 108 (CC); Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape; S v Coetzee
19972 SA 368 (CC); S v Coetzee 19974 BCLR 437 (CC); S v Ntsele 19972 SACR 740 (CC); S v
Mello 19983 SA 712 (CC).
197 Chaskalson in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 26-9.
198 Snyekers in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 27-85; Chaskalson in Chaskalson et al
(eds) Constitutional Law 26-9; Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 322.
199 S v Zuma 19952 SA 642 (CC).
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Constitutional Court in subsequent cases left little room for the justification of a
. 200reverse onus presumption.
Evidential burdens, on the other hand, require the court, upon proof of one fact, to
assume another fact unless there is sufficient evidence to raise doubt about the
truth of the assumed fact. 201The accused is not required to disprove the assumed
fact on a balance of probabilities, but needs merely to adduce evidence that creates
a reasonable doubt about the assumed fact,202 in which case the accused will be
entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Chaskalson+" is of the opinion that evidential
burdens intrude on the presumption of innocence since they require the court to
proceed from the assumption that the assumed fact is true in the absence of
evidence that either supports or contradicts the assumed fact.204 However,
Steytler205 argues, on the basis of the decision in Scagell,206 that a provision which
places an evidential burden on the accused does not violate the right to be
presumed innocent. He argues that such provisions do not create the possibility of
conviction based merely on the inability of the accused to adduce evidence that
creates reasonable doubt about the assumed fact. Therefore, in cases where
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused exists, the fact that the accused has
not succeeded in creating doubt about the assumed fact does not increase the
possibility of conviction. De Waaf07 argues that an evidential burden does not
affect the burden of proof. It seems therefore that he does not view the presumption
of innocence as being infringed by provisions that create a mere evidential burden.
The difficulty in distinguishing between a burden of proof and a mere evidentiary
burden can be illustrated with reference to proposed amendments with regard to the
definition of the crime of rape, as included in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences)
200 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 4th ed (2001) 634. S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 842
(CC); S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso 1996 1 SA 388 (CC); S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 19962 SA 464
(CC); S v Julies 19962 SACR 108 (CC); Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape; S v Coetzee
19972 SA 368 (CC); S v Ntsele 19972 SACR 740 (CC); S v Mello 19983 SA 712 (CC).
201 Chaskalson in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 26-9.
202 De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 631.
203 Chaskalson in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 26-10.
204 Chaskalson in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 26-10.
205 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 322.
206 Scagell v Attorney-General, Western Cape; S v Coetzee 1997 2 SA 368 (CC).
207 De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 631.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 36
Amendment Bill.208 At common law, the crime of rape consists of a man having
unlawful intentional sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent.209
Therefore, the absence of consent is an element of the crime and must be proved by
the prosecution. Section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment
Bilf10 states that an act of penetration is prima facie unlawful if committed in
coercive circumstances, under false pretences, by fraudulent means or in respect of
a person who is incapable in law of appreciating the nature of the act which causes
penetration. Therefore, unlawfulness will be presumed if one of these
circumstances is proved by the prosecution. This in itself does not create a
problem, since it is clear that the prosecution is still required to prove the
unlawfulness of the action, by proving the existence of one of the circumstances
mentioned in the Bill. The only thing required of the accused is to create doubt as
to the truth of the assumed fact. However, it was clear that the Commission had in
mind that the accused must prove the defence of consent. This can be seen from the
comments made by the Law Commissiorr'!' where is was opined that
"[0 ]nce unlawfulness is established by proof that the rape took place in certain
circumstances the onus must be on the accused to prove his or her defence, which
may, or may not, be based on consent as a justification for his or her actions"
Therefore, it appears that the Law Commission has in mind that the accused must
prove any defence alleged by him or her, but the wording of section 2(2) places
nothing more than an evidential onus on the accused.212
Having had regard to the comments made by, inter alia, Van der Merwe and
Schwikkard.t'" the Law Commission was satisfied that section 2(2) places no more
than an evidential burden on the accused. Therefore, if the court is satisfied that the
prosecution has not succeeded in proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it is
possible for the accused to be acquitted despite not having adduced evidence.
Nonetheless, the Commission found it necessary to mention that the proposals do
208B50-2003.
209MiltonSouth African Criminal Law and Procedure (Volume II) (1996) 435.
210 B50-2003.
211SA Law Commission Sexual Offences: The Substantive Law Project 107 Discussion paper 85
(1999) § 3.4.7.3.8.
212Van der Merwe "Redefining rape: Does the Law Commission really wish to introduce a reverse
onus?" 2001 SACJ 66.
213SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Project 107 Report (2002) Chapter 333.
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not alter the standard of proof required when the accused adduces evidence in
rebuttal, and recommended that section 2(9) be inserted in the Bill. Section 2(9)
reads:
"Nothing in this section may be construed as ... [adjusting] the standard of proof
required for adducing evidence in rebuttal."
Despite unlawfulness being presumed after the proof of certain circumstances, the
accused needs do no more than create doubt as to his guilt. The burden will still be
on the prosecution to disprove any defence raised by the accused, including a
defence based on consent.i" The right of the accused to be presumed innocent
will, therefore, not be infringed by the incorporation of section 3(2) in the Bill.
3 2 2 The right to a public trial before an ordinary court
Although section 35(3)(c) should be seen as a unit requiring the right to a public
trial before an ordinary court, the two components "public trial" and "ordinary
court" will be discussed separately.
3221 Public trial
In the 1924 case of R v Sussex Judges, Ex Parte McCarthy,215 Lord Hewart
succinctly described the reasons for the requirement that a criminal trial should be
a public trial when he said: "Justice must not only be done, but must manifestly be
seen to be done".
Section 35(3)(c) guarantees, as part of the right to a fair trial, the accused's right to
a public trial. This guarantee is also reflected in section 152 of the Criminal
Procedure ACt.216 Section 152 requires that, unless otherwise provided for by the
Act, criminal proceedings must take place in an open court. This requirement stems
from the need to ensure the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and is an
important safeguard of impartiality. 217 The court in K v Regional Court Magistrate
N0218 expressed the view that the requirement of a public trial amounts to the
214 Schwikkard Presumption of Innocence 19.
215 [1924] 1 KB 256259.
21651 of 1977.
217 De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 622.
2181996 (1) SACR 434 (E) 447b.
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constitutionalisation of the long-recognised principle of transparency in criminal
proceedings.i'" The purpose of a public trial, according to the court, is to enable
the public to be fully informed of the evidence so that the judgement of the court
can be properly evaluated.22o
The right to a public trial is not absolute. There are exceptions to the requirement
ofa public trial. Section 153 of the Criminal Procedure Act221contains a number of
exceptions to the requirement of a public trial. It empowers a court in which
criminal proceedings are pending to deviate from the requirement of a public trial
if it appears to the court that it would be in the interests of the security of the State
or good order or public morals or the administration of justice. In such cases the
court may order that the proceedings be held behind closed doors or it may direct
that the public or any class of the public may not be present at the trial. In
circumstances specified in the act the court also has the discretion to direct that
certain witnesses may testify behind closed doors or that the identity of the witness
may not be revealed.222
In an obiter dictum the court in Nel v Le Roux Nd23 remarked that there are "well-
recognised exceptions in our criminal procedure to the general rule that criminal
proceedings are to be conducted in open COurt".224The court cited section 153 of
the Criminal Procedure Act225 as an example. Although in practice appeals are
heard in open court, it is not required by the section 35(3)(c) right.226
219 See S v Leepile (1) 19862 SA 333 (W); S v Baleka (2) 19864 SA 200 (T); Botha v Minister van
Wet en Orde 19903 SA 937 (W).
220447b.
22151 of 1977.
222 Ss 153(2) and 153(3).
223 Nel v Le Roux NO 19963 SA 562 (CC).
224 § [17] 573A-B.
22551 of 1977.
226 See S v Pennington 19974 SA 1076 (CC).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICfIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 39
3222 Ordinary courts
Section 165(2) of the Constitution requires the courts to be independent and apply
the law impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. An "ordinary" court is
therefore a court that complies with this requirement.V'
In President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football
Union228 the Constitutional Court formulated the test for impartiality as follows:
"The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the
correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to
persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the
apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the Judges to
administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by
reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed that they can disabuse
their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or predispositions. They must take into
account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged
to recuse themselves. At the same time, it must never be forgotten that an impartial
Judge is a fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer should not
hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are reasonable grounds on the part of the
litigant for apprehending that the judicial officer, for whatever reasons, was not or
will not be impartial."
As similar approach was followed in S v Roberti29 where the Supreme Court of
Appeal found that a suspicion that the judicial officer might be biased must
exist,230 and the suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds. The suspicion
must also be that of a reasonable person in the position of the accused or litigant
and that such a reasonable person must in fact have such a suspicion.v"
Both these decisions were accepted by the Constitutional Court in South African
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Irvin & Johnson Ltd.232
227 Snyekers in Chaskalson et al (eds) Constitutional Law 27-68 - 27-69.
228 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 19994 SA 147
(CC) § [48] 177B.
229 19994 SA 915 (A).
230 The court does not require that there must be suspicion that the presiding officer would be
biased, but merely that he or she might be biased.
231 The fact that the reasonable person might have such a suspicion in insufficient. It is required that
the suspicion must in fact exist.
232 South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods
Division Fish Processing) 2000 3 SA 705 (CC) § [13] 714B.
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3 2 3 The right to be present when tried
Section 35(3)(e) guarantees the right of the accused to be present when being tried.
The purpose of this right can be traced back to the need for the effective exercise of
the right to challenge and adduce evidence and other active defence rights?33
These rights are inextricably linked. The right to be present when being tried is not
new to the South African law, since section 158(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Ace34 requires that "except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act or any
other law, all criminal proceedings in any court shall take place in the presence of
the accused". This provision is peremptory - the accused must as a rule be present
at all times.235 Moreover, the right requires that there be a confrontation: the
accused must be able to see the witnesses and the witnesses must testify in the
presence of the accused.236
Certain exceptions to this rule are created in the Criminal Procedure Act. Section
159, for example, provides that the trial may proceed in the absence of the accused
where the accused, through his behaviour, makes the continuance of the
proceedings in his presence impracticable.
Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act also creates a number of exceptions to
the rule. In terms of section 158(2)(a) a court may, mero motu or on application of
the prosecution, the accused or a witness, order that a witness or the accused testify
via closed circuit television or similar electronic device. Section 158(2)(a) requires
that the accused or the witness must consent to this. Section 158(3) stipulates that
the court may only make such an order if the facilities are readily available and it
seems that the order will prevent unreasonable delay, save costs, be in the interests
of the security of the State or of public safety or justice or the public, or prevent the
likelihood that prejudice or harm is suffered by any person as a result of being
present at such proceedings. Section 158 is discussed in paragraph 6.3 below.
233 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 294.
234 51 of 1977.
235 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra: Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 6th ed (2002) 415.
236 See for example R v Molatla 1975 1 SA 814 (T).
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In terms of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Ace37 the court may , m
certain circumstances, order that a child give evidence through an intermediary and
that the witness give his evidence in a separate room. Section 170A(3)(c) requires
that the court and any person whose participation in the trial is necessary must be
able to see and hear the witness during his testimony. Therefore, there is no
confrontation in the strict sense of the word, since the witness will not be in a
position to see the accused and will therefore not testify in the physical presence of
the accused.i"
3 2 4 The right to challenge and adduce evidence
The right to challenge and adduce evidence is inextricably linked with the right to
be present when being tried, since the presence of the accused at the trial ensures
that the accused has a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence of state
witnesses. Section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution guarantees the right of the accused
to challenge and adduce evidence. The purpose of the right to challenge and
adduce evidence forms the essence of the criminal trial in the sense that it
incorporates the audi alteram partem rule.239
The right to challenge and adduce evidence is a composite right, rather than two
separate rights. For example, through cross-examination the accused can challenge
the evidence of witnesses called by the prosecution while eliciting favourable
evidence from those witnesses.f''" The adducing of evidence by the accused
normally has the sole purpose of challenging the evidence brought by the state. It is
clear that a meaningful right to challenge and adduce evidence is dependent on,
first, the right to cross-examine witnesses'"' and, secondly, the freedom to call
witnesses.242
23751 of 1977.
238 See infra § 6.4 for a discussion on s 170A.
239 Steytier Constitutional Criminal Procedure 346.
240 Pretorius Cross-examination in South African Law (1997) 90-92.
241 K v Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 (1) SACR 434 (E). See also Van der Merwe "Cross-
examination of the (sexually abused) child witness in a constitutional adversarial system: Is the
South African intermediary the solution" 1995 Obiter 16.
242 Ss 196(1)(a) and 151(1) Criminal Procedure Act.
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3241 The right to challenge evidence and cross-examine
Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that a witness in criminal
proceedings must give his evidence viva voce. This principle is essential to the
right to cross-examine.Y' In terms of section 166( 1) of the Criminal Procedure Act
the accused has the right to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution or
a co-accused. Where the accused is unrepresented, the court is obliged to inform
the accused of his right to cross-examine the witness.244 This information must be
given to the accused before the witness commences with his testimony in chief.245
However, the right to cross-examine is not absolute. Certain common law and
statutory limitations are of necessity placed on the right of the accused to cross-
examine a witness.246
One such example is the discretion that the court has to disallow questions that are
irrelevant, misleading, vexatious, abusive, oppressive or discourteous.r'" InKlink v
Regional Court Magistrati48 Melunsky J found that
"[v]ital as the right to cross-examination may be, it is not an absolute right, for the
trial court retains a discretion to disallow questioning which is irrelevant, unduly
repetitive, oppressing or otherwise improper".
A limitation can also be found in section 166(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 249
In terms of section 166(3) the court may request the cross-examiner to disclose the
relevancy of any particular line of examination and may impose reasonable limits
in cases where it appears to the court that the cross-examination is being protracted
unreasonably and is causing the proceedings to be delayed unreasonably. Section
166(3) does not violate the right of the accused to challenge evidence, but merely
243 SteytIer Constitutional Criminal Procedure 347. See also Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 427 and
the authority cited there.
244 S v Khambule 1991 2 SACR 277 (W).
245;Sv Raphatle 1995 2 SACR 452 (T) 456g. and the Namibian case of S v Wellington 1991 1
SACR 144 (Nm) 149f
246 Some of these limitations which pertain particularly to the prosecution of sexual offenders
aRainst children will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.
24 S v Mayiya 19973 BCLR 386 (c); S v Sella 1993 1 SACR 497 (0); S v Gidi 19844 SA 537 (C);
Tshona v Regionnal Court Magistrate, Uitenhage 2001 8 BCLR 860 (E).
248K v Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 1 SACR 434 (E).
24951 of 1977. Sub-section (3) was inserted by s 8 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 86 of 1996.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRlAL RIGHTS 43
gives further form to the court's common law discretion of controlling
unreasonable questioning.v'"
Further limitations that are placed on the right of an accused to cross-examine
concern the content of the cross-examination and the evidence that the cross-
examiner is seeking to elicit. Evidence that is inadmissible cannot, for example, be
elicited during cross-exarnination.Y'
Questions regarding confrontation as part of the right to cross-examination have
been raised. In particular, questions have been asked about the constitutionality of
section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act.252These questions will be dealt with
in chapter 5 with specific reference to evidence in child sexual abuse cases.
Attention will also be given to hearsay evidence and the effect thereof on the right
to challenge and adduce evidence.
3242 The right to adduce evidence
The right to adduce evidence implies that the accused must be given the
opportunity to call witnesses in his defence. This right is one of the core principles
of the adversarial criminal justice process.253 In terms of section 151(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Act,254the accused may call witnesses in his defence255 and in
terms of section 196 of the same Act the accused may elect to testify in his own
defence.f" Where the accused is unrepresented, the court must inform the accused
250 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 348. For a general discussion see Van der Merwe
"Regterlike Inkorting van Kruisondervraging: 'n gemeenregtelike, statutêre en grondwetlike
perspektief' 1997 Stell LR 348.
251 See, for example, S v Nkwanyana 19783 SA 404 (N). See also Isrealsohn v Power NO & Ruskin
NO (J) 19532 SA 499 (W); R v Gibixegu 19594 SA 266 (0); S v Phiri 1973 3 SA 538 (T).
25251 of 1977.
253 See Taylor v Illinois 484 US 400 408 (1988).
25451 of 1977.
255 S 151 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 also indirectly affects the order of defence
witnesses. S 151(1)(b)( i) provides that where the accused indicates that he intends to testify in his
own defence, he must do so before the other witnesses are called on his behalf. The court may,
however, allow the accused to testify after having called other witnesses if there is good reason to
do so.
256 This right is also guaranteed in s 35(3)(h).
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of these rights and the court must ensure that the accused is not prejudiced by his
own inability.257
Although Didcott J in S v Gwala258 held that the "accused has an absolute right to
call the witness" which is not "qualified in any way", 259the right to call witnesses
is neither unlimited nor absolute. At common law, the accused is not allowed to
offer testimony that is irrelevant or where the prejudicial effect of the testimony
outweighs the probative value.26o For example, evidence of the previous sexual
history of the complainant in a sexual offence case, can, in terms of section 227 of
the Criminal Procedure Act only be led with permission of the court and then only
when the probative value of such evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect thereof.
Furthermore, the right of a co-accused to remain silent can place limitations on the
right of the accused to call witnesses in the sense that a witness who would, but for
the fact that he is a co-accused, have been available to offer exculpatory evidence
on behalf of the accused, may choose to exercise his own right to remain silent and
therefore not offer the evidence.i'"
3 3 Conclusion
In this chapter it has been shown that fair trial rights have been part of South
African law for a long time. They have withstood changes in society and are
generally accepted. All procedural rules and rules of evidence that affect accused
persons must be tested against the fair trial rights of the accused, for it is in the
upholding of the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of the accused that the
integrity of the criminal justice system lies.
257 See Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 385 for a discussion on the obligations of the Court in this
regard.
258 19894 SA 937 (N) 938G.
259939B.
260 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 356 and the authority cited there.
261 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 357 and the authority cited there.
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4 1 Introduction262
In recent years attention has increasingly been drawn to the plight of crime victims
in South Africa, especially in so far as their participation in the criminal justice
process is concemed.i'" Victims' rights advocates point out that not only does the
position of the crime victim compare unfavourably to that of their counterparts in
other jurisdictions.i'" but it also compares particularly unfavourably to the position
of alleged offenders in the South African Law.265In this regard, Meintjies-van der
Walt writes that "current victim support strategies are uncoordinated, inadequate,
and when in existence, limited and under-utilised.,,266 The lack of expressly (or
constitutionally) guaranteed victims' rights leads to the conclusion that the criminal
justice process is offender-orientated.P" For this reason there has been a general
call for the improvement of the role and rights of crime victims in South Africa.268
262 Itmust be pointed out that due to the limited scope of this study, it is unfortunately impossible to
cover the body of research relating to victims' rights in its entirety. This section will therefore be
limited to a brief discussion of the concept of victims' rights and victims' rights in South Africa.
Brief mention will, however, be made of the recognition of victims' rights in international
instruments and in other jurisdictions. This will be limited to examples which illustrate certain
~oints.
63 For a general discussion see Camerer "Victims and Criminal Justice" 1997 Institute for Security
Studies Monograph 12 Policing the Transformation; Garkawe "Enhancing the role and rights of
crime victims in the South African justice system - an Australian perspective" 2001 SA CJ 131;
Meintjies-van der Walt "Towards victim's empowerment strategies in the criminal justice process"
1998 SACJ 157; Kgosimore "The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
and its application in the criminal justice system" 2000 Crime Research in South Africa; Moolman
"Victims' rights in Anglo-American and continental European countries: What can South Africa
learn?" 1997 SACJ 273; Visser & Potgieter "Some critical comments on South Africa's Bill of
Fundamental Human Rights" 1994 THRHR 493; Moolman "Rights of crime victims in South
Africa: An evaluation and future prospects" 1997Acta Criminologica 199767; Snyman "The victim
impact statement as a means of addressing the victim's needs for rights" 1995 Acta Criminologica
30.
264 Camerer 1997 Institute for Security Studies Monograph 12; Moolman 1997 SA CJ 273ft·
Garkawe 2001 SA CJ 131ff; Moolman 1997 Acta Criminologica 67ff.
265 Camerer 1997 Institute for Security Studies Monograph 12; Garkawe 2001 SA CJ 131; Meintjies-
van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157; Kgosimore 2000 Crime Research in South Africa, Moolman 1997
SACJ 273; Visser & Potgieter 1994 THRHR 493; Moolman 1997 Acta Criminologica 67; Snyman
1995 Acta Criminologica 30.
266 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157 158.
267 Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157 158;
268 For a general discussion see Camerer 1997 Institute for Security Studies Monograph 12;
Garkawe 2001 SACJ 131; Meintjies-van der Walt 1998 SACJ 157; Kgosimore 2000 Crime
Research in South Africa; Moolman 1997 SACJ 273; Visser & Potgieter 1994 THRHR 493;
MoolmanActa Criminologica 199767; Snyman 1995 Acta Criminologica 30.
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42 Grounds for victims' rights
Criminologists advance a number of different arguments in support of the
recognition and protection of the rights of victims of crime. While the nature of
this study does not justify an in-depth discussion of all these arguments, some need
to be examined from a legal point of view.
Historically the penal system developed from one of private vengeance to one of
state-administered justice.i'" This resulted in the victim's role being reduced to a
secondary role,27o in which the victim has virtually no say in the decision-making
process regarding the offender's fate.271 In the adversarial model of criminal
justice, such as the one used in South Africa, a sexual offence, like any other
crime, is considered to be a crime against the state and not against the individual
victim of the crime.272Therefore, the victim of the sexual offence is considered to
be no more than a state witness, whose role in the criminal justice process is
limited to testifying for the state and providing part or all of the evidence necessary
for the state to secure a conviction.Y' Exclusion of the victim during the
investigation and trial phases leads to alienation and powerlessness.F'" which is
said to cause the public's negative perception of the criminal justice process.i"
It is also argued that the criminal justice system shows excessive concern for the
rights of the accused person,276 which results in the needs of victims being
neglected.277 This, in turn, leads to dissatisfaction and frustration on the part of
269 Snyman 1995 Acta Criminologica 30.
270 Snyman 1995 Acta Criminologica 30.
271 Moolman 1997 SACJ273.
272 Fryer "Law versus prejudice: views on rape through the centuries" 1994 SACJ 77.
273 Symonds "The Second Injury" in Kivens (ed) Evaluation and Change: Services for Survivors
(1980) 36-38; Moolman 1997 SACJ 273; Christie "Conflicts as property" 1977 B. J. ofCrim 17;
Shapland "Victims, the criminal justice system and compensation" 1984 B. 1. Crim 24.
274 Garkawe 2001 SACJ 131 134; Camerer "What about the victims? Suggested changes in the
criminal justice system with the aim of promoting a more victim-centric approach" 1999 De Rebus
22.
275 Naude "Dealing with the victims of crime - the role of the legal profession" 1997 Consultus 57.
276 Moolman 1997 SACJ 273; Moolman 1997 Acta Criminologica 67; Meintjies-van der Walt 1998
SACJ 157 158; see in general Kgosimore 2000 Crime Research in South Africa where the position
of the victim is compared with the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of the accused.
277 Davis & Saffy "Young witnesses: experiences of court support and court preparation officials"
2004 Acta Criminologica 17.
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victims.278 It has, for example, been argued that, m the absence of expressly
recognised rights for victims of crime, the constitutional entrenchment of fair trial
rights of the accused has created an inequality between the accused and the
victim.279
An example of this is the lack of court preparation of the victim-witness. While the
accused are usually well prepared by their legal representatives, victim-witnesses
are largely left to their own devices and must therefore cope with the unfamiliar
court procedure and legal jargon on their own.280 This increases the stress of the
victim-witness and can result in secondary victimisation and the acquittal of the
accused as a result of blunders made by the victim during his evidence.
Kgoismore points out that, while the accused is entitled to be present when being
tried,281 the victim's presence in court is required only for the purpose of giving
evidence, which means that the victim may not be aware of the eventual outcome
of the case.282 He goes on to argue that the accused's right to challenge and adduce
evidence favours the accused over the victim, who has no such right.283
Victims' rights advocates are concerned that the victim's involvement m the
criminal justice system may result in secondary victimisation.284 In the aftermath of
initial victimisation, it is argued that repeated questioning by police officials285 and
other criminal justice professionalsi'" further traumatises victims. Questioning by
defence counsel aimed at humiliating witnesses and undermining their credibility is
said to contribute to the victim's view of the criminal justice system as being
278 Clark, Davis & Booysens "A silver era for victims of crime: Reassessing the role that victim
impact statements can play in improving victim involvement in criminal justice procedures" 2003
Acta Criminologica 43; Camerer 1999 De Rebus 22.
279 Kgosimore 2000 Crime Research in South Africa. The discussion of Kgosimore unfortunately
looses sight of the fundamental difference between the position of the accused and that of the
victim. The discussion is therefore used only as an illustration of arguments advanced in favour of
recognition of rights for victims of crime.
280 Kgosimore 2000 Crime Research in South Africa;
281 S 35(3)(e) Constitution.
282 S 35(3)(e) Constitution.
283 S 35(3)(e) Constitution.
284 Garkawe 2001 SACJ 131 134; Camerer 1999 De Rebus 22.
285 Clark et al2003 Acta Criminologica 43.
286 Garkawe 2001 SACJ 131 134.
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stressful and disruptive.t'" Further factors that contribute to the negative
experience of victims who become involved in the criminal justice system include
delays in completion of the trial, loss of wages due to the postponement of
proceedings and poor protection against intimidation.
Recognition of victims' rights will necessarily result in increased victim
participation in the criminal justice process. This, it is argued, will reduce the risk
of secondary victimization.288 It is also argued that victim participation will lead to
the recognition of the victim as a party to the dispute,289 which, in tum, will
improve victim co-operation and ultimately the efficiency of the criminal justice
system.i'"
Although increased victim participation could have its advantages, there are also
disadvantages inherent in allowing victim participation in the criminal justice
process. Apart from the negative impact it could have on the Due Process fair trial
rights of the accused.i" increased victim participation could burden the victim
while raising his expectations unrealistically.Y'
Since few of these arguments are controversial, it can be accepted that victims'
rights should be protected. The issue is, however, to what extent this should be
done. This question will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
43 Classification of victims' rights
When considering the recognition of victims' rights, it is important to note that
these rights can, apart from the fundamental rights issue, function on two distinct
levels, namely at extra-trial level and at trial level. At extra-trial level it is possible
to distinguish between different types of victims' rights: the right to receive
support, the right to have a complaint thoroughly investigated and the right to
287 Lurigio, Skogan & Davis Victims of Crime: Problems, Policies and Programs (1990) 60;
Symonds in Kivens (ed) Evaluation and Changes 36.
288 Zedner "Victims" in Maguire, Morgan & Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology 2nd
ed (1997) 601.
289 Chirstie 1977 B. 1. Crim 1-15.
290 Zedner in Maguire et al (eds) Handbook of Criminology 601.
291 This impact will be discussed in due course.
292 Reeves "The Victim and Reparation" 1984 Probation Journal 136-139.
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information concerning the investigation and prosecution of the alleged offender.
The right to receive support functions at three different stages, namely pre-trial
support, (ie, support during the investigation phase), support during the trial phase
and post-trial support.
At trial level victims' rights can either be classified as participation rights or
protection rights. At this level, participation rights can be sub-divided into the right
to participate during bail proceedings, the right to participate during plea and
sentencing agreements, the right to participate during the trial of the alleged
offender, the right to instruct a legal representative to hold a watching brief, the
right to participate during the sentencing phase of the trial and the right to
participate at parole hearings. The right to institute private prosecution can also be
classified as a participation right on trial level.
The following diagram illustrates the classification of Victims' rights:
Victims' Rights
Victim s'Rights
Investigation
Extra Trial Level
Supor! &
Protection
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4 3 1 Fundamental rights
Chapter 2 of the Constitution=" contains the Bill of Rights which entrenches a
number of fundamental human rights. Section 7(2) places a positive duty on the
state to protect, promote and fulfil the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. While
section 10 entrenches the individual's right to dignity, sections 11 and 14
respectively entrench the right to life and the right to pnvacy. Section 12
entrenches the right to freedom and security of the person and, in terms of section
12(1)(c), everyone has the to be free from all forms of violence, irrespective of
whether the source of violence is public or private. The state is therefore under a
positive obligation to protect individuals from violence.i'"
In S v Basson295 the Constitutional Court, per Ackermann J, expressed the view
that
"[i]n our constitutional State the criminal law plays an important role in protecting
constitutional rights and values. So, for example, the prosecution of murder is an
essential means of protecting the right to life, and the prosecution of assault and rape
a means of protecting the right to bodily integrity. The State must protect these rights
through, amongst other things, the policing and prosecution of crime.,,296
Therefore, the fundamental rights of crime victims and potential victims of crime
are already protected by the enactment and enforcement of the criminal law.i'"
432 Extra-trial level
4321 Support and protection
Several provisions envisage support for victims at various stages in the criminal
justice process. For example, section 3 of the Probation Services Act298 empowers
the Minister to establish programmes which are aimed at the assessment, care,
treatment, support, referral for and provision of mediation in respect of the victims
293108 of 1996.
294See also S v Chapman 19973 SA 341 (A).
2952004 1 SACR 285 (CC).
2962004 1 SACR 285 (CC) § [31] 302b-c.
297 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies
Intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) §§ [61]-[62] 963H-965B.
298116 of 1991.
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of crime.299However, this provision does not envisage an improvement of the role
of the victim within the criminal justice process as such, but is aimed at the
treatment and support of such victims on an extra-trial level. As far as can be
established the Minister has not as yet made use of the powers granted in the
Probation Services Act. 300
Similarly, section 191A of the Criminal Procedure Aceol empowers the Minister to
make regulations relating to the assistance of and support to witnesses at courts,302
the establishment of reception centres for such witnesses.i'" the counselling of
witnesses=" and any other matter which the Minister deems expedient to prescribe
in order to provide services to witnesses at courtS.305However, as yet no such
regulations have been made.
In terms of the Witness Protection Act,306a witness may apply to be placed under
protection if he has reason to believe that his safety is threatened by reason of him
being a witness. Should the application be successful, the witness is held in
protective custody during the period of testimony at the trial and, if necessary, is
assisted in resettlement at the end of the trial.
In its 2002 Report on Sexual Offences307 the South African Law Commission
accepted that protection of victims in general fell outside the scope of their
investigation. However, certain recommendations with regard to the position of the
victims of sexual were made. For example, the Commission recommended that
persons308 who sustained injuries, be it physical, psychological or other injuries,
should be entitled to treatment at state expense. "Treatment" is, owever, not
limited to medical treatment. The Commission also recommended that a statutory
duty be placed on medical and other health care professionals to advise the victim
299 S 3(1)(d) as inserted by the Probation Services Amendment Act 35 of2002.
300 116 of 1991.
30151 of 1977.
302 S 191A(2)(b).
303 S 191A(2)(a).
304 S 191A(2)(c).
305 S 191A(2)(d).
306 112 of 1998.
307 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Project 107 Report (2002).
308 In this respect "person" can include not only the victim, but also any other family member who
suffered injury as a result of the sexual offence.
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of certain sexual offences of the possibility of being tested for sexual transmitted
infections as well as their access to treatment and care.309
Since most of these provisions have not been implemented, it is uncertain whether
they have any practical value.
4322 Investigation
Every citizen has the right to have a complaint investigated thoroughly by the
South African Police Service and, if they are not satisfied with the way in which
their complaint is being dealt, they are free to complain to the Independent
Complaints Directorate.Ï'" In this respect victims' rights are therefore recognised.
4323 Information
There are no provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act3)) obliging the state to
provide information about the case to the victim or complainant. But the Promotion
of Access to Information Ace)2 can be used to obtain such information. In terms of
section 11 this Act a requester may be given access to a record of a public body if
the request complies with all the procedural requirements set in the Act. "Public
body" is defined as
"(a) any department of state or administration in the national or provincial
sphere of government or any municipality in the local sphere of
government; or
(b) any other functionary of institution when -
(i) exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in
terms of any legislation".
Since section 179(5) of the Constitution and section 20 of the National Prosecuting
Authority Ace)3 empower the prosecuting authority to institute criminal
proceedings on behalf of the state, it is clear that the provisions of the Promotion of
309 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 6.3.3.
310 S 53 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995.
31151 of 1977.
3122 of 2001.
31332 of 1998.
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Access to Information Act314 must apply to the prosecuting authority as a public
body.
It must be noted that "record" in the Act refers only to recorded information.
Therefore, once information has been recorded, in any form whatsoever, the
requester may gain access to such record in terms of the Act. However, raw
information is not covered by the Ace 15 and therefore a request to create or
compile a record that does not already exist does not qualify as a "request for a
record" as contemplated in the ACt.316
In terms of Chapter 4 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act317 certain
grounds are laid down in terms of which a public body may refuse to grant access
to the requested records. In terms of section 34 of the Act the privacy of third
parties is protected. This provision obliges the information officer of a public body
to refuse access to information that would involve the unreasonable disclosure of
personal information about the third party. This does not, however, apply to
information which is already publicly available.i'" nor does it apply to information
given to the public body by the person to whom it relates after having been
informed that the information may be made available to the public.319
Section 39 of the Act relates to the mandatory protection of police dockets in bail
proceedings, and the protection of law enforcement and legal proceedings. In terms
of this section a request for access to records may be denied if the prosecution of
an alleged offender is being prepared, is about to commence or is pending, and the
disclosure of the record could reasonably be expected to impede the prosecutiorr"
or would result in a miscarriage of justice. 321 Likewise, a request may be denied if
31420f2001.
315Currie & Klaaren The Promotion of Access to Information Act Commentary (2002) 41
316Currie & Klaaren AlA 41
31720f2001.
318 S 34(2)(c).
319S 34(2)(b).
320 S 39(2)(b )(ii)(aa).
321 S 39(2)(b)(ii)(bb).
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disclosure of the record could reasonably be expected to prejudice or impair the
fairness of a trial or the impartiality of an adjudication.r"
Although, in principle, the Promotion of Access to Information Ace23 can be used
by the complainant or victim to obtain information about the case against the
alleged offender, this solution is not without its problems. For example, the
requestor may be required to pay access fees in terms of section 22(6) of the Act.
This will necessarily hamper such requests where the victim is indigent.
Furthermore, information regarding the rights created in the Act may not be readily
available to potential requestors and therefore, despite the existence of the
provisions, access to information may be limited.
In an attempt to accommodate the victim of a sexual offence section 9 of the
Namibian Combating of Rape Ace24 places two specific duties on the prosecutor in
sexual offence cases. First, the prosecutor must ensure that all relevant information
has been obtained from the complainant. This includes the duty to obtain
information relevant to the question of whether the accused should be granted bail
and, if so, whether any bail conditions should be imposed.325 Second, the
prosecutor is tasked with the duty to provide to the complainant all information
that is "necessary to lessen the impact of the trial on the complainant". Schedule 1
of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bi1l326 makes provision for
similar rights for victims of sexual offences in South Africa.
4 3 3 Trial level
4 3 3 1 Participation
43311 Bail
In terms of section 60 of the Criminal Procedure Ace27 an accused may be released
on bail of the court is satisfied that the interests of justice permit his release. As a
322S 39(2)(b)(iii)(ee).
32320f2001.
3248 of 2000.
325 S 9(a).
326B50-2003.
32751 of 1977.
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general rule the onus rests on the prosecution to prove that the interests of justice
do not permit the release of the accused.328 Where the accused is charged with an
offence listed in schedules 5 or 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act329 the onus is on
the accused to prove that in the case of a schedule 5 offence, the interests of justice
permit his release330 or, in the case of a schedule 6 offence, that there are
exceptional circumstances which justify his release in the interests of justice.r"
Where a bail application in respect of matters referred to in sections 60(11)(a) and
(b) is not opposed by the prosecution, the prosecution must place its reasons for not
opposing the application on record.332
Section 60(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act333 lists a number of circumstances in
which the interests of justice will not permit the release of the accused. In terms of
section 60(4)(c) the interests of justice do not permit the release of the accused
where there is a likelihood that the accused will attempt to influence or intimidate
the witnesses or to conceal or destroy evidence. Section 60(4)( c) therefore provides
a measure of protection for the victim-witness against the possibility of
intimidation by the accused. Where the victim therefore fears the possibility of
intimidation by the accused he can have such evidence placed before the court by
the prosecution.
Although the Criminal Procedure Ace34 does not make specific provision for the
participation of the victim during bail proceedings, the prosecution may bring any
relevant evidence to the attention of the court. Therefore, the prosecution may
ascertain the views of the victim and place such evidence before the court.
However, the victim does not have the right to oppose the bail application where
the prosecution refuses to do so. Likewise, the victim does not have the right to
have his views made known where the prosecution decides not to place such
328 Du Toit, De Jager, Paizes, Skeen, & Van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure
Act (1987) (Revision Service 30 2003) 9-41.
32951 of 1977.
330 S 60(11 )(b).
331 S 60(11)(a).
332 S 60(2)(d).
33351 of 1977.
33451 of 1977.
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evidence before the court. But a court, acting inquisitorially, may call for the views
of the victim.
Section 12 of the Namibian Combating of Rape Ace35 inserts section 60A in the
Criminal Procedure Act. 336 In terms of this section certain rights are given to the
complainant in a rape case.337 Section 60A(1)(a) gives the complainant the right to
attend any proceedings relating to the granting of bailor the imposition,
amendment or supplementing of bail conditions. Section 60A(1 )(b) makes
provision for indirect participation at bail proceedings. In terms of this section the
complainant has the right to request the prosecutor to present to the court any
information or evidence relevant to the proceedings.
Section 60A(2) places an obligation on the person in charge of the facility where
the accused is being held. In terms of this section such a person must inform the
complainant of the place, date and time of the accused's first appearance in court
as well as the complainant's right to be present at and to participate indirectly in
the proceedings. In terms of section 60A(3) an obligation is placed on the defence
to inform the complainant of an intention to apply for bail on a date and time of
which the complainant has not yet been informed.
Where the complainant is present at bail proceedings and the proceedings are to be
postponed, the court is required to inform him of the date and time to which the
proceedings are to be postponed and to remind him of his right to be present at
those proceedings.t" Where the complainant is not present, the court is required to
enquire into the question whether the complainant of informed of the proceedings.
If the court is satisfied that it is likely that the complainant knows about the
335 8 of 2000.
33651 of 1977.
337 The relevant section specifically states that a "complainant of rape" has the rights listed in the
section. However, S 2(a) of the Act defines "rape" as the intentional committing or continuance of
commission under coercive circumstances of a "sexual act" with another person. "Sexual act" is
defmed as "(a) the insertion (even to the slightest degree) of the penis of a person into the vagina or
anus or mouth of another person or (b) the insertion of any other part of the body of a person or of
any part of the body of an animal or of any object into the vagina or anus or mouth of another
person ... or (c) cunnilingus or any other form of genital stimulation." Therefore, the rights listed in
S 60A will accrue to the victim of any physical sexual offence.
338 S 60A(6).
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proceedings, the proceedings can continue in the absence of the complainant.r'"
Should the court not be satisfied that the complainant has been informed of the
proceedings, the proceedings must be postponed until such. a time as the
complainant's presence can be obtained.I" If, however, it is in the interests of
justice for the matter to be dealt with immediately the court may order that the
proceedings proceed in the absence of the complainant.i"! In deciding whether
such an order will be in the interests of justice, the court must have due regard to
the interests of the complainant. Section 60A(8) places a duty on the prosecutor to
inform the complainant of the outcome of bail proceedings in cases where the
complainant was not present at those proceedings. Section 13 of the Namibian
Combating of Rape Ace42 inserts section 62(2) into the Criminal Procedure ACt.343
In terms of this section the court must, in the case of a charge of rape, add any bail
conditions necessary to ensure that the accused does not make contact with the
complainant.
Similar provisions have been included in schedule 1 of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Amendment Bill.344
43312 Plea and sentencing agreements
In terms of section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act345 a prosecutor may enter
into plea and sentencing agreements with an accused. In terms of such an
agreement an accused will agree to plead guilty either to the offence with which he
is charged or to an offence recognised as a competent lesser verdict to the offence
with which he was charged, in exchange for a just sentence.Ï" or a suspended''V or
a postponed sentence.r" When entering into plea and sentencing agreements with
the accused, the prosecutor has a duty to afford the plaintiff (either in person or
through his representative) the opportunity to make representations regarding
339S 60A(7)(a).
340S 60A(7)(b).
341S 60A(7)(b).
34280f2000.
34351 of 1977.
344B50-2003.
34551 of 1977. S 105A was inserted by the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 62 of2001.
346S 105A(1)(a)(ii)(aa).
347S 105A(1)(a)(ii)(bb) read with S 297(1)(b).
348S 105A(1)(a)(ii)(cc) read with S 297(1)(a).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RlGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRlAL RlGHTS 59
either the content of the agreementf" or the inclusion of a prOVISIon III the
agreement relating to compensation or rendering of benefits to the complainant in
lieu of compensation for pecuniary 10ss.350
Section l05A(1)(b)(ii) provides that the prosecutor may enter into a plea and
sentencing agreement after affording the complainant or his representative an
opportunity of making representations. However, this is qualified by the words
"where it is reasonable to do so and taking' into account the nature of and
circumstances relating to the offence and the interests of the complainant". Despite
this, the complainant or his representatives would be entitled to make
representations to the prosecutor even in the absence of a formal invitation to do
so. These representations should not be ignored by the prosecutor.
Where the court is satisfied that the prosecution indeed consulted with the
investigating officer and that the victim was afforded an opportunity to make
representations, the court must ask the accused to plead to the charge and order that
the contents of the plea and sentencing agreement be disclosed in court.351
It is obvious that victim participation in plea and sentencing agreements seeks to
accommodate the personal interests of the victim. However, its value is not limited
only to this. As Bekker352puts it:
"The other interests advanced by giving the victim a right to participate in the plea
bargain are society's interests. Society benefits from victim participation in plea
bargains in two ways. The first is that according to the victim the right to participate
will result in more information being provided to the decision-maker. The second
benefit which accrues to society from victim participation in plea bargains is that it
promotes the effective functioning of the criminal justice system. The theory is that if
victims are not consulted regarding the plea bargain and so feel irrelevant and
alienated they will not cooperate in reporting and prosecuting a crime. As a result, the
system, which is dependent on them, functions less effectively. Therefore, making
victims feel their contributions critical, regardless of its actual value, will motivate
the victim to continue to report crime and cooperate in its investigation and
prosecution. "
349 S 105A(I)(b)(iii)(aa).
350 S 105A(I)(b)(iii)(aa).
351 S 150A(5) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
352 Bekker "Plea Bargaining in the United States of America and South Africa" 1996 elLSA 168
169
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The provisions of section 105A are therefore aimed at encouragmg victim
participation during plea and sentencing agreements.Y'
43313 Trial
In the adversarial model of the criminal justice process such as the one found in
South Africa, crimes are committed against the state354 and therefore the obligation
to prosecute crime rests with the state.355 The victim of the crime is not a party to
criminal proceedings and is therefore not entitled to active participation in the trial.
However, the victim plays an important role in the prosecution of crime in that the
victim testifies on behalf of the prosecution. In this respect the victim of a crime is,
in principle, a competent and compellable witness for the prosecution.P"
Therefore, where a victim has been subpoenaed to testify, he must do SO.357
43314 Watching brief
It is generally accepted that a person who is not himself a party to proceedings
before the court may appoint a legal representative to hold a so-called "watching
brief'. The task of the legal representative on a watching brief is merely to observe
the proceedings and to report to his client. The legal representative on a watching
brief is not entitled to address the court and is not entitled to call witnesses or
cross-examine witnesses called by the parties to the proceedings. However, there is
nothing that precludes the legal representative who is holding a watching brief to
confer with the prosecution. Therefore, it is possible for the victim of a crime to
appoint a legal representative on a watching brief and in such a way participate,
albeit indirectly, in the proceedings before the court.
Since the victim will be liable for the costs of the legal representative, this does not
provide a workable solution in all cases. Where the victim is affluent, he will be in
353 Directive no 11 of the set of directives issued by the National Director of Public Prosecutions on
14 March 2002 determines that "in the case of homicide, the relatives of the victim are to be
consulted". Therefore, in the case of homicide, "victim" is read to include the relatives of the
deceased victim. This directive therefore seeks to ensure that even in the absence of the "victim"
there should be some sort of "victim participation".
354 Fryer 1994 SACJ77.
355 See S 179(5) Constitution 108 of 1996 and S 20 National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998.
356 S 192 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
357 S 187 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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a position to appoint such a legal representative. However, where the victim is less
affluent or even indigent, this does not provide a solution.
43315 Sentencing
In terms of section 274 of the Criminal Procedure Ace58 the court may receive any
evidence that it deems necessary to inform itself as to the proper sentence to be
passed.359Before sentencing, both the accused and the prosecution may address the
court on the matter of sentencing.Y" In S v Rabie361 the court set out the general
principles of sentencing:
"Punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society, and be
blended with a measure of mercy according to the circumstances."
It has long been held that in deciding on a sentence the court must consider not
only the crime and the interest of the criminal, but also the interests of society.362
Although nothing precludes the submission and acceptance of a victim impact
statement during the sentencing phase of the trial, there are no measures that
require such statements to be submitted. Therefore, it is possible for the
prosecution (or the accused) to submit a victim impact statement during sentencing
proceedings, although neither is compelled to do so.
The South African Law Commission has on a number of occasions had the
opportunity to consider the desirability of admission of victim impact statements.
For example in the Issue Paper on Sentencing: Restorative Justice 363 it was
proposed that impact statements should be generally admissible during sentencing
proceedings.ê'" The proposal was confirmed in a later discussion paper on
Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framewoki''? where the commission found that it
was necessary to include a provision in the Sentencing Framework Bill to formally
recognise the use of victim impact statements during the sentencing phase. In the
35851 of 1977.
359 S 274(a).
360 S 274(b).
361 19754 SA 855 (A) 862G.
362 See, for example, S v Serumala 1978 4 SA 811 (NC) 812A; S v Zinn 19692 SA 537 (A) 540G; S
v J 1998 (2) SA 984 (A) 997A.
363 SA Law Commission Sentencing: Restorative Justice Project 82 Issue Paper 7 (1997).
364 § 4.7.
365 SA Law Commission Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) Project 82 Discussion Paper
91 (2000).
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Sentencing Framework Bill the obligation is placed on the prosecution to consider
the impact of the crime on the victim, while no such obligation is placed on the
COurt.366
It is therefore clear that although there are no specific provisions that allow for the
admission of victim impact statements during the sentencing phase, the prosecution
may bring such a statement to the attention of the court, thereby increasing victim
participation.
The prosecutor plays and important role in assisting the court during the sentencing
phase.367 In this respect Part 31 of Policy Document of the National Prosecuting
Authority lays down certain guidelines for prosecutors. In terms of these guidelines
the prosecutor must, in the case of serious crimes, lead evidence regarding the
impact of the crime on the victim, as well as its impact on the family of the victim
and the community. Where the charge concerned the sexual abuse of a child, the
prosecutor is required to lead evidence about the negative impact of the sexual
abuse on the child.
Therefore, although submission of victim impact statements is not required by
existing legislation, prosecutors are required to lead evidence about the impact of
the crime. One such way would be to submit a victim impact statement.
43316 Parole
In terms of section 75(4) of the Correctional Services Ace68 a complainant or
relative who is entitled in terms of the Criminal Procedure Ace69 to make
representations to or to attend the meeting of the Correctional Supervision and
Parole Board, must be notified in writing when and to whom representations must
be made and when and where the meeting of the Board will take place.
As yet the Criminal Procedure Ace70 has not been amended to make provision for
victim participation during parole proceedings. However, such an amendment is
366 For a discussion see Clark et a/2003 Acta Criminologica 43.
367 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra Strafprosesreg 6th ed (2002) 690.
368 111 of 1998.
36951 of 1977.
37051 of 1977.
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envisaged by section 6 of the Judicial Matters Second Amendment Bill.371 Section
6 envisages the insertion of section 299A in the Criminal Procedure Act.372 Section
299A will read:
"Right of complainant to make representations in certain matters with regard to
placement on parole, on day parole, or under correctional supervision
299A. (1) When a court sentences a person to imprisonment for-
(a) murder or any other offence which involves the intentional killing of a person;
(b) rape;
(c) robbery where the wielding of a fire-arm or any other dangerous weapon or the
infliction of grievous bodily harm or the robbery of a motor vehicle is involved;
(d) assault of a sexual nature;
(e) kidnapping; or
(f) any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit any offence contemplated in
paragraphs (a) to (e),
it shall inform-
(1) the complainant; or
(ii) in the case of murder or any other offence contemplated in paragraph (a), any
immediate relative of the deceased,
ifhe or she is present that he or she has a right, subject to the directives issued by the
Commissioner of Correctional Services under subsection (4), to make representations
when placement of the prisoner on parole, on day parole or under correctional
supervision is considered or to attend any relevant meeting of the parole board.
(2) If the complainant or a relative intends to exercise the right contemplated in
subsection (1) by making representations to or attending a meeting of the parole
board, he or she has a duty-
(i) to inform the Commissioner of Correctional Services thereof in writing;
(ii) to provide the said Commissioner with his or her postal and physical address in
writing; and
(iii) to inform the said Commissioner in writing of any change of address.
(3) The Commissioner of Correctional Services shall inform the parole board in
question accordingly and that parole board shall inform the complainant or relative in
writing when and to whom he or she may make representations or when and where a
meeting will take place."
These provisions will go a long way to increasing victim participation. However, it
is imperative that the view of the victim not be the overriding consideration in the
decision on the granting of parole.
43317 Private prosecution
In terms of section 7(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ace73 any person who "proves
some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the trial arising out of some
injury which he individually suffered in consequence of the commission" of an
offence may institute and conduct a private prosecution of the alleged offender.
371 B 4IB-2003.
372 51 of 1977.
37351 of 1977.
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However, the private individual may only conduct such prosecution in cases where
the National Director of Public Prosecutions has refused to prosecute the alleged
offender and a certificate nolle prosequi has been provided.Y" The process used in
such a case is the same as in the case of state prosecution.
In its 2002 Report on Sexual Offencesi'? the South African Law Commission did
not recommend any changes to the existing legal position. Therefore, victims'
rights in this regard have not been enhanced, but neither have they been reduced.
Although the Criminal Procedure Ace76 provides for the institution of private
prosecution in certain circumstances, it does not markedly improve the position of
victims in general. The reason being that the private prosecutor is required to pay
the costs of the process,377 his own costs and expenses.I" and could in limited
instances, possibly be ordered to pay the costs of the accused should the latter be
acquitted.I" Therefore, this option is open only to the affluent members of society.
4 3 3 2 Protection
43321 Section 153 Criminal Procedure Act
In terms of section 153 of the Criminal Procedure Ace80 the court is-empowered to
order that criminal proceedings or part thereof take place in camera under certain
defined circumstances. For example, where the proceedings relate to a charge of an
indecent act having been committed the court may, at the request of the
complainant or, ifhe is a minor, at the request of his parent or guardian, direct that
any person whose presence is not necessary at the proceedings or any person or
class of persons mentioned in the request, shall not be present at the
374 Phillips v Botha 19992 SA 555 (A).
375 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences.
37651 of 1977.
377 S 14 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
378 S 15( 1) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Where the accused is convicted he may, in terms of
S 15(2) be ordered to pay the costs of the private prosecutor. In certain circumstances the state can
be ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution.
379 S 16 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
38°51 of 1977.
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proceedings.Y' The court may also direct that proceedings take place in camera
where there is a likelihood that the witness may suffer harm if he testifies.382
Therefore, it can be said that the provisions of section 153 of the Criminal
Procedure Act383 are aimed at protecting witnesses from possible harm that may be
caused by his involvement in the criminal justice system. Where the victim
therefore testifies, the provisions of section 153 provide a certain degree of
protection against the possibility of secondary victimisation.
43322 Section 158 Criminal Procedure Act384
Similarly section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act385 empowers the court to order
that a witness may testify via closed circuit television or similar electronic media.
Section 158(3)(e), for example, states that such an order may be made to prevent
the likelihood that prejudice or harm might result to the witness if he testifies or is
present at criminal proceedings. Section 158 therefore provides another example of
a provision which is aimed at protecting the victim-witness from secondary
victimisation.
43323 Section 170A Criminal Procedure Act386
In terms of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act387 the court may order that
a child under the age of 18 years testify through an intermediary if it appears that
the child will suffer undue mental stress if he were to testify in the presence of the
accused. The provisions relating to the appointment of an intermediary are unique
in the sense that they allow for a deviation of the requirement that the witness must
testify in the presence of the accused. Where an intermediary is appointed, the
witness testifies in a separate room, but also through an intermediary who is
empowered to convey the general purport of the question to the witness instead of
its ipsissima verba.
381 S 153(3)(a).
382 S 153(2).
38351 of 1977.
384 See the discussion on S 158 below 63.
38551 of 1977.
386 For a detailed discussion on S 170A see below 6 4.
38751 of 1977.
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The provisions of section 170A clearly strive to protect the youthful witness from
the possibility of (secondary) traumatisation.
43324 Other
There are also other provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act388 that are aimed at
providing protection for the victim. For example, in terms of section 185 of the Act
a witness may be detained if his life is in danger and in terms of section 153 of the
Act, the court may direct that witness may testify in camera and that his identity
not be revealed. In terms of section 179 of the Act a witness is entitled to be
notified in writing that his presence is required in court to give evidence. Despite
these provisions it is argued that these "rights" which are ostensibly accorded to
the victim are accorded to the victim, not in his own right, but in his capacity as
witness for the prosecution.i'" Be that as it may, the victim-witness is still afforded
a measure of protection by these provisions.
44 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims
of Crime and Abuse of Power390
South Africa is a signatory to the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.391 The declaration provides that
victims should have access to justice and fair treatment. Victims should therefore
be treated with compassion and their dignity protected. Further, they should be
entitled to access to mechanisms of justice and prompt redress for the harms they
have suffered.392 Article 6 of the Declaration provides that the needs of victims
should be facilitated by
"(a) Informing victims of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the
proceedings and of the disposition of their cases, especially where serious crimes are
involved and where they have requested such information;
(b) Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at
appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected,
without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal
justice system;
38851 of 1977.
389 Kgosirnore 2000 Crime Research in South Africa.
390 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations resolution 40/34 of29 November 1985.
391 Accepted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1985.
392 Article 4.
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(c) Providing proper assistance to victims throughout the legal process;
(d) Taking measures to minimize inconvenience to victims, protect their privacy,
when necessary, and ensure their safety, as well as that of their families and witnesses
on their behalf, from intimidation and retaliation;
(e) Avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposition of cases and the execution of orders
or decrees granting awards to victims."
Despite the fact that South Africa is a signatory to the United Nations Declaration
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,393 the
victim is not, by virtue of his status as the victim of crime, entitled to be present at
the trial. The victim is not entitled to address the court,394unless the court is of the
opinion that his evidence is needed in order to decide on a sentence. 395In terms of
international law, declarations are intended to serve as guidelines and do not have
the force of law.396Therefore, despite the fact that South Africa is a signatory to
the declaration, crime victims cannot rely on the declaration to lay claim to any
specific rights.
4 5 Other jurisdictions
Victims' rights have received different measures of recognition III other
jurisdictions. For example, in Canada the Canadian Statement of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime provides that the victims of crime should be treated
with courtesy, compassion and with respect for their dignity and privacy and that
they should suffer the minimum of necessary inconvenience from their
involvement in the criminal justice system. It also provides that information should
be made available to victims about their participation in criminal proceedings and
scheduling, progress and the ultimate disposition of the proceedings. The views
and concerns of victims should be ascertained and assistance should be provided
throughout the criminal process. Where the personal interests of the victim are
affected the views or concerns of the victim should be brought to the attention of
the court. This must, however, be done in a manner consistent with the criminal
law and procedure. Victims and their families should be protected from
393 Accepted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1985.
394 S 175 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides that the prosecutor and the defence
may address the court in closing after all the evidence has been led.
395 S 274(1) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
396 Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2nd ed (2000) 36.
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intimidation and retaliation and victims should be informed of the availability of
health and social services.
In England, for example, the Victims' Charter " provides the victim with certain
entitlements. Victim are entitled to have a complaint investigated and to receive
information about the outcome of the investigation, to have the opportunity to
explain the impact of the crime on them and to have their interests taken into
account, to be treated with sensitivity, to be offered emotional and practical support
and to be given information about the likelihood of the offender being released
from prison.
InMarch 2001 the European Union adopted a Council Framework Decision on the
standing of victims in criminal proceedings.i'" In terms of this framework victims
of crime have certain entitlements. Article 2 provides that victims are entitled to be
treated with due respect for their dignity. Article 3 places an obligation on member
states to safeguard the possibility for victims to be heard during proceedings and to
supply evidence. Article 4 requires member states to ensure that victims have
access to information relevant for the protection of their interests. The framework
lays down certain minimum requirements with regard to information to which the
victim is entitled. The victim is entitled to, inter alia, information about the type of
services or organisations to which they can turn for support, the type of support
they can obtain, where and how they can report an offence, how and under which
circumstances they can receive protection. Victims who have expressed the wish to
be kept informed are entitled to information about the outcome of their complaint
and the court's sentence. They are also entitled to receive information about
"relevant factors enabling them... to know the conduct of the criminal
proceedings". However, this right may be limited where the "proper handling of
the case will be adversely affected". Where a sentenced offender is to be released,
the relevant authority may notify the victim if necessary. Article 8 places a duty on
member states to ensure a suitable level of protection for victims and their families,
particularly as far as their privacy and safety are concerned. Member states are
397 Victims Charter (1997) http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk. Accessed 10 November 2005.
398 European Union Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in
criminal proceedings Official Journal of the European Communities L82/1 22.3.2001.
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required to ensure that contact between the victim and the offender is avoided,
unless such contact is necessary for the proceedings. In this respect progressive
measures must be taken to provide victims with separate waiting areas at courts.
Article 8(4) provides that where necessary victims may be entitled to testify in a
manner aimed at protecting vulnerable witnesses. This entitlement, however, only
follows on a decision of the court.
Section 24 of Article 1 of the Michigan Constitutiorr " provides for the rights of
crime victims. In terms of this section victims of crime have the following rights:
The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy; the
right to timely disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused; the right
to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice
process; the right to notification of court proceedings; the right to attend the trial
and other court proceedings the accused has the right to attend; the right to confer
with the prosecution; the right to make a statement to the court prior to sentencing;
and the right to information about the conviction, sentence and release of the
accused.
4 6 Recommendations of the South African Law Commission
In its 2002 report400 the South African Law Commission recommended that certain
objectives should be included in the Sexual Offences Bill. These objectives contain
normative values that underpin the draft Bill and serve as indicators as to how, and
in which context, the Bill should be interpreted and applied.401 The objectives
could be used in judicial review of the application of the Bill.402 The following
objectives were included in Schedule 1 of the Bill that was tabled before
parliament in August 2003:403
"(a) Complainants should not be discriminated against, either directly or indirectly,
on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social origin, birth, status, sex, gender,
sexual orientation, age and developmental level, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture or language;
399 Michigan Constitution of 1963.
400 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences.
401 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 2.2.
402 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 2.2.
403 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50-2003.
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(b) complainants should be treated with dignity and respect;
(c) complainants should be ensured access to the mechanisms of justice;
(d) complainants should be informed of their rights and the procedures within the
criminal justice system which affect them;
(e) complainants should have the right to express an opinion, to be informed of all
decisions, and to have their opinion taken seriously in any matter affecting them;
(f) in addition to all due process and constitutional rights, complainants should have
the right-
(i) to have present at all decisions affecting them a person or persons
important to their lives;
(ii) to have matters explained to them in a clear, understandable manner
appropriate to their age and in a language and manner which they
understand;
(iii) to remain in the family, where appropriate, during the investigation
and whilst awaiting a final resolution of the matter and, if a child is
removed from the family, to have the placement periodically reviewed;
(iv) to have procedures dealt with expeditiously in time frames appropriate
to the complainant and the offence;
(g) complainants should have the right to confidentiality and privacy and to
protection from publicity about the offence;
(h) the vulnerability of children should entitle them to speedy and special protection
and provision of services by all role-players during all phases of the investigation, the
court process and thereafter;
(i) since the family and the community are central to the well-being of a child,
consideration should be given, in any decisions affecting a child, to-
(i) ensuring that, in addition to the child, his or her family, community and
other significant role-players are consulted;
(ii) the extent to which decisions affecting the offender will affect the
child, his or her family and community;
(iii) the particular relationship between the offender and the child;
(iv) keeping disruptive intervention into child, family and community life
to a minimum in order to avoid secondary victimisation of the child;
0) restorative and rehabilitative alternatives should be considered and applied unless
the safety of the complainant and the interests of the community requires otherwise;
(k) a person who commits a sexual offence should be held accountable for his or her
actions and should be encouraged to accept full responsibility for his or her
behaviour;
(l) in determining appropriate sanctions for a person who has been found guilty of
committing a sexual offence-
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(i) the sanctions applied should ensure the safety and security of the
victim, the family of the victim and the community;
(ii) the sanctions should promote the recovery of the victim and the
restoration of the family of the victim and the community;
(iii) where appropriate, offenders should make restitution which may
include material, medical or therapeutic assistance to victims and their
families or dependants;
(iv) the child sexual offender should receive special consideration in
respect of sanctions and rehabilitation;
(v) the possibility of rehabilitating the sexual offender should be taken into
account in considering the long-term goal of safety and security of victims,
their families and communities;
(vi) the interests of the victim should be considered in any decision
regarding sanctions;
(m) in order to avoid systemic secondary victimisation of the victim of sexual
offences, binding inter-sectoral protocols following an inter-disciplinary approach
should be followed;
(n) all professionals and role-players involved in the management of sexual offence
cases should be properly and continuously trained after going through a proper
selection and screening process; and
(0) cultural diversity should be taken into account in all matters pertaining to the
victim, the offender and to their communities. The existence of cultural differences
should be no justification for or licence to commit a sexual offence or to exclude a
criminal justice process."
It is clear that victims' rights values underpin all these objectives.
4 7 Conclusion
Although it is important to recognise the fact that victims of crime have an interest
in the prosecution of the alleged offender - at the very least an indirect interest -
and it is important to provide protection for such victims, it is equally important to
ensure that the integrity of the criminal justice process is not undermined by the
protection, and maybe even the participation, of the victims of crime.
Further, although child victims of sexual abuse are particularly worthy of
protection, it is important to bear in mind that it is imperative that the
constitutional fair trial rights of the accused are not infringed by measures aimed at
the protection of child victims. The reason is two-fold: First, should the rights of
the accused be infringed, the integrity of the criminal justice system could be
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undermined and, second, if the rights of the accused are infringed, a guilty verdict
may be set aside and ultimately the interest of society as a whole will be damaged.
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the recognition of victims' rights is
necessary and is receiving increasing attention both nationally and internationally.
It is also clear that victims' rights which have received recognition nationally and
internationally do not undermine the integrity of the criminal justice process.
However, measures designed to further victims' rights may have such an influence.
In the following chapters rules of procedure and evidence applicable in the
prosecution of alleged sexual offenders against children will be discussed.
Proposed amendments to these rules will be evaluated against the backdrop of the
values identified in Chapter 2 and the fair trial rights of the accused and victims'
rights as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. It will be shown that while
some of the proposed amendments will not have any influence on the fair trial
rights of the accused, others will.
It will be shown that while the recognition of victims' rights is essential, the
integrity of the criminal justice process demands that the fair trial rights of the
accused be upheld. Therefore, attempts to further the rights of victims of crime
should not be of such a nature that due process rights are adversely affected.
In the following two chapters measures aimed at enhancing victim participation at
trial level and measures aimed at providing protection for the victim of a sexual
offence at the same level are be discussed and the possible effect of these
provisions on the fair trial rights of the accused, considered.
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5 1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4 the enhancement of victims' rights and the fair trial rights of
the accused were discussed. It was argued that while the enhancement of victims'
rights is important, measures aimed at achieving this purpose may have a negative
influence on the fair trial rights of the accused and that the integrity of the criminal
justice system may be undermined by such measures. In the chapter relating to
victims' rights it was shown that victims' rights can function on different levels
and serve various purposes. In this chapter measures aimed at enhancing victim
participation in the criminal justice process are discussed and the possible effect of
such measures on the fair trial rights of the accused is considered. While some of
the measures discussed in the chapter concern the active participation of the victim
during the trial, for example, the competency test, others concern the participation
of the victim in the criminal justice process in the sense that the version of the
victim is placed before the court without the victim testifying himself. An example
of this is the admission hearsay evidence. Others, still, concern the effective
participation of the victim. In these cases it can be argued that while the victim is
permitted to actively participate in the trial, his participation is rendered ineffective
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by certain rules of evidence, such as the various cautionary rules. Chapter 6
focuses on measures aimed at protection of victims at trial level.
5 2 Competency of children as witnesses
A witness is competent ifhe is lawfully allowed to give evidence.t'" Section 192 of
the Criminal Procedure Act405contains the general rule with regard to competency
of witness. It states:
"Every person not expressly excluded by this Act from giving evidence shall, subject
to the provisions of section 206, be competent and compellable to give evidence in
criminal proceedings"
Section 193 states that the court in which criminal proceedings are conducted shall
decide any question concerning the competency or compellability of any witness to
give evidence. This section therefore complements section 192 of the Act. With
regard to the competency of a witness, section 206 provides that unless otherwise
provided, the law as it was on 30 May 1961 is applicable. Since South African law
does not prescribe a minimum age for a witness406 and the Criminal Procedure
Act407is silent on this question, the question of competency is left to regulation by
the common law. In terms of the common law the main factor for deciding on the
competency of a witness is whether, in the opinion of the court, the witness can
understand what it means to tell the truth.408Should the child, in the opinion of the
court, not have the intelligence to distinguish between the truth and a lie, the child
will be considered an incompetent witness409 and, as such, not permitted to
testify.41oOther factors that are taken into account when judging the competency of
404 Muller The Child Witness in the Accusatorial System (1997) Unpublished LLD 267.
40551 of 1977.
406 Oosthuizen & Verschoor "Jeudigheid by getuinislewering en verhoorbaarheid" 1996 SACJ9 23.
40751 of 1977.
408 Schwikkard "The abused child: A few rules of evidence considered" 1996 Acta Juridica 148;
Zeffertt, Paizes & Skeen The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 671; Zieff "The child victim as
witness in sexual abuse cases - A comparative analysis of the law of evidence and procedure" 1991
SACJ 422. Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra: Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 6th ed (2002) 490.
409 Zeffertt et al Evidence 671. S v L 1973 1 SA 344 (C); S v T 1973 3 SA 794 (A).
410 Le Roux & Engelbrecht "The Sexually Abused Child as a Witness" in Davel (ed) Introduction to
Child Law in South Africa (2000) 345.
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a witness include the ability to communicate effectively and sufficient
. Il' 411mte igence.
From the earliest times the competency test has been linked, although not
necessarily expressly so, to the credibility of the witness.412 Since it is commonly
accepted that a child who is unable to articulate the distinction between the truth
and a lie might not be a credible witness,413 the evidence of these witnesses is
excluded on the basis that it may lead to the wrong conviction of an accused.414
However, Spencer and Flin415point out that truth and the duty to tell the truth are
abstract notions, which a young child may not be able to understand or explain.
This does not mean that the child cannot give a reliable account of the events.l'"
Conversely, the mere fact that a witness is found to be a competent witness does
not necessarily indicate that the witness will be a reliable witness.417 Schwikkard'l"
seems to support this point of view, arguing that despite the provisions of section
192 of the Criminal Procedure Act,419the threshold competency test, as applied to
child witnesses, can be described as a presumption of incompetence which may
operate to exclude testimony which may assist the court in adjudicating the
matter.420
In its 2002 report421 the South African Law Commission considered the practical
application of the competency test and found that the pre-emptive exclusion of
evidence based on the competency test ignores the ability of the presiding officer
to make a decision about the weight and credibility which should be attached to the
evidence.422 Taking into account, further, the fact that neither convicted perjurers
411 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2nd ed (2002) 393.
412 Perry & Wrightsman The Child Witness: Legal Issues and Dilemmas (1991) 37-40.
413 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 37-40.
414 Spencer & Flin The Evidence of Children: The Law and the Psychology 2nd ed (1993) 55.
415 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 54.
416 See also Spencer "Reforming the Law on Children's Evidence in England: The Pigot Committee
and After" in Dent & Flin (eds) Children as Witnesses (1992) 114 and Reddi "The child witness in
the criminal justice system: Suggestions for reform" 1993 JJS 128.
417 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 57.
418 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148.
41951 of 1977.
420 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 148. See also SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Project 107
Report (2002) 99.
421 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences.
422 § 36.4.2.
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nor persons convicted of a crime involving an element of dishonesty have to pass a
similar test the Commission recommended that a witness should not be disqualified
from testifying due merely to his inability to define the difference between the
truth and a lie.423
The Commission therefore recommended that section 164(1)424 of the Criminal
Procedure Act425be amended to reflect that all witnesses should be regarded as
competent to testify if they can understand the questions put to them and can in
return give answers that the court can understand.V" It also recommended that a
new section be inserted in the Sexual Offences Act which clearly establishes that
any child in a sexual offence trial is competent to testify.427 The Commission also
recommended the inclusion of a new section (section 192A) in the Criminal
Procedure Act,428 which clearly establishes a presumption of competence of
persons below the age of 18 years. In this respect, the Commission recommended
that the new provision should read:
"( 1) All persons below the age of 18 years shall be presumed to be competent to
testify in criminal proceedings and no such person shall be precluded from giving
evidence unless he or she is found, at any stage of the proceedings, not to have the
ability or the mental capacity, verbal or otherwise, to respond to questions in a way
that is understandable to the court.
(2) The evidence given by a person referred to in subsection (1) shall be admissible in
criminal proceedings contemplated in that subsection, and the court shall attach such
weight to such evidence as it deems fit.
(3) The court shall note the reasons for a fmding in terms of subsection (1) on the
record of the proceedings."
However, the Commission pointed out that despite the new presumption of
competence, the decision concerning the weight attached to the evidence of the
child and the discretion to exclude evidence on the basis that it is irrelevant, are left
up to the presiding officer. 429 These recommendations were included in the
423 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 4.3.1.
424 A discussion on s 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 will be included in the section
relating to the oath and unsworn testimony below § 5 3.
42551 of 1977.
426 § 36.4.7.
427 § 36.4.8.
42851 of 1977.
429 § 36.4.5.
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Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill430 which was tabled before
Parliament in August 2003.
It is clear that the Commission abolished the presumption of incompetence and
replaced it with an express presumption of competence. Should the court, however,
deem it necessary, it can inquire into the competency of the witness at any stage of
the proceedings. Where the Court makes a finding of incompetence, the Court is
required to note the reasons for the finding on the record of the proceedings. By
using the phrase "at any stage during the proceedings" the Commission has
indicated that the inquiry should not take place before the proceedings, thereby
making it clear that the procedure to be followed is not the same as it is at present.
Further, the Commission makes it clear that where an inquiry into the competency
of the witness is necessary, the test should be directed solely at the witness' ability
to make himself understandable to the court and should no longer enquire into the
capacity of the witness to understand and articulate the difference between the truth
and a lie.
The question whether a child witness should pass a competency before being
allowed to testify is not unique to South Africa. In Canada, for example, there is a
presumption of incompetence with regard to children under the age of 14. Where a
witness is below the age of 14 years, the presiding officer must determine not only
whether the child understands the nature of the oath or affirmation, but also
whether the child has the ability to communicate the evidence.Y' Should the child
not have the ability to communicate the evidence, the child is not a competent
witness.432
In other jurisdictions the traditional competency test which is used to decide the
competency of the child witness prior to the commencement of his evidence has
been abolished. For example, in England section 33A of the Criminal Justice Act433
regulates the law regarding the competency of child witnesses in criminal cases.
430 B50-2003.
431 S 16(1) Canada Evidence Act R.S. 1985, c. C-5.
432 S 16(4).
433 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
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Section 33A(2A) provides that "a child's evidence shall be received unless it
appears to the court that the child is incapable of giving intelligent testimony".
According to Tapper434 it is clear that only if doubts about the competency of the
witness arise after the child begins to testify, will the Court have to make a
decision about the competency of the witness. Section 2A creates a statutory
presumption of competency which the opposing party will have to rebut by
showing that the child is incapable of giving intelligent testimony.Y' In DPP v
Jvt36 it was found that
"a child will be capable of giving intelligible testimony if he or she is able to
understand questions and to answer them in a manner which is coherent and
comprehensible"
Section 33A applies to children under the age of 14 years and therefore children
above the age of 14 years are presumed to be competent to give evidence.Y'
In Scots law the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act438 abolished the competence
test for witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings. In terms of section 24(1)
of the Act the evidence of a witness is not inadmissible solely because the witness
does not understand (a) the nature of the duty of a witness to give truthful
evidence, or (b) the difference between truth and lies. The act further stipulates that
the court must therefore not, at any time before the witness gives evidence, take
any step to establish whether the witness understands those matters.439 The section
does not refer only to child-witnesses.
The early development of the competency test in the United States of America
followed that of the United Kingdom. During 1895 in Wheeler v United States440
the United States Supreme Court found that there was no precise age which
determines the question of competency and that competency depends on the
person's capacity and intelligence and his appreciation of the distinction between
truth and falsehood, as well as his appreciation of his duty to tell the truth.
434 Tapper Cross & Tapper on Evidence 9th ed (1999) 210.
435 Dennis The Law of Evidence (1999) 422.
436 [1997] 2 Cr App R 70, DC 75.
437 Dennis Evidence 421.
438 Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004.
439 S 24(2) Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004.
440 159 U.S. 523 (1895).
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Although children were still presumed to be incompetent, a party could challenge
the presumed incompetence of the child.441 In Rosen v United States442 the court
changed the presumption from one of incompetence to one of competence.T''
There was a shift from responsibility on the judge to decide competency to a
responsibility on the jury to decide credibility.l''"
Although each state now has its own rules with regard to the competency of child
witnesses, four main categories can be distinguished.Y Firstly, there are those
states which follow Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In terms of Rule
601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence everyone is a competent witness except as
otherwise provided in the rules. In theory this should make the traditional
competency investigation unnecessary, but in practice trial judges continue to asses
and rule on the competency of children.446 Several states claim to follow the Rule
601 approach, but add one or more of the traditional competence qualifications.Y'
For example, the Massachusetts statute states that"[a]ny person of sufficient
understanding ... may testify",448 while the Kentucky statute provides that "every
person is competent ... unless he be found by the court incapable of understanding
the facts concerning which his testimony is offered".449
The second category includes those states which presume incapacity to testify in
children below a certain age. These children are presumptively incompetent to
testify unless the trial judge determines otherwise through questioning. The ages
set by the states range from 10 years to 14 years. The mere fact that a presumption
of incompetence exists does not mean that children below these ages cannot testify.
In fact, in the vast majority of cases children above the age of five years where
found to be competent after having been questioned by the court.450
441 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 40.
442245 U.S. 467 (1918).
443 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 40.
444 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 40-41.
445 There may be overlapping between the different categories.
446 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 40-46.
447 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 40-46.
448 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Cho233, § 20.
449 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.200.
450 See for example People v Rowell 463 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1983); Victor v Smilanich 54 Colo. 479,
131 P.392 (1913); Berger v People 122 Cola. 367, 224 P.2d 288 (1950).
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In the third category are states which presume that any person will be competent if
he understands the concept of the oath or the duty to tell the truth.451 The child
need not be able to define the term "oath" in order to judged competent.Y'
The last category includes those states which provide that all children are
competent witnesses in sexual offence cases. For example, the Utah statute
provides that "[a] child victim of sexual abuse under the age of ten is a competent
witness and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any judicial
proceeding't.Y'
The recommendations of the South African Law Commission therefore correspond
with the position as it is in the United Kingdom and Scotland. Although the
recommendations are similar to Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of the
United States of America, they differ to the extent that the Law Commission
recommended that one of the traditional components of the competency test be
added to section 192A of the Criminal Procedure Act, namely that the witness must
have the ability to make himself understood to the Court.
Evaluation
It must be borne in mind that sexual abuse of children is a very real problem in
South Africa, with the result that it is imperative that those guilty of such crimes be
tried and convicted. However, since accused people are not necessarily guilty, they
need to be protected against wrong convictions. In this respect the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a fair trial requires that a conviction follow only where the State
has proved the guilt of an accused based on reliable evidence and beyond
reasonable doubt.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Due Process Model of criminal justice places
the emphasis on legal guilt, thereby accepting a reduction in the overall
effectiveness of the criminal justice process. The basis for the traditional
competency test can, therefore, be found in the Due Process value that, in the
451 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 40-43.
452 Perry & Wrightsman Child Witness 43-44.
453 hUta Code Ann. § 76-5-410.
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interest of justice, any evidence that creates the risk of a wrong conviction must be
excluded. This underscores the presumption of innocence that requires the State to
prove the elements of a crime beyond reasonable doubt. The insistence on a prior
indication of reliability can have a particularly negative impact on the effective
prosecution of alleged sexual offenders against children. As a result of the nature
of the offences involved, the child-victim is often the only witness available to the
prosecution.I" If the court finds that such a child-witness is unable to distinguish
or articulate the distinction between the truth and a lie, the court is compelled to
exclude the evidence, thereby depriving the court of all available evidence.
In contrast, the Punitive Victims' rights Model places the emphasis on factual guilt.
The model therefore requires that all evidence that is necessary to enhance the
administration of justice and the conviction of the factually guilty be placed before
the court. However, in the light of the values that underlie this model, the
reliability of evidence cannot be pre-judged. The evidence must therefore be
allowed initially and its credibility and veracity judged after it has been heard.
The recommendations of the South African Law Commission reflect Victims'
rights values in that all evidence that is necessary to promote the administration of
justice and the conviction of the factually guilty is placed before the court. Victim
participation will therefore be enhanced. The proposed amendments will make it
possible for evidence, which would traditionally have been excluded, to be placed
before the Court. This will increase the potential for successful prosecutions and
will act as a buttress for the child's constitutional right to security and freedom
from abuse, as described in section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution.V"
It could be argued that the presumption of competence may lead to the admission
of unreliable testimony and that the constitutional presumption of innocence could
be infringed thereby; however, provided that the accused is afforded the
opportunity of challenging the evidence of the witness, the abolition of the
competence test should not infringe on the accused's right to a fair trial, as defined
454 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 54-55; Reddi 1993 JJS 128. See also S v T 1973 3 SA 749
(A). See also SA Law Commission Sexual Offences 99 and Spencer in Dent & Flin (eds) Children
as Witnesses 114.
455 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 151.
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in section 35(3) of the Constitution.Y'' Bearing in mind also that the weight
attached to the evidence of the child is left to the discretion of the presiding officer,
there should be no grounds for arguing that the inclusion of the evidence of the
child-witness infringes the accused's right to a fair trial.
Therefore, the recommendations of the South African Law Commission enhance
Victims' Rights by providing for increased victim participation at trial level. The
conflict between the Due Process claims of the accused, on the one hand, and
Victims' rights claims, on the other, is resolved by the discretion of the presiding
officer to determine the weight to be attached to the evidence. Since the Law
Commission's recommendations do not affect this discretion, the initial admission
of the evidence will not detract from the rights of the accused.
5 3 The oath and unsworn testimony
Once competency has been determined, the next enquiry is whether the child has
sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and import of the oath.457
At common law it was required that a witness must testify under oath.458 This
requirement is restated (with certain exceptions) in section 162 of the Criminal
Procedure Act.459 Section 162(1) contains a peremptory provision that no one may
be questioned. in criminal proceedings unless under oath.46o Two exceptions are
allowed: the witness may testify without having taken the oath where the
affirmation as provided for in section 163461 has been taken or where the witness is
permitted to give unsworn testimony in terms of section 164. The oath or
456 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 151.
457 Le Roux & Engelbrecht in Davel Child Law 346.
458 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences 98.
45951 of 1977.
460 SvB 2003 1 SA 552 (A) § [11] 561H and § [14] 562C. See also S v Ndlela 1984 1 SA 223 (N)
225G-H; S vMashava 1994 1 SACR 224 (T) 228f-g and); S v N 1996 2 SACR 225 (C) 227c.
461 S 163 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 makes it possible for an affirmation to be given
in lieu of the oath in cases where the witness objects to taking the oath or to taking it in the
prescribed form as a result of the witness not considering the oath binding on his conscience or
where the witness either has no religious belief or feels that the taking of the oath is contrary to his
religious belief. The affirmation has the same legal force as if the person making it had taken the
oath. It is the responsibility of the witness to inform the Court about any objections he or she may
have with regard to the oath. If the witness does not object to the taking of the oath, it is accepted
that he or she considers it to be binding on his or her conscience. The Court may not mero mota
decide to use the s 163 affirmation instead of the oath. It is furthermore unnecessary for the Court to
ask the witness whether he or she considers the oath to be binding on him or herself.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICfIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 83
affirmation may only be administered if the witness understands the distinction
between the truth and a lie.462 If, after an investigation, it is apparent that the
witness does not understand the difference between the truth and a lie, the witness
is not a competent witness and admission of the witness' testimony after a warning
to tell the truth amounts to an inconsistency.P'' If a witness should not understand
the nature and import of the oath or the affirmation as a result of ignorance arising
from youth, defective education or another cause, the person may be permitted to
give evidence in criminal proceedings without taking the oath or making an
affirmation.r" This may only be done once the person has been admonished by the
presiding officer to speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.465
The requirements relating to the oath or affirmation also apply to child-
witnesses.t'" Since there is no set age at which a child is deemed to understand the
nature and import of the oath or affirmation, the court will have to decide the issue,
based on the intelligence that the child displays in the answering of questions
posed to the child by the presiding officer or legal representatives.l'"
Although in theory the inquiry into the ability of the witness to understand the
nature and import of the oath or affirmation should be made after the competency
inquiry, the two inquiries are often made together. Courts have held that the fact
that section 164 requires a finding that the witness does not understand the nature
and import of the oath or affirmation, implies that an investigation be held
beforehand.468 If no express investigation has been held, the evidence is
inadmissible.P" For example in in S v Kondile47o the court found that where a court
462 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 423. S v Mashava 1994 1 SACR 224 (T) 228c-d; S v Stefaans 1999
1 SACR 182 (C) 185j-186a; S v Vumazonke 2000 1 SACR 619 (C) §§ [6] - [8] 621c - 622d; S v
Pienaar 2001 1 SACR 391 (C). S v N 1996 2 SACR 225 (C) 22ge-g.
463 S v V 19982 SACR 651 (C) 652g-j.
464 In terms of S 164 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
465 S 164 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. S 164(1) "Any person who, from ignorance arising
from youth, defective education or other cause, is found not to understand the nature and import of
the oath or the affirmation, may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings without
taking the oath or making the affirmation: Provided that such person shall, in lieu of the oath or
affirmation, be admonished by the presiding judge or judicial officer to speak the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth"
466 S v Seymour 1998 1 SACR 66 (N) 71b-c.
467 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 425.
468 S v Mashava 1994 1 SACR 224 (T) 228g-h; S v Vumazonke 2000 1 SACR 619 (C) 622f-g.
469 S v Mashava 1994 1 SACR 224 (T) 228g-h; S v Vumazonke 20001 SACR 619 (C) 622f-g.
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concludes that a witness does not understand the nature and import of the oath or
admonition due to ignorance arising from youth, defective education or some other
cause, it is necessary to establish whether or not the witness understands what it
means to speak the truth, is able to distinguish between the truth and falsehood and
is aware that it is morally wrong, in the sense of it being wicked or sinful, to lie.471
In this case the magistrate did not question a ten-year-old as to whether she
understood the consequences of not telling the truth. On appeal the court found that
this questioning formed part of the enquiry to be conducted into determining
whether the child was a competent witness and that in the absence of that being
established, it would be improper to hold that the child was competent to testify.472
However, in S v B,473 the Supreme Court of Appeal expressed the view that the
construction placed on section 164 by other courts is too narrow. In this case, a
man was accused of repeatedly raping his thirteen-year-old daughter. At the trial in
the regional court, the child testified through an intermediary.V" The child was
asked whether she understood what it meant to swear to tell the truth and what it
meant if someone said that they would tell the truth.475 After answering in the
affirmative, she was admonished to tell the truth and her evidence was admitted.
The accused was convicted of rape and the case was referred to a High Court for
sentencing in terms of section 52(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.476
However, since she had not taken the oath, the Court found that the evidence of the
child was inadmissible. The High Court found that an enquiry had not been held
with regard to the child's ability to understand the nature and import of the oath
and that the warning in terms of section 164 accordingly amounted to an
irregularity.Y' Having made this finding, the Court found that the remaining
evidence was insufficient to convict the accused and it set aside the conviction. The
court reserved two questions of law. The relevant question was whether the
absence of an investigation and consequent finding by a trial court that a witness
47020032 SACR 221 (Ck).
471 § [6] 223g - h.
472 § [8] 224c - e.
4732003 1 SA 552 (A) § [15] 562F.
474 Appointed in terms of s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
475 § [2] 558D.
476 105 of 1997.
477 § [15] 562F Jf.
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did not understand the nature and import of the oath due to ignorance arising from
youth or other cause, necessarily had the effect that the evidence of the witness
could not be regarded as evidence.t"
In response to this question, the Supreme Court of Appeal, per Streicher JA, found
that a construction that section 164 requires an investigation that precedes a finding
with regard to the ability of the witness to understand the nature and import of the
oath,479was too narrow.480 The Court decided that the mere youthfulness of a child
could justify a finding in terms of section 164. Nothing more was required than
that the presiding officer form an opinion that the witness did not understand the
nature and import of the oath as a result of ignorance arising from youth, defective
education or other cause.481However, on the facts, the Court concluded that since
the possibility that the child could understand the nature and import of the oath or
affirmation existed, the evidence should have been given under oath. Her evidence
was accordingly inadmissible.482
Whether the evidence of a child is given under oath or affirmation or whether it is
given subsequent to a warning in terms of section 164, the Court has to make a
decision as to the weight to be attached to the evidence based on the intelligence
and honesty of the child.483
It is clear that an error in the inquiry by the presiding officer and a subsequent
decision on whether a child should testify under oath or whether he should merely
be admonished to speak the truth, often results in an appeal being upheld. It is for
this reason, inter alia, that the South African Law Commission investigated the
need for reform in this regard.
The Commission accepted that the emphasis placed on making the witness aware
of the importance of telling the truth stems from an inherent fear that the witness
may fabricate events or evidence. In terms of the traditional test, evidence of
478 § [4] 559B. The second question oflaw is not important for purposes of this thesis.
479 As was found by the court a quo.
480 § [15] 562F ff.
481 § [15] 562F ff. See also S v Chalale 20042 SACR 264 (W) § [3] 266a-c.
482 See also S v Chalale 2004 2 SACR 264 (W) § [3] 266a-c.
483 R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A) 163A. See a discussion on the credibility of the evidence of
children infra. Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 425.
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children who cannot articulate the difference between the truth and a lie IS,
however, excluded without the presiding officer assessing whether or not the child
can understandably relay the events that are at issue in the proceedings.Y' Based
on recent research the Commission concluded that the memory of children is as
accurate as that of adults, that children do not lie more than adults and that they can
discern fact from fantasy, particularly in the context of acts of abuse. 485
Therefore, the Commission, in its 2002 Discussion Paper,486 expressed the view
that the exclusion of evidence based on the requirements set in sections 162, 163
and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act487not being met "seems to run contrary to
the goal of bringing all relevant evidence before the COurt".488Accordingly, the
Commission recommended that section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act489
should be amended to reflect that all witnesses should be regarded as competent to
testify if they can understand the questions put to them and can, in tum, give
understandable answers to the questions.l'" In cases where there is doubt as to
whether the child is capable of communicating effectively, the presiding officer
should call for an expert assessment of the witness and in such cases, the witness
must give unsworn testimony'ï" and should merely be admonished to speak the
truth.492
Despite this recommendation, the presiding officer may still exclude unsatisfactory
evidence on the basis that the evidence is irrelevant. 493The presiding officer also
retains the discretion to decide what weight should be attached to evidence which
is admitted after an admonition to speak the truth. 494
484 § 36.4.1.
485 § 36.4.3.
486 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 36.4.5.
48751 of 1977.
488 § 36.4.5.
48951 of 1977.
490 § 36.4.7.
491 § 36.4.5.
492 § 36.4.5.
493 § 36.4.5.
494 § 36.4.5.
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Sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Act495 have been left unchanged
by the proposals of the South African Law Commission. Therefore, unless the new
requirements of section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act496 are met, any viva
voce evidence placed before the court, must therefore either be given under oath or
affirmed by the witness.
Since the Law Commission recommended the deletion of the provision relating to
the reasons underlying the decision to admonish the witness instead of requiring
the witness to take the oath or make the affirmation, the operation of section 164
will no longer be limited to cases where the witness cannot, as a result of youth,
defective education or other cause, understand the nature and import of the oath.
The proposed amendments will, therefore, make it unnecessary for the court to
enquire into the witness' ability to understand the nature and import of the oath or
the affirmation. Accordingly, the possibility of a challenge against the admission of
the evidence on this basis will be minimised.
The only requirement set for application of the amended section 164 is that the
witness must be able to understand questions put to him or her and to respond to
such questions in a manner which is intelligible. This requirement is substantially
lower than the one set in the existing wording of section 164 of the Criminal
Procedure Act. Although the Commission recommended that the admonition to
speak the truth be retained, it recommended the deletion of the words "the whole
truth and nothing but the truth" from section 164.
Section 164 should, according to this recommendation, read as follows:
"(1) Any person may be admitted to give evidence in criminal proceedings without
taking the oath or making the affirmation: Provided that such person is able to
understand questions put to him or her and to respond to such questions in a manner
which is intelligible; and provided further that such person shall, in lieu of the oath or
affirmation, be admonished by the presiding judge or judicial officer to speak the
truth."
495 51 of 1977.
49651 of 1977.
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The recommendation of the Law Commission has been included in the Criminal
Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill497tabled before Parliament.
In most jurisdictions the requirement that the witness take the oath has been
relaxed so some extent or another, especially in so far as child witnesses are
concerned. In England, for example, the general common law rule was that the
testimony of a witness to be examined viva voce in a criminal trial was not
admissible unless he had previously been sworn to speak the truth.498 In terms of
section I of the Oaths Act499a person taking the oath is required to place their hand
on the Bible and say "1 swear by Almighty God that..." In terms of section 28 of
the Children and Young Persons Act500 a child is not required to use the word
"swear" but may say that "1 promise by Almighty God". Section 5 of the Oaths
Act501 makes it possible for a witness to make an affirmation where he or she
objects to taking the oath.
Section 33A of the Criminal Justice Act502makes it possible for a child witness to
give unsworn testimony. In terms of this section the unsworn testimony of a child
under the age of fourteen years503must be received unless it appears to the court
that the child is incapable of giving intelligent evidence. Section 33A dispenses
with the need for an inquiry into whether the child understands the nature of the
oath. Section 52(s) of the Criminal Justice Act504 repealed section 38(1) of the
Children and Young Persons Act,505thereby making it unnecessary for a presiding
officer to satisfy him or herself that the child has sufficient intelligence to give
evidence and understands the duty to speak the truth before he or she can allow the
child to testify.
It must be pointed out that in England the Court has no discretion to reject the
testimony of the child, unless it appears to the Court that the child is incapable of
497 B50-2003.
498 Richardson (ed) Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence & Practice (2002) § 8-26.
499 Oaths Act 1978.
500 Children and Young Persons Act 1963.
501 Oaths Act 1978.
502 Criminal Justice Act 1988.
503 S 33A(3).
504 Criminal Justice Act 1991.
505 Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
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giving intelligent testimony.i'" The Court must determine the ability of the child to
give intelligent evidence by questioning the child or by watching a videotaped
interview with the child.507
In R v Hampshire508 the Court found that, although it is not a legal requirement, it
may be appropriate for the presiding officer to remind the child, in the presence of
the defendant and the jury, of the importance of telling the truth.
With regard to the testimony of children above the age of fourteen years, section
55 of the Youth and Criminal Evidence Act509 provides that when deciding
whether a witness in criminal proceedings may be sworn for purposes of giving
evidence on oath, the witness may not be sworn unless he or she has attained the
age of 14 years510 and has a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion
and of the particular responsibility that is involved in taking an oath."! If the
witness is able to understand the questions put to him or her and give
understandable answers to those questions, he or she will be presumed to have
sufficient appreciation of the above mentioned matters.512
Section 56 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Acë13 makes it possible for
a competent witness who is not permitted to be sworn for purposes of giving
evidence on oath, to give unsworn evidence. In such cases section 56(5) provides
that "no conviction, verdict or finding in those proceedings shall be taken unsafe
for purposes of appeal by reason only that it appears that the witness should have
given his or her evidence on oath."
In the United States of America various different provisions with regard to the oath
apply in different states. Rule 603 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that
506 Richardson (ed) Archbold § 8-34 1036.
507 Richardson (ed) Archbold § 8-34 1036. See also Muller Child Witness 76 and the authority cited
there.
508 [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 319.
509 Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
510 S 55(2)(a).
511 S 55(2)(b).
512 S 55(3) read with S 55(7).
513 Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
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"[b ]efore testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with a duty to do so"
At common law it was accepted that there was a certain age below which the
capacity to take the oath was non-existent. This notion has since been rejected and
at present there is no specific age below which the capacity to take the oath will
always be wanting.Ï'" What needs to be determined is whether the child has the
capacity to understand the distinction between the truth and lies and whether the
child understands that he will be punished if he lies. SISIf the child can understand
this, the child may take the oath or make the affirmation. The administering of the
oath does not need to take on a particular form and a promise to tell the "absolute
truth" may be sufficient.ê'" Should the child not be able to understand the concept
of the oath, the Court may instruct the child on the meaning of the oath.Sl7
There are, however, a number of states which allow a child to testify without
taking the oath or making an affirmation.sl8 Examples of these are Florida, where
the Court has the discretion to allow a child to testify without taking the oath if the
Court is satisfied that the child understands the obligation to speak the truth.Sl9 In
New York a child under the age of twelve may give unsworn evidence if the court
is satisfied that the child has sufficient intelligence and capacity. The rider is that
the accused may not be convicted on uncorroborated, unsworn testimony.s20
514 Chadbourn Wigmore on Evidence (1976) Volume 6 § 1821.
515 Chadbourn Wigmore § 1821. See also Muller Child Witness 182 and Perry & Wrightsman Child
Witness 43-45.
516 See Burkett v State 439 SO.2D 737 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).
517 Chadbourn Wigmore § 1821.
518 Muller Child Witness 182.
519 Muller Child Witness 182.
520 S 60.20 (3) New York State Consolidated Laws: Criminal Procedure. S 60.20 reads:
"1. Any person may be a witness in a criminal proceeding unless the court fmds that,
by reason of infancy or mental disease or defect, he does not possess sufficient
intelligence or capacity to justify the reception of his evidence.
2. Every witness more than nine years old may testify only under oath unless the
court is satisfied that such witness cannot, as a result of mental disease or defect,
understand the nature of an oath. A witness less than nine years old may not testify
under oath unless the court is satisfied that he or she understands the nature of an
oath. If in either case the court is not so satisfied, the witness may nevertheless be
permitted to give unsworn evidence if the court is satisfied that the witness possesses
sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify the reception thereof. A witness
understands the nature of an oath if he or she appreciates the difference between truth
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In terms of section 13 of the Canada Evidence Act521a judge may administer an
oath to every witness who is called to give evidence before that court. Section 14
makes provision for the making of an affirmation instead of taking an oath. The
making of the affirmation has the same effect as the taking of an oath.522
Section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act523states that where a proposed witness is a
person under fourteen years of age or a person whose mental capacity is
challenged, the court must, before permitting the person to give evidence, conduct
an inquiry to determine (a) whether the person understands the nature of an oath or
a solemn affirmation; and (b) whether the person is able to communicate the
evidence.Y" If the person understands the nature of an oath or a solemn affirmation
and is able to communicate the evidence, that person must testify under oath or
solemn affirmation.t" Should the witness not understand the nature of an oath or a
solemn affirmation but have the ability to communicate the evidence, the witness
may testify on promising to tell the truth.526A person who does not understand the
nature of an oath or a solemn affirmation or who is unable to communicate the
evidence may not testify.527
With regard to a witness above the age of 14 years, there exists a presumption that
the witness has the necessary capacity to understand the nature of the oath or
affirmation and that the witness has the capacity to communicate the evidence. The
party who wishes to rebut this presumption bears the burden of proof. 528
In Scotland the rule that all witnesses had to give evidence under oath and that girls
under the age of 12 and boys under the age of 14529were forbidded to take the oath
and therefore disqualified from testifying, was abolished by the Evidence Act
and falsehood, the necessity for telling the truth, and the fact that a witness who
testifies falsely may be punished.
3. A defendant may not be convicted of an offense solely upon unsworn evidence
given pursuant to subdivision two."
521 R.S. 1985, c. C-5.
522 S 14(2).
523 R.S. 1985, c. C-5.
524 S 16(1).
525 S 16(2).
526 S 16(3).
527 S 16(4).
528 S 16(5).
529 So-called "pupils".
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(Scotlandjr" in 1840. Where the witness has the ability to understand the nature of
the oath, the witness is required to take the oath, while in cases where the witness
lacks this ability, the taking of the oath is merely dispensed with altogether.t"
Evaluation
The reasons for the taking of the oath are to be found in the need to convince the
witness to tell the truth because "God would damn his soul forever if he lied".532
Where this purpose cannot be achieved as a result of some or other pre-disposition
of the witness, the legislature prescribes an affirmation or admonishment to tell the
truth. Since the basis for sections 162, 163 and 164 of the Criminal Procedure
Act533is to be found in the need to have only truthful testimony placed before the
court, thereby ensuring that neither a wrong conviction nor a wrong acquittal is
made, it reflects Due Process values.
As mentioned before, Punitive Victims' rights values place the emphasis on factual
rather than legal guilt, in terms of which it would be unacceptable for otherwise
potentially reliable evidence to be excluded merely as a result of the wrong
procedure being used. Viewed from this perspective, the problem with the oath
does not lie in the existence of the provisions relating to the oath, affirmation or
admonition, but rather in their practical application. As is apparent from S v B534
the danger exists that the evidence of a witness can be excluded on appeal on the
basis that the presiding officer in the trial court should have seen to it that the
witness take the oath or make the affirmation instead of issuing a warning to the
witness.535 The converse is also true: where the presiding officer allows the witness
to take the oath without investigating whether the witness understands the nature
and import of the oath, the evidence might also be excluded on appea1.536Although
530 Evidence Act (Scotland) 1840.
53 I Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 67.
532 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 48.
533 51 of 1977.
534 2003 1 SA 552 (A).
535 See also S v Mashava 1994 1 SACR 224 (T) 228j-229a; S v Vumazonke 2000 1 SACR 619 (C)
625h-j; S v Pienaar 2001 1 SACR 391 (C) 396c; S v Stefaans 1999 1 SACR 182 (C) 186b-c.
536 See S v N 1996 2 SACR 225 (C) 230c-g. In that case the witness took the oath after the
magistrate had investigated the competency of the witness. The magistrate did not, however,
enquire into the ability of the witness to understand the nature and import of the oath before she
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RlGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RlGHTS 93
the court in S v Mashava537 found that the admission of such evidence is not an
irregularity in the true sense of the word538 for purposes of section 309 of the
Criminal Procedure Act,539the court's decision to disregard the victim's evidence
in this case540resulted in the exclusion of the only evidence linking the accused to
the crime.54! It also added to the lack of certainty created by previous findings.
Kriegler & Kruger are of the opinion, for example, that in cases where there is
doubt a warning in terms of section 164 is to be preferred, since this would most
probably have a deeper impact on the child.542
The court in S v Mashava543 was correct in finding that an error by the presiding
officer in his decision regarding the desirability of applying section 164 does not
per se constitute an irregularity which results in a failure of justice. Such an error
will also not necessarily infringe the fair trial rights of the accused, an infringement
of which will depend on the circumstances of each case. Therefore, the mere fact
that such an error was made will not necessarily be fatal. What needs to be
established is whether the inconsistency resulted in an infringement of the fair trial
rights of the accused.
took the oath, although the magistrate did establish that the witness was a regular churchgoer. See
also S v Seymour 1998 1 SACR 66 (N) 71d.
537 1994 1 SACR 224 (T).
538 227j - 228a.
539 S 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for appeal from a lower court to a higher court.
The appeal can be based on a point oflaw or on the factual fmding of the presiding officer. S 309(3)
provides that "[t]he provincial or local division concerned shall thereupon have the powers referred
to in s 304 (2), and, unless the appeal is based solely upon a question of law, the provincial or local
division shall, in addition to such powers, have the power to increase any sentence imposed upon
the appellant or to impose any other form of sentence in lieu of or in addition to such sentence:
Provided that, notwithstanding that the provincial or local division is of the opinion that any point
raised might be decided in favour of the appellant, no conviction or sentence shall be reversed or
altered by reason of any irregularity or defect in the record or proceedings, unless it appears to such
division that a failure of justice has in fact resulted from such irregularity or defect.
540 228j. The same approach was followed in S v Vumazonke 2000 1 SACR 619 (C), S v Pienaar
2001 1 SACR 391 (C), S v Seymour 1998 1 SACR 66 (N), S v N 1996 2 SACR 225 (C) and SvB
2003 1 SA 552 (A)
541 See S v Mashava 1994 1 SACR 224 (T) 228j-229a where the conviction of the accused was set
aside on the basis that the evidence of the witness is inadmissible and that there is no other evidence
linking the accused to the crime. See also S v Vumazonke 20001 SACR 619 (C) 625h-j.
542 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 425.
543 1994 1 SACR 224 (T).
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The proposed amendments of the South African Law Commission largely resemble
the position in England.544 In Scotland, USA and Canada, the presiding officer is
required to inquire into the witness's ability to understand the nature of the oath.
Where the witness can understand the nature of the oath, these jurisdictions require
that the child take the oath or make the affirmation.
It is clear that the amendments proposed by the South African Law Commission
are based on Victims' rights values which prioritise conviction of the factually
guilty. The retention of the admonition in the proposed section 164, however, still
reflects the suspicion with which evidence is viewed and therefore still reflects Due
Process values.
The practical effect of the new provision will be that where the presiding officer
merely admonishes the witness to speak the truth, the fact that the witness did in
fact have the ability to understand the nature and import of the oath or affirmation
will not result in the evidence of the witness being excluded on appeal. However,
where the presiding officer does allow the witness to take the oath or make the-affirmation, testimony given by the witness may still be excluded on appeal should
it appear that the witness did not understand the nature and import of the oath.
Therefore, despite the fact that the presiding officer is no longer required to enquire
into the ability of the witness to understand the nature and import of the oath, it is
important that he satisfy himself that the witness does in fact understand the nature
and import of the oath or affirmation before resorting to sections 162 or 163.
Despite the shift from Due Process to Victims' rights values, there is, in this
context, no real opposition between Due Process claims and Victims' Rights values
in this context. Any opposition which might have existed is eliminated by the
retention of the discretion of the presiding officer not only with regard to the initial
admission of the evidence, but also with regard to the weight to be attached to the
evidence. Therefore, the proposed amendments should not have a significant
impact on the rights of the accused. Whether or not there has been an infringement
544 Save that S 33A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 sets an age requirement of 14 years or younger
and that the witness need not necessarily be admonished to speak the truth, although the latter is
preferable.
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of the fair trial right depends on the circumstances of the case. However, it is clear
that the mere fact that the wrong provision was used does not, in itself, constitute
and infringement of these rights.
5 4 Cautionary rules and corroboration
Ever mindful of the fact that a wrong conviction of an accused is possible, certain
rules of practice have been developed over time by courts in the law of evidence.
These rules of practice do not have the force of law, but were created with a view
to helping the judicial officer in the evaluation of evidence545 and can be described
as cautionary rules.546 What a cautionary rule in effect does, is to remind the
judicial officer that the "facile acceptance of the credibility of certain witnesses
may be dangerous'V'" Application of the cautionary rule requires, first, that the
court remind itself to be careful when considering certain evidence and, second, to
seek some or other safeguard reducing the risk of a wrong finding based on the
suspect evidence.i'" One of the ways in which the risk of a wrong finding can be
reduced is by corroboration of the evidence to which the cautionary rule is
applied.i" Possible safeguards are, however, not limited to corroboration, and any
factor which, in the ordinary course of human experience, can reduce the risk of a
wrong finding, will suffice.55o
The basis of the development of cautionary rules is clearly to be found in the need
to prevent wrong convictions. Zeffertt et a/55! describe the basis of cautionary rules
as follows:
"The cautionary rules have been evolved because the collective wisdom and
experience of judges has found that certain kinds of evidence cannot be safely relied
upon unless accompanied by some satisfactory indication of trustworthiness."
545 Schmidt & Rademeyer Schmidt Bewysreg 4th ed (2000) 121.
546 Cautionary rules have, in the past, been applied to a number of scenarios, for example cases
where a party relies on the testimony of a single witness, where children testify, where the witness
is the complainant or plaintiff in sexual cases, where evidence of identification is heard and where
the testimony of an accessory is heard, to name but a few.
547 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 513.
548. Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 5l3.
549 Schmidt & Rademeyer Bewysreg 122.
550 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 5l3.
551 Zeffertt et al Evidence 799.
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At common law three different cautionary rules would have applied to the victim
of a sexual offence where the victim was a child and the only witness to the
offence. In the following section attention will be drawn to these three cautionary
rules. Despite the abolition of the rule applicable to the evidence of the victim of a
sexual offence, this rule will be discussed as a basis for the argument in favour of
the abolition of the cautionary rule relating to the evidence of children.
54 1 Sexual offences
The first cautionary rule is that which applied to the evidence of complainants in
sexual cases.552 It is believed that the cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of
a complainant in a sexual offence case originates from a statement made by Lord
Chief Justice Hale during the 17th century.553 Lord Hale expressed the following
OpInIOn:
"Rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.v"
Various reasons have been given for the application of the cautionary rule with
regard to the evidence of complainants in sexual offences.f" In the first instance,
sexual offences often occur in private and leave no outward traces, thereby making
it very difficult to refute an assertion that there was no consent. 556This problem is
compounded by the allegation that women "frequently lie about being raped".557
552 The general cautionary rule in this regard has since been abolished. See the discussion on S v J
19982 SA 984 (A) infra.
553 Fryer "Laws versus prejudice: views on rape through the centuries" 1994 SACJ74.
554 Bronstein "The Cautionary Rule: An Aged Principle in Search of Contemporary Justification"
1992 SAJHR 557 and the authority cited there.
555 See in general: Bronstein 1992 SAJHR 557; Labuschagne "Versigtigheidsreël by Seksuele Sake:
Opmerkinge oor die Menseregtelike Begrensing van die Bewysreg" 1992 Obiter 131; Schwikkard
"Sexual Offences - The Questionable Cautionary Rule" 1993 SAL.! 46; Jagwanth & Schwikkard
"An Unconstitutional Cautionary Rule" 1998 SACJ 87; Chinner "Stawing en Versigtigheidsreëls in
die Strafreg" 1995 THRHR 73; Viljoen "Die Redelikheid en Onrustigheid oor die
Versigtigheidsreël by Verkragting" 1993 TSAR 173; Fouche "Die Versigtigheidsreël in Gevalle van
Seksuele Wangedrag" 1993 Consultus 50; Wilmot "The Cautionary Rule in Sex Crimes" 1992
SA CJ 211; Viljoen. "Removing Insult from Injury: Reviewing the Cautionary Rule in Rape Trails"
1992 TSAR 743.
556 Jagwanth & Schwikkard 1998 SACJ 88.
557 Fryer 1994 SACJ 61 and the authority cited there.
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Schreiner JA in R v Rautenbach558 was of the opinion that
"[i]t is not only the risk of conscious fabrication that must be guarded against; there is
also the danger that a frightened woman, especially if inclined to hysteria, may
imagine that things have happened which did not happen at all"
In R v W,559 Watermeyer CJ found that in addition to the reasons mentioned by
Schreiner JA, evidence in cases of sexual assault should be treated with caution
because
"[w]here pregnancy has supervened and in that way it has become necessary for the
girl to explain her condition, she may be tempted to shield some young friend who is
the actual wrongdoer and to implicate someone of relatively sound financial standing
who may be better able than the actual father of the child about to be born to provide
it with maintenance".
Financial considerations, spite, sexual frustration or other unpredictable emotional
causes, may be the motive behind the bringing of a charge against an alleged
offcndcr.i'" Even where the motive for the bringing of the charge may not be
readily apparent, there can, according to Botha JA, be no doubt that the risk of
false accusation may be present. 56!
For these reasons, inter alia, the cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of
complainants in sexual cases was applied in the South African Law.562 However,
the application of this cautionary rule was abolished in South Africa in 1998 by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of S v J 563 InJ the appellant was found guilty
of attempted rape and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. After an unsuccessful
appeal to the Cape Provincial Division, the accused appealed to the Supreme Court
of Appeal. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the trial court had
misdirected itself in not truly applying the cautionary rule in respect of the
evidence of complainants in sexual cases.564 It was contended that the magistrate
merely paid lip service to the rule. The court, per Olivier JA, found that the rule is
55819491 SA 135 (A) 143.
559 1949 3 SA 772 (A) 780.
560 Hoffmann & Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence 3rd ed (1986) 455.
561 S v F 1989 3 SA 847 (A) 8531-1.
562 See R v M 19474 SA 489 (N); RvS 1948 4 SA 419 (GW); R v Ncanana 19484 SA 399 (A); R v
Rautenbach 1949 1 SA 135 (A); R v W 19493 SA 772 (A); RvD 1951 4 SA 450 (A); R vJ 19661
SA 88 (SR); S v Snyman 19682 SA 582 (A); S v Balhuber 1987 1 PH H22 (A); S v F 1989 3 SA
847 (A); S v M 19922 SACR 188 (W); S v Ncanywa 19922 SA 182 (Ck).
563 S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
564 1006H -I.
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based on the notion that women are habitually inclined to lie about being raped.565
The court found that this justification lacks any factual or reality-based foundation
and that it can be exposed as a myth.566 The court undertook a brief comparative
analysis of the continued use of the cautionary rule and found that
"the cautionary rule in sexual assault cases is based on an irrational, out-dated
perception. ,,567
Accordingly, it found that, although the evidence in a particular case may call for a
cautionary approach, this was a far cry from the application of a general cautionary
rule.568
In endorsing the guidance provided by the English Court of Appeal in R v
Makanjuola; R v Easton,569 the court in J offered some guidance as to when
caution should be applied. This includes cases where, inter alia, the witness has
been shown to be unreliable, where the witness has been shown to have lied, to
have made previous false complaints or to bear the accused some grudge.570 The
court emphasised that, although it may be appropriate to exercise caution in a
particular case, this will not be simply because the witness is a complainant in a
sexual case. There must be an evidential basis for suggesting that the evidence of
the witness may be unreliable and not a mere suggestion to that effect by cross-
examining counsel. 571 This finding has since been applied in Director of Public
Prosecutions v S572and in the Zimbabwean case of S v Banana.573
In S v Jones574 the court followed the approach suggested in S v }75 with regard to
the evidence of the complainant in a sexual offence matter and came to the
conclusion that, since the victim is a single witness and there are unusual features
in her testimony, caution should be applied in the assessment of her evidence. Here
565 1007F.
566 1007G.
5671009E.
568 1009F.
569 [1995] 3 All ER 730 (CA).
570 IOWA.
571 lOWE.
572 2000 2 SA 711 (T).
573 2000 3 SA 885 (ZS).
574 2004 1 SACR 420 (C) 427f
575 S V J 19982 SA 984 (A).
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the court stressed that the cautionary rule does not require that the evidence must
be free of all criticism, but that it must either be satisfactory in relation to material
aspects, or that it must be corroborated.
In its discussion paper, the South African Law Commission opined that although
the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v J576 removed the obligation to treat evidence
of victims of sexual offences with caution, the discretion to do so still remains.577
Although the guideline for the exercise of the discretion is that there needs to be an
evidential basis suggesting that the evidence of the witness may be unreliable and
must therefore be approached with caution, the Commission opined that this
approach holds the danger that, in establishing the evidential basis, the issues in
dispute may be broadened and evidence that would otherwise be irrelevant might
need to be introduced.V'' Therefore, the Commission recommended that a clause
providing for the abolition of the cautionary rule in sexual offences should be
included in the Sexual Offences Act. 579
After evaluating comments on the Discussion Paper and after having re-studied the
judgement of the Supreme Court Appeal in S v J,580 the Commission was of the
opinion that the court in Sv J58l made it clear that a complainant's evidence should
not be treated with caution merely because of the nature of the offence and that the
application of caution would need to be preceded by an evidential basis for
suggesting that the witness may be unreliable.
Therefore, the Commission was of the opinion that in light of the rejection of the
cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of the complainant of a sexual offence
by the Supreme Court of Appeals in S v J582 legal reform is clearly not necessary.
However, the Commission was of the opinion that "there can be no harm in giving
legislative confirmation to the repeal of the common law".583 Accordingly, the
576 S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
577 § 31.2.4.5. Emphasis in the original.
578 § 31.2.4.5.
579 § 31.2.4.10.
580 S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
581 S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
582 S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
583 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 5.2.2.
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Commission recommended the inclusion of section 20 in its Draft Sexual Offences
Bill. Section 18(a) of the Draft Sexual Offences Bill reads:
''Notwithstanding the provisions of the common law, any other law or any rule of
practice, a court shall not treat the evidence of a witness in criminal proceedings
pending before that court with caution and shall not call for corroboration of evidence
merely because that witness is -
(a) the complainant of a sexual offence ... "
With regard to the retention of a discretion to apply caution where it is warranted,
the Commission was of the opinion that this did not amount to the retention of a
residual cautionary rule allowing the presiding officer to generally apply the rule if
he or she should so decide.584 The Commission was mindful of the fact that a
particular case may call for a cautionary approach, but was of the opinion that
legislation prohibiting the general use of the cautionary rule would not preclude the
court from following a cautionary approach where necessary.r"
The approach followed by the South African Law Commission and the abolition of
the general cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of the complainant of a
sexual offence, are in line with the recent developments in case law. Considering
that the cautionary rule was a common law rule of practice, which had already
been abolished by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v J586 it is, at first glance,
difficult to see why the Commission still found it necessary to include section
20(a) in the Bill. However, in S v Van der Ross587 the court found that
"[t]he judgment in S v J 1998 (1) SACR 470 (SCA) (1998 (2) SA 984) does not mean
that trial courts are free to convict in an indiscriminate and reckless manner where the
charge is of a sexual nature. It also does not mean that in those cases courts no longer
have to be cautious. On the contrary, criminal courts should be encouraged to
exercise extreme caution before they convict people on serious charges, such as rape,
especially with the introduction of prescribed sentences by the Legislature. All that
the judgment in S v J means is that a general, immutable cautionary rule does not
have to be applied to the evidence of the complainant in such cases. The evidence in a
particular case may call for a cautious approach. It will depend on the facts and the
584 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 5.2.2.
585 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 5.2.2.
586 S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
58720022 SACR 362 (C).
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circumstances of each individual case as to whether such an approach is necessary or
not.,,588
As a result of the court's approach in Van der Ross589 Schwikkard=" expressed the
opinion that if the judgement in S v J591 is open to such interpretation, the Law
Commission's recommendation relating to the statutory abolition of "this
iniquitous rule,,592 should be acted upon. Similar to the Law Commission's
recommendation, section 5 of the Namibian Combating of Rape Act593contains a
statutory abolition of the cautionary rule applicable to the evidence of the
complainant in a sexual offence.
Evaluation594
When the abolition595 of the general cautionary rule in respect of the evidence of a
victim of a sexual offence is evaluated, one comes to the undeniable conclusion
that the interests and rights of the victim (and in this case, the child witness) are
served by the abolition. As Steyn596 puts it, "[a]ny treatment of sexual
complainants as witnesses, other than that meted out to ordinary witnesses, is no
longer justified". Although the court in S v J597 did not base its finding on the
constitutional rights of children.Ï" nor on the equality clause,599 it is submitted that
the effect of the abolition of this archaic rule is the realisation of these very rights.
Therefore it can be said that Punitive Victims' rights values underlie the abolition
of the rule.
588 365f-i. Quotation taken from the headnote of the case. See further S v Jones 2004 1 SACR 420
(C).
58920022 SACR 362 (C).
590Schwikkard "Evidence" 2003 SAC! 8994-95.
59119982 SA 984 (A).
592Schwikkard 2003 SAC! 8995.
5938 of 2000.
594Since the general cautionary rule with respect to the evidence of a complainant in a sexual
offence trial has been abolished, this evaluation will focus only on the position as it presently
stands. The focus will, accordingly, be on the impact that the abolition of the rule has on the rights
of the accused and on the rights and/or interests of the child witness.
595Although the South African Law Commission was of the opinion that the court in S v J 1998 2
SA 984 (A) merely reformulated the existing rule, this view will be discussed infra, and for
purposes of this evaluation, this is disregarded.
596Steyn "Witnesses in South Africa, The Stepchildren of the Criminal Justice System" (1999)
Unplublished LLM thesis 111.
59719982 SA 984 (A).
598See s 28(1)(d) which guarantees the child's right to be protected from abuse and degradation.
599S 9.
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Viewed against Due Process values and the accused's right to a fair trial, 600 it may
be argued that the abolition of this general cautionary rule may infringe the right to
a fair trial601 since this may, in many cases, force the accused to testify at his own
trial in order to rebut the testimony of the only other eye-witness. However,
although this may be the practical effect of the abolition of the cautionary rule, the
purpose served by the abolition of the rule, namely the equal treatment of
complainants in sexual offence cases, can be regarded as a rational and justifiable
measure for purposes of limitation of the accused's rights. After all, the accused
may still choose to remain silent and not to testify.
Subsequent to the judgement in S v j02 the evidence of a complainant in cases of a
sexual nature may not be approached with circumspection merely because the
offence is sexual in its nature. Where the evidence available to the prosecution,
however, is only that of a single witness, the same caution would still apply as
would be the case in all other matters where the prosecution seeks to rely on the
evidence of a single witness. In the result, the accused is still afforded the same
measure of protection he would have where the charge is not sexual in nature. This,
coupled with the presumption of innocence.ï'" will afford sufficient protection to
the accused, and therefore, the abolition of the cautionary rule with regard to the
evidence of the complainant will not have a significant negative impact on the
rights of the accused.
5 4 2 Children
The second cautionary rule that has developed is a rule of practice that requires a
presiding officer to remind him or herself consciously to be careful when
considering the evidence of children and to seek some sort of safeguard to reduce
the risk of a wrong finding based on suspect evidence.604 Although it is not a fixed
600 S 35(3) Constitution.
601 Specifically the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent and not to testify during the trial,
as enumerated in s 35(3)(h) of the Constitution.
602 S v J 19982 SA 984 (A).
603 S 38(h) Constitution.
604 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 513. See also S vArtman 19683 SA 339 (A).
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rule of law that the evidence of children needs to be corroborated.ï'" the courts
often require such corroboration.ï'" Even where this does not happen, judicial
officers are reminded that the evidence of children must be approached with
caution.607
The development of this rule of practice is underpinned by the "inherent dangers in
the testimony of children".608 The court in R v Belf09 expressed the opinion that
such dangers occur especially if the substance of the testimony has reference to
sexual matters and that the court should not ordinarily convict the accused unless
the evidence of the child has been treated with due caution. What these dangers are
is not entirely clear.6lOInR v Manda.i" the court viewed the imaginativeness and
suggestibility of children as two of a number of reasons why their evidence should
be "scrutinized with care amounting, perhaps, to suspicion".612 Schreiner JA did
not elaborate on the other elements to which he had eluded, but in R v .1'13it was
noted that a complaint in a sexual case involving a child may be a mere figment of
the child's imagination.v" or a false allegation of rape against an innocent person
in order to cover up wilful indulgence in some form of sexual experience with
another child or adolesccnt.V''
It is possible to identify a gradual decline over the years in the application of the
cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of children. In 1933, for example, in R
v De Beer,616 Grindley Ferris J refused to accept the testimony of a six-year old
witness, finding that, although she was a competent and reliable witness, there was
605 Zieff 1991 SACJ 4 28. See also R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A) 162H and Woji v Santam
Insurance Company Ltd 1981 1 SA 1020 (A) 1027H-I028A. .
606 Le Roux "Kinders en die versigtigheidsreël" 1990 The Magistrate 148 and the authority cited
there.
607 Le Roux 1990 The Magistrate 148 and 150. See also S v Artman 1968 3 SA 339 (A) and De
Beer v R 1933 NPD 30.
608 R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A).
609 1929 CPD 478 480.
610 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 151.
61119513 SA 158 (A).
612 163C. The question of the suggestibility and imaginativeness of children was also raised in R v J
19583 SA 699 (SR) 702.
613 R v J 1966 1 SA 88 (SR) 91G-H. See also R v Bell 1929 CPD 478 480.
614 R v J 1966 1 SA 88 (SR) 91G-H. See also R v Bell 1929 CPD 478 480.
615 R v J 1966 1 SA 88 (SR) 99F-G.
6161933 NPD 30.
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no corroborative evidence and therefore rejection of the evidence was justified.617
In the 1948 decision of R v ~18 the court found that the degree of corroboration
required before the evidence of a young child could be accepted depended on the
circumstances of the case. In this case the court found that where an intelligent ten
year old child gave evidence in a convincing manner, both in chief and under
cross-examination, the degree of corroboration required would be less than would
be the case if, for example, a six year old were testifying. Later in R vManda619 the
court, per Schreiner J, found that
"the nature of the evidence given by the child may be of a simple kind and may relate
to a subject matter clearly within the field of his understanding and interest and the
circumstances may be such as practically to exclude the risks arising from
suggestibility. In such circumstances it might perhaps be unfortunate if the courts
acted upon a rigid rule that corroboration should always be present before the child's
evidence is accepted".620
However, the court went further and expressed the view that "the dangers inherent
in reliance upon the uncorroborated evidence of a young child must not be
underrated'Y" In 1968 the court in S v Snyman622 stressed that the exercise of
caution should not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense.623 In Woji
v Santam Insurance Company Lt~24 the court, per Diemont JA, noted that
"[t]he question which the trial court must ask itself is whether the young witness'
evidence is trustworthy. Trustworthiness ... depends on factors such as the child's
powers of observation, his power of recollection, and his power of narration on the
specific matter to be testified. In each case the capacity of the particular child is to be
investigated. His capacity of observation will depend on whether he appears
'intelligent enough to observe'. Whether he has the capacity of recollection will
depend again on whether he has sufficient years of discretion 'to remember what
occurs' while the capacity of narration or communication raises the question whether
the child has the 'capacity to understand the questions put, and to frame and express
intelligent answers' ... There are other factors as well which the court will take into
account in assessing the child's trustworthiness ... Does he appear to be honest - is
there a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth? Then also 'the nature of the
evidence given by the child may be of a simple kind and may relate to a subject-
617See Le Roux 1990 The Magistrate 149.
61819484 SA 419 (GW).
61919513 SA 158 (A).
620163A-C.
621163C.
62219682 SA 582 (A).
623585G_H.
6241981 1 SA 1020 (A).
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matter clearly within the field of its understanding and interest and the circumstances
may be such as practically to exclude the risks arising from suggestibility'C'"
He went further, however, to say that
"[a]t the same time the danger of believing a child where evidence stands alone must
not be underrated.,,626
Before the decision in Woji, corroboration was often required in cases where a
child testified, or later, where a child testified about something that does not fall
clearly within the field of his understanding. Even though Woji was still based on
the premise that children are inherently less reliable than adults as witnesses.r" this
case was the first to recognise the individuality of children.628 In S v Sauls629 the
Appellate Division63o found that "the cautionary rule ... may be a guide to a right
decision but it does not mean 'that the appeal must succeed if any criticism,
however slender, of the witnesses' evidence were well founded".63l
According to Zieff,632 the incidents and degrees of caution applied by the courts
generally depend on the circumstances of each case. Schwikkard & Van der
Merwe refer to this notion, noting that any factor should suffice that in the ordinary
course of human experience can reduce the risk ofa wrong finding.633
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Hendrik Jacobus Swartz634 Kirk-Cohen J
changed the approach to the evidence of children in sexual cases when he found
"It is so that children lack the attributes of adults and, generally speaking, the
younger, the more so. However it cannot be said that this consideration ipso facto
requires of a court that it apply the cautionary rules of practice as though they are
matters of rote ... [I]t cannot be said that the evidence of children, in sexual and other
cases, where they are single witnesses, obliges the court to apply the cautionary rules
before conviction can take place ..."
6251028A_E.
6261028E.
627Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 152.
628Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 152.
62919813 SA 172 (A) 180G.
630As it then was.
631This case concerned the evidence of a single witness, but the principle expressed by Diemont JA
is just as valid in cases where it concerns the evidence of a child.
632Zieff 1991 SACJ 429.
633Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 513-514.
634Unreported 2 September 1999 Transvaal Provincial Division (case A 907/98).
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The court was prepared to acknowledge that the evidence in a particular case might
call for a cautionary approach.r" but found that such an approach would depend on
the facts in each case, for which it was impossible to lay down guidelines.
The South African Law Commission investigated the need for the abolition of the
general cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of children and in its
Discussion Paper636it stated that it could find no proof that children are prone to lie
more than adults, that they have more sexual fantasies than adults or that they have
more motive than adults to lay false charges.r" Since the Commission was of the
opinion that the cautionary rule relating to children is so entrenched in the daily
application of law in our courts, it recommended that the proposed Bill should
clearly state that this rule should no longer be applied.t"
After evaluation of comments made in respect of the proposals in the Discussion
Paper, the Law Commission expressed the opinion that the general application of
the rule of practice is inherently discriminatory in that children are disadvantaged
merely on the basis of their age.639Furthermore, the Commission made it clear that
its recommendation is largely aimed at terminating the general application of the
cautionary rule in cases where it is applied as a result of out-dated beliefs regarding
the cognitive ability and credibility of children.
As far as corroboration of the evidence of children is concerned, the Commission
noted that presiding officers mostly insist that the testimony of children be
corroborated in some way.640InDiscussion Paper 102 the Commission argued that
corroboration is often impossible in sexual offence matters, since medical evidence
or eye-witness testimony is often non-existent. In light of research the Commission
further concluded that the evidence of children is no less reliable than that of adults
635 Referring to S v J 1998 2 SA 984 (A).
636 SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 Project 107.
637 §§ 31.3.4.3,31.3.4.5 and 31.3.4.6 the authority cited there.
638 § 31.3.4.7.
639 § 5.2.2.
640 It is doubtful whether this statement of the Law Commission can be accepted as the absolute
truth. While it cannot be denied that corroboration of the evidence of children is often required by
presiding officers, it cannot with certainty be said that corroboration is mostly required.
Corroboration will, generally, be required where the evidence of the child is not in all respects
satisfactory.
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and for this reason it recommended that a clause prohibiting the practice of
requiring corroboration for the evidence of children be included in the draft Bill.
The Commission was prepared to accept that the requirement of corroboration is
not a rule of evidence, but rather a rule of practice, but was of the opinion that it
was necessary to provide legislative confirmation of the fact that corroboration of
the complainant's evidence is not necessary before a conviction can follow. This,
the Commission felt, would be in line with legislative provisions in other
jurisdictions, notably Australia. Accordingly, section 20 was included in the draft
Sexual Offences Bill.
Section 20(b) of the draft Sexual Offences Bill reads:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the common law, any other law or any rule of
practice, a court shall not treat the evidence of a witness in criminal proceedings
pending before that Court with caution and shall not call for corroboration of evidence
merely because that witness is -
(a)
(b) a child"
Although no specific mention is made of a discretion to apply caution in cases
where it is warranted with regard to the evidence of children, the Commission
approved the retention of this discretion with regard to the evidence of the
complainant in a sexual matter. In light of the fact that the Commission included
both the abolition of the cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of the
complainant as well as the abolition of the cautionary rule with regard to the
evidence of a child in section 18 of the Bill, it is submitted that it can be assumed
that a retention of such a discretion with regard to the evidence of children was
accepted by the Commission.
Evaluation
Although it is not entirely clear from case law what the "inherent dangers'Y" in the
testimony of children are, it is clear that the purpose of the rule with regard to the
evidence of children is to reduce the risk of a wrong conviction. Due Process
641 R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A).
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values and the presumption of innocence therefore underlie this rule. The tension
between these Due Process values and Punitive Victims' rights values which
require that the rights of crime victims be protected, is clear. Since the rights of
crime victims include the constitutionally guaranteed right to dignitl42 as well as
the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age,643this tension needs to
be resolved.
Much has been written about the cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of
children in South Africa.644What is common cause is that the application of the
cautionary rule should be re-evaluated.P" Schwikkard646 argues, for example, that
the cautionary rule applicable to children is prima facie discriminatory in that the
witness is disadvantaged on the basis of age. She adds that in order to pass the
limitation criteria647 the infringement of a right must be reasonable.648
Reasonableness, in tum, demands that the limitation must be rationally connected
to its objective. In order for such a rational connection to exist, the measure itself
must have a rational basis. If this is not the case, there would be no need to enquire
into the rationality of the connection between the rule and the objective. Therefore
the question is whether the cautionary rule which applies to the evidence of
children has a rational basis.
Spencer and Flin649 discuss SIX main objections to relying on the evidence of
children. The first objection is that children's memories are unreliable. The second
is that children are egocentric, the third that they are highly suggestible, the fourth
that they have difficulty distinguishing between fact and fantasy. In the fifth place,
children are said to make false allegations, particularly with respect to sexual
assault. Lastly, children do not understand the duty to tell the truth. With reference
642 SlO Constitution.
643 S 9 Constitution.
644 See in general Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 152; Zieff 1991 SACJ 4; Le Roux 1990 The
Magistrate 148; Struwig "Evaluation the evidence of the child witness - a common sense
approach" 2001 THRHR 596; Nicholas "Credibility of witnesses" 1985 SAIJ32.
645 See Struwig 2001 THRHR 602; Le Roux 1990 The Magistrate 151-152; Schwikkard 1996 Acta
Juridica 154. See also S v S 1995 1 SACR 50 (ZS) 59h.
646 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 154.
647 S 36 Constitution. Schwikkard refers to s 33 Interim Constitution.
648 Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 154.
649 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 285ff.
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to existing empirical studies, the authors discredit each one of these objections
individually.
Research has shown, for example, that children generally have a good recall of
central events but a poorer memory for detail and evidence of surrounding
occurrences. 650With regard to the second objection, they point out that while very
young children may be morally under-developed, the ability to make simple but
reasonable inferences about what other people feel, intend and think, develops
somewhere between the ages of four and five.651The so-called cognitive weakness
of young children, described as an inability to understand another person's point of
view and a selective memory for information of personal significance, is equally
true of adults.652Reliable research also shows that children may be susceptible to
suggestion, but so are adults.653 The degree of suggestibility must therefore be
minimised in both cases by posing questions designed to overcome known
pitfalls.f"
The authors also point out children do not fantasise about things that are beyond
their own direct or indirect experience.F'' Interestingly also, although children are
said to be prone to magnifying incidents, studies indicate that victims tend to
under-report the type and amount of abuse rather than to exaggerate.F" Spencer
and Flin's estimate that the incidence of false allegations of sexual abuse accounts
for less than 5% of the total of allegations.f" also counters the allegation that
children are more prone to lying than adults.658 In addition, research suggests that
they have the ability not only to distinguish between the truth and a lie from as
young as three years of age,659but also to understand the duty to tell the truth in
court from five or six years of age.660 This shows that the existence of the
cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of children has no rational scientific
650 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 289-301.
651 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 301-302.
652 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 302.
653 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 302-309.
654 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 302ff.
655 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 317-318.
656 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 318 and the authority cited there.
657 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 325.
658 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 329.
659 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 333 and the authority cited there.
660 Spencer & Flin Law and Psychology 334.
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basis. Thus there can be no rational connection between the infringement of the
child's right to equality and the objective sought to be achieved, namely reduction
of the possibility of a wrong finding and protection of the accused's right to a fair
trial. In these circumstances, there is no justification for the limitation of a child's
constitutionally guaranteed right to equality in favour of the accused's right to a
fair trial. As with the abolition of the cautionary rule that applied to victims of
sexual offences, the abolition of the cautionary rule that applies to the evidence of
children will therefore not have a significant impact on the fair trial rights of the
accused. Other measures, notably the cautionary rule with regard to the evidence of
the single witness, continue to exist and offer protection to the rights of the
accused.
5 4 3 Single witnesses
In terms of section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act661 an accused may be
convicted of any offence on the evidence of any single competent witness. The
word "competent" does not refer to the quality of the witness, but merely to the
requirement of competence set in section 193 of the Act. 662 Kriegler & Kruger663
point out that although the provision in section 208 is unqualified, courts follow a
cautious approach when the conviction of the accused is dependent on the evidence
of a single witness. In R vMokoena664 De Villiers JP found that
"the uncorroborated evidence of a single competent and credible witness is no doubt
declared to be sufficient for a conviction ... but ... that section should only be relied
on where the evidence of a single witness is clear and satisfactory in every material
respect."
This strict approach has often been criticised.f" but in a similarly named case of
several years later, R v Mokoena,666 Fagan JA pointed out that it was improbable
that De Villiers JP had intended to lay down a requirement of law that must be
66151 of 1977.
662Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 519.
663 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 519.
6641932 OPD 79.
665 R v Abdoorham 19543 SA 163 (N) 165D-E; R v Mokoena 19563 SA 81 (A) 86A-B.
66619563 SA 81 (A) 86B.
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strictly complied with. In R v Nhlapo/" Schreiner JA noted that while the dictum
of De Villiers JP in Mokoena might be a useful guide to a correct decision, it did
not mean that "an appeal must succeed if any criticism, however slender, of that
witness' evidence were well founded". Likewise, the court in R v r68 found that
although the remarks of De Villiers JP remain appropriate, they did not constitute a
rule of law. This was accepted in S v Sauls669 where Diemont JA found that
"[t]here is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a consideration
of the credibility of the single witness (see the remarks of Rumpff JA in S v Webber
1971 (3) SA 754 (A) at 758). The trial Judge will weigh his evidence, will consider
its merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether it is trustworthy and
whether, despite the fact that there are shortcomings or defects or contradictions in
the testimony, he is satisfied that the truth has been told. The cautionary rule referred
to by De Villiers, JP in 1932 may be a guide to a right decision but it does not mean
"that the appeal must succeed if any criticism, however slender, of the witnesses'
evidence were well founded" (Per Schreiner JA in R v Nh/apo (AD 10 November
1952) quoted in R v Bellingham 1955 (2) SA 566 (A) at 569). It has been said more
than once that the exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace the exercise of
common sense."
Although there is no rule of law requiring the court to approach the evidence of a
single witness with caution the dictum of De Villiers JP, as qualified by the court
in S v Sauls,670 can still be used as a guide in assessing the evidence of a single
witness.
Section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act67l clearly states that an accused may be
convicted on the single evidence of any competent witness. But despite this
provision the evidence of a single witness, particularly in sexual offence matters,
has been treated with the utmost caution by COurtS.672The Commission opined that
667Unreported Appellate Division decision of 10 November 1952. Quoted in R v Bellingham 19552
SA 566 (A) 569G.
66819582 SA 676 (A) 678B.
6691981 3 SA 172 (A) 180E-G. See also S v Kubeka 1982 1 SA 534 (W) and S v Banana 2000 2
SACR 1 (Z).
67019813 SA 172 (A) 180E-G.
67151 of 1977.
672See for example, in S v Joors 2004 1 SACR 494 (C) 504g where the court questioned the trial
court's application of the cautionary rule in this regard; S v Makeba 2003 2 SACR 128 (A) § [9]
131a-b where the court found that "[i]t is trite that the evidence of a single witness must, in order to
lead to a successful conviction, be clear and satisfactory in every material respect." In S v Mpuh/e
2002 1 SACR 550 (W)552d the court held that "[a] court would only be entitled to convict on the
evidence of a single witness if it is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such evidence is true."
Likewise, in S v H/ongwa 2002 2 SACR 37 (T) 49a the court found that "[t]o justify a conviction,
his evidence [that of the single witness] had to pass the test of being clear and satisfactory in all
material respects". See also S v Ndika 2002 1 SACR 250 (A) § [19] 256f § 31.4.3.1.
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the court should have the opportunity of weighing the evidence of the single
witness, without first cautioning itself of the fact that the witness is a single
witness.673 The court should, according to the Commission, consider the merits and
demerits of the evidence of the single witness and, having done so, decide whether
it is satisfied that the truth has been told.674 On this basis, the Commission
proposed that a clause should be included in the draft Bill stipulating the abolition
of the cautionary rule that applies to single witnesses.v"
This proposal of the Commission was met with much resistance. Itwas pointed out
in the Report on the Preliminary Investigation into the Review of the Rules of
Evidence'l" that the cautionary rules applicable to complainants in sexual offence
cases and children are flawed because their existence is largely based on an
irrational belief as to the truthfulness of such witnesses. On the other hand, it was
argued, the single witness rule is not based on the premise that certain categories of
witnesses are more mendacious than other, but that it merely constitutes a
recognition of the difficulties in assessing the credibility of the evidence in the
absence of an independent measure.
Furthermore, it was argued that the retention of the single witness rule should not
be open to constitutional challenge on the basis that it discriminates against a
specific group, but even if it is accepted that it is discriminatory, it would amount
to a reasonable and justifiable limitation which is allowed in terms of section 36 of
the Constitution.
The Commission expressed the view that recent developments in case law indicate
that a presiding officer may not caution himself as a matter of course and that the
court should weigh the evidence of the single witness and consider its merits and
demerits and, having done so, decide whether or not the truth has been told.677
Against this background the Law Commission withdrew its original
recommendation that the cautionary rule applicable to single witnesses be
673 § 31.4.3.1.
674 § 31.4.3.1.
675 § 31.4.3.2.
67626.
677 S v Sauls 1981 3 SA 172 (A) 180F; Director of Public Prosecutions vS 2000 2 SA 711 (T).
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abolished by the Sexual Offences Act. Therefore, the cautionary rule applicable to
the evidence of a single witness will continue to exist subject to the qualification
that the presiding officer may not caution himself as a matter of course and must
consider the merits and demerits of the evidence of the witness in each individual
case.
Evaluation
In the case of the so-called cautionary rule regarding the evidence of a single
witness a conflict exists between Due Process values, which require that a
conviction only follow on reliable evidence, and Victims' rights values, which
require conviction of the factually guilty in an attempt to protect the rights of
victims and potential victims of crime. This tension is especially noticeable in the
prosecution of sexual offences where the victim is often the only witness for the
prosecution. However, based on the fact that the cautionary "rule" is not a rule of
law, but merely a guideline to be used in assessing the evidence of a single witness,
there can be no real objection to the exercise of a cautionary approach.
SS Hearsay
In the prosecution of sexual offences against children, the child victim is often not
able to testify or does not want to testify at trial. The reasons for this are manifold.
For example, where the child is very young and has limited articulation ability, the
court may through the application of the competency test, refuse to permit the
complainant to testify.678Other reasons include the need to protect the child victim
from the possibility of secondary victimisation by the criminal justice system or
from the possibility of trauma caused by his participation in the criminal justice
process and the inability of the child to later recall the events which gave rise to the
charge. The admission of hearsay evidence can therefore play an important role in
the prosecution of alleged sexual offenders against children in the sense that
678 While the value of out-of-court statements of a child with limited articulation ability can be
questioned, it must be pointed out that while the court may [md that the child's articulation ability is
not satisfactory for purposes of testifying, it does not mean that the child will not be able to
communicate with other persons, such as a parent.
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evidence that would not otherwise have been placed before the court can be
brought before the court.
In terms of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,679hearsay evidence is defined as
"evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon
the credibility of any person other than the person giving such evidence".68o As a
general rule hearsay evidence is inadmissible. This is primarily as a result of the
constraints that the admission of the evidence places on cross-examination.ï'"
Section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Acë82 provides for certain
exceptions'f'' to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.684 In terms of
section 3(1)(c) of the Act, the court has a discretion and may, taking into account
the factors stipulated in section 3(1)(c)(i)-(vii), admit the evidence if it is of the
opinion that admission of the evidence is in the interests of justice. According to
the court in Metedad v National Employers' General Insurance Co Lt~85 the
purpose of the amendment of the common law regarding the admission of hearsay
evidence was to permit hearsay evidence in certain circumstances where the
application of the rigid common law principles might frustrate the interests of
justice.686 Here the court expressed the opinion that the exclusion of hearsay
evidence in cases where the testimony of an otherwise reliable person cannot be
obtained might result in a greater injustice that would its admission.t'" Further, the
court was of the opinion that the fact that hearsay evidence is untested by cross-
67945 of 1988.
680S 3(4).
681 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 256.
68245 of 1988.
683 The first two exceptions provided for in s 3(1)(a) and (b) will not be discussed here, since they
fall outside of the scope of this study.
684 S 3(1 )(a) provides that hearsay evidence is admissible if each party against whom the evidence is
to be adduced agrees to the admission thereof, while s 3(1)(b) provides that such evidence is
admissible if the person upon whose credibility the probative value of the evidence depends testifies
at the proceedings. Neither of these exceptions creates specific problems as far as the prosecution of
sexual offences against children is concerned and they will therefore not be discussed in this study.
6851992 1 SA 494 (W).
686498I.
687498I_A.
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examination is a factor which must be taken into account when the probative value
of the evidence is assessed.688
The factors listed in section 3(1)( c)(i)-(vii) are the following: (i) the nature of the
proceedings; (ii) the nature of the evidence; (iii) the purpose for which the
evidence is tendered; (iv) the probative value of the evidence; (v) the reason why
the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility the probative value
of such evidence depends; (vi) any prejudice to a party which may be caused by
the admission of such evidence; and (vii) any other factor which should be taken
into account in the opinion of the court. It is clear that this confers a wide
discretion on the court, since the court may take into account any other factor
which it considers should be taken into account. 689The wording of section 3(1)( c),
specifically the use of the word "and" between subsections 3(1)(c)(vi) and
3(1)(c)(vii), makes it clear that the court may not merely consider one or some of
the factors when deciding whether it is in the interests of justice to admit the
evidence.69o
Although the Law of Evidence Amendment Act691changed the common law and
the court is now vested with a discretion to admit hearsay evidence, the Law
Commission found that the prevailing view is that children's hearsay evidence in
sexual offence matters is not readily received and that a case will rarely be
prosecuted if the child victim is unable to testify.692 For this reason, the Law
Commission investigated the position regarding hearsay evidence of child victims
of sexual offences.
In Discussion Paper 102 the Commission noted that section 3(1)(c) of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act693provides the court with a discretion to admit hearsay
evidence if it is in the interests of justice to do SO.694However, the Commission
conceded that it is uncertain whether the presiding officer will exercise his
688499A.
689 See Mnyama v Gxalaba 1990 1 SA 650 (C) 653B.
690 Paizes "Evidence" in Du Toit, De Jager, Paizes, Skeen, & Van der Merwe Commentary on the
Criminal Procedure Act (1987) 24-49.
69145 of 1988.
692 Discussion paper 102 § 35.1.
69345 of 1988.
694 § 35.4.4.
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discretion in terms of section 3(1)(c) to admit the hearsay evidence of children who
do not testify at the proceedings.F" Due to the relative lack of reported judgments
in this regard, it is uncertain whether a problem indeed exists in practice and, if so,
what the exact cause of the problem is.
The Law Commission was of the opinion that the existing legal mechanism for the
admission of hearsay evidence is in line with, if not ahead of, international moves
to admit hearsay evidence, especially hearsay evidence of children who fall victim
to sexual offences.ï'" The Commission stated that it was not in favour of
recommending legislative amendment stating the obvious, nor could it see the need
to create an additional statute to regulate the admission of extra-curial statements
of sexual offence victims due to the fact that such evidence may already be
admissible in terms of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act697
and the fact that it would be highly unlikely that a presiding officer would convict
an accused solely on hearsay evidence. The Commission was of the opinion that
the hearsay evidence would have to be corroborated before a conviction can
follow.698
Despite the Commission's recommendation that no legislative amendments
relating to the admission of hearsay evidence be made, the Commission
acknowledged that there is an apparent disparity between the de facto and de iure
position and welcomed further submissions pertinent to the issue.699
In its final report on Sexual Offencesi'" the South African Law Commission's did
not discuss hearsay evidence. Therefore, the existing legal position will remain
unchanged and hearsay evidence of child victims of sexual offences will be
admissible, ifin taking into account the factors listed in section 3(1)(c) the court is
of the opinion that it would be in the interests of justice to admit such evidence.
695 § 35.4.6.
696 § 35.4.7.
69745 of 1988.
698 § 35.4.7.
699 § 35.4.8.
700 Report project 107.
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In the case of R v Khan 701 the Canadian Supreme Court developed a special
exception to the rule against hearsay. This exception applies in cases where the
evidence sought to be led relates to a statement made by a child. In Khan it was
held that hearsay statements by a child regarding the issue at trial may be admitted
in evidence provided that admission of the statement is necessary and the hearsay
statement is reasonably reliable. The court explained that the admission is
"necessary" if the court decides that the child is incompetent to give either sworn
or unsworn evidence, the child is unable or unavailable to testify or if the judge is
satisfied, based on psychological assessments of the child, that giving evidence
might be traumatic for the child or harm the child.702 InR v P (J)703 the court found
that the admission of hearsay evidence was necessary as a result of the extreme
youth of the victim.704 While in Khan v College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario'r" the inability of a young child to give a coherent or comprehensive
account of the events necessitated the admission of hearsay evidence.
Based on the Canadian approach it can be argued that the requirement of
"necessity" is similar to the requirement in South Africa that the admission of the
hearsay evidence must be "in the interests of justice". On this basis, hearsay
evidence relating to statements made by the child should be admitted where the
child is incompetent to testify, is very young, or cannot give a coherent or a
complete account of the events.
Evaluation
The rule against the admission of hearsay evidence is linked to the importance of
oral evidence, which is reflected in the requirement that the evidence be given
under oath and subject to cross-examination. In fact, the primary reason for the
exclusion of hearsay evidence is found in the constraints that it places on cross-
examination.Ï'" At least in criminal cases, therefore, the rule is based on Due
701 (1990) 2 SCR 531.
702546.
703 (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 276 (Quebec Court of Appeal) aff'd (1993) 1 SCR 469.
704 The victim was 2 and a half years old at the time of the alleged offence and five years old at the
time of the trial.
705 (1992) 9 OR (3d) 641 (Ontario Court of Appeal).
706 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 255.
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Process values that require that the matter be adjudicated only after the accused has
had full opportunity to discredit the case against him.
Because the admission of hearsay evidence in terms of section 3 is dependent on its
being in the interest of justice, which, in tum, is dependent on the particular
circumstances of the case, it is not possible to classify the exception created in
section 3(1)(c) as Due Process or Victims' Rights. However, one can identify Due
Process and Victims' rights values in the way in which the courts interpret the
requirement that admission of the evidence must be in the interests of justice. For
example, in S v Staggie707 Victims' rights values dictated the admission of hearsay
evidence in an application in terms of section 153 of the Criminal Procedure
Act,708 while in S v Ramavhale,709 Due Process values militated against the
admission of the hearsay evidence.
The question of balancing the Due Process constitutional fair trial rights of the
accused against Victims' rights claims is particularly important in the context of
prosecution of alleged sexual offenders against children where the child
complainant is often not capable of testifying in court. In this context it may, in the
opinion of the trial court, be in the interests of justice to allow hearsay evidence. It
is, however, important to consider the implications of admission of such evidence
on the fair trial rights of the accused. Although an accused person has the right to
challenge and adduce evidence in terms of section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution.i'"
hearsay evidence, by its very nature, denies the accused his right to cross-examine
the declarant, ie, the non-witness.Ï!'
The constitutional validity of section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Acel2
was challenged in S v Ndhlovu.713 On behalf of the appellants it was argued that
section 3 violates the right to a fair trial as guaranteed in section 35(3) of the Bill of
Rights and, more specifically, that it violates the right to adduce and challenge
7072003 1 SACR 232 (C) 241b.
70851 of 1977.
709 1996 1 SACR 639 (A).
710 108 of 1996.
711 S v Ramavhale 1996 1 SACR 639 (A) 649g-h.
71245 of 1988.
713 2002 2 SACR 325 (A).
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evidence.Ï'" However the court, per Cameron JA, concluded that the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act715"provides a constitutionally sound framework for the
admission of hearsay evidence.,,716 Despite the caution expressed in S v
Ramavhale't' the court found that a trial court should be "scrupulous to ensure
respect for the accused's fundamental right to a fair trial". A number of safeguards
were therefore identified to assist the court in this task.718
Firstly, the presiding officer generally has the duty to keep inadmissible evidence
out and to prevent a witness from giving hearsay evidence. Secondly, the
provisions of the act cannot be applied against an unrepresented accused unless the
significance of its provisions has been explained to him. Thirdly, the court finds a
safeguard in the fact that the accused cannot be ambushed by the "late or
unheralded admission of hearsay evidence'Y'" A further safeguard can, according
to the court, be found in the fact that a decision on the admissibility of evidence is
one of law and that a court of appeal can therefore overrule such a decision by a
lower court if it considers it to be wrong.720 The court also found that making the
admission of hearsay evidence "subject to broader, more rational and flexible
considerations" is in keeping with developments in other democratic societies
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.721
Respect for the accused's fundamental right to a fair trial includes the right to
adduce and challenge evidence. In this regard the court found that the Bill of
Rights does not guarantee an entitlement to subject all evidence to cross-
examination, but contains the right (subject to limitation in terms of section 36) to
"challenge evidence".722 In the case of hearsay evidence, the court considers the
right to challenge evidence as encompassing the entitlement to resist the admission
714 S 35(3)(i).
71545 of 1988.
716 § [26] 341b.
71719961 SACR 639 (A) 649d-e.
718 § [17] 337dff.
719 § [18] 338a. In this respect, the Court found that the prosecution must clearly signal its intention
to invoke the provisions of the Act before closing its case and the trial Judge must rule on its
admissibility at that stage so that the accused can appreciate the "full evidentiary ambit he ... faces".
§ [17].
720§ [22] 33ge.
721 § [23] 339h - 340a.
722 § [24] 340d-e.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 120
of the hearsay and to scrutinise its probative value, including its reliability.723 As
the interests of justice require the admission of hearsay evidence, the right to
challenge evidence does not encompass the right to cross-examine the original
declarant.Ï'" On this basis, the court found that no constitutional right is infringed
where hearsay evidence is admitted in terms of section 3(1)(c).725
Although there can be little doubt that the provisions of section 3(1)(c) have passed
constitutional muster it is significant that the court in Ndhlovu726 adopted an
approach in terms of which the question of admissibility of evidence and the right
to challenge evidence are conflated. The court seems to accept that reliability of the
hearsay evidence is sufficient fulfilment of the right to challenge evidence and
therefore does not find it necessary to explore the content of the right to challenge
evidence or, more importantly, the role played by cross-examination in the
fulfilment of the right.727
However, the role of cross-examination cannot be over-emphasised. Although the
purpose of cross-examination is primarily to test the testimony offered728 so that
the court may be in a position to asses the value of the evidence, cross-examination
has a number of subsidiary goals, which include the eliciting of evidence that is
favourable or advantageous to the cross-examiners' side,729 to demolish evidence
given in chief,730 to undermine the probative value of evidence given,731 to attack
and undermine the credibility of the witness,132 to elicit facts which may be used to
cross-examine others,733 and to put the cross-examiner's case to the witness for
723 § [24] 340e.
724 § [24] 340f
725 § [24] 340e.
726 2002 2 SACR 325 (A).
727 Schwikkard "The Challenge of Hearsay" 2003 SALf 6370.
728 S V Gobozi 1975 3 SA 88 (E).
729 Ferreira Strafproses in die Laer Howe 2nd ed (1979) 366; Daniels Morris Technique in Litigation
5th ed (2003) 202; Wrottesley The Examination of Witnesses in Court 3rd ed (1961) 781; S v Langa
19634 SA 941 (N); S v Engelbrecht 1967 1 PH Hl77 (SWPA); Carol! v Carol! 1947 4 SA 37 (N).
Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 420 goes as far as stating that this is the only objective of cross-
examination.
730 Ferreira Strafproses 366; Daniels Technique 202.
731 Ferreira Strafproses 366; Daniels Technique 202.
732 Ferreira Strafproses 386; Daniels Technique 202.
733 Distillers Corporation v Kotze 1956 1 SA 357 (A) 361D-E.
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purposes of eliciting reactions and explanations.i" By emphasising reliability and
not exploring the essential content of the right to challenge evidence the court in
Ndhlovu'i? created the risk of a narrow interpretation being placed on the right to
challenge evidence.Ï'"
As the court's finding in S v Ndhlovu'[' that no constitutional right is infringed
where hearsay evidence is admitted in terms of section 3(1)(C)738 creates the risk of
a narrow interpretation being placed on the right to challenge evidence, it is open
to criticism. The risk could however be obviated by applying the two-stage
approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane.V' In the first
stage the court, could have considered the content of the right in order to determine
whether an infringement had in fact existed. Only if it had, would the court have
been required to proceed to the second, limitations stage. Since the right to
challenge evidence must, at least, include the right to cross-examination, the court
in the Ndhlovu/" case would undoubtedly have had to find that the use of hearsay
evidence by the State violated the accused's right to challenge evidence through
cross-examination.Ï'" After coming to this conclusion, the court would have had to
proceed to the second stage of the enquiry to consider whether the infringement on
the right to challenge evidence could have been justified in terms of the limitations
clause.742 In light of the safeguards built into section 3(1)( c), a limitation of the
right to challenge evidence would have been reasonable and justifiable and would
therefore have passed constitutional scrutiny.
The balance between the Due Process rights of the accused on the one hand, and
Victims' Rights values on the other, therefore lies in the strict application of the
734Daniels Technique 202.
73520022 SACR 325 (A).
736Schwikkard 2003 SAL! 63 71.
7372002 2 SACR 325 (A).
738§ [24] 340e.
73919953 SA 391 (CC) § [26] 410B and § [102] 4351 - 436A.
7402002 2 SACR 325 (A).
741 Snyekers "Criminal Procedure" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz, Woolman
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (2003) 27-94A.
742 S 36 Constitution.
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requirements set in section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.743
Legislative interventions in this regard are therefore unnecessary.
5 6 Previous consistent statements
"Previous consistent statement", the third aspect discussed in this chapter, refers to
"a written or oral statement made by a witness on some occasion prior to testifying
and which corresponds with or is substantially similar to his or her testimony in
court".744 As a general rule, a witness is not allowed to refer to a previous
statement that is consistent with his testimony in court.745
The reason for the exclusion of previous consistent statements is to be found in its
lack of relevance.i" This can, in tum, be attributed to the cumulative effect of a
number of factors.Ï" First, because it is commonly accepted that a lie can be
repeated as often as the truth,748 the probative force of a previous consistent
statement is very low.749The danger of easy fabrication of evidence or so-called
"self-made" evidence also influences admissibility.P" Thirdly,75I since it can be
accepted that a witness's evidence will in all probability to consistent with what he
previously said about the same topic or incident, evidence of previous consistent
statements would be superfluous. Fourthly, as it would merely duplicate the
evidence already given by the witness, proof of a previous consistent statement
makes no probative contribution to the case.752 Lastly, the rule against self-
743 45 of 1988.
744 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 100.
745 R v Rose 1937 AD 467; S v Bergh 19764 SA 857 (A) 865G; S v Mkohle 1990 1 SACR 95 (A)
99c-d; S v Moolman 1996 1 SACR 267 (A) 300c.
746 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 101.
747 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 101.
748 R v Rose 1937 AD 467 473. See also Van Wyk in Ferreira Strafproses in die Laer Howe 2nd ed
(1979) 442.
749 S v Mkohle 1990 1 SACR 95 (A) 99d.
750 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 101 and the authority cited there. It is argued by van
Wyk in Ferreira Strafproses 442 that the witness might retell his story to a number of different
~eople with the view to calling those people to conftrm his evidence.
5! Tapper Cross and Tapper 272.
752 Holtzhausen v Roodt 1997 4 SA 766 (W) 774D.
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corroboration''P limits the probative value of the statement to such an extent that it
has little probative force.754
Despite the rule against the admissibility of previous consistent statements, a
number of exceptions have been developed. Relevant to this study is the one that
relates to the complaint of a victim of a crime of a sexual nature.755 This makes it
possible to lead evidence with regard to a voluntary complaint made by the victim
within a reasonable time after the commission of the alleged offence.756 The
requirements 757 that are set for the admission of previous consistent statements are
that the complaint must be voluntary.Ï'" it must have been made at the first
reasonable opportunity, the victim must testify, and must be a victim of a sexual
offence.
A voluntary complaint in sexual offences cannot result from leading or suggestive
questions/59 nor from intimidation.76o In R V C,761 for example, the accused was
found guilty of rape of a five year old girl, even though the complaint had been
made pursuant to questions by the mother of the victim. Since the questions were
neither of a suggestive nor leading in nature, the court found that the evidence of
the complaint had been correctly admitted.762 The decision on the character of the
question is therefore a matter that must be left to the discretion of the presiding
officer.763 In R v Osborne'ï" the court, per Ridley J, was of the opinion that
evidence would be inadmissible if the facts indicated that, but for the questioning,
there would have been no voluntary complaint. However, evidence regarding the
753For a discussion see Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 497ff. See also Schmidt &
Rademeyer Bewysreg 397ff and Zeffertt et al Evidence 403-404.
754Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 101.
755Due to the limited scope of this study, the discussion on the exceptions to the rule against the
admissibility of previous consistent statements will be limited to the exception regarding the
complaint in sexual cases where there is a victim.
756For a discussion on the origin of the exception see Harms "Res Gestae in the Suid-Afrikaanse
Reg" 1965 THRHR 257 268-269; Van der Merwe "Die toelatingsgrond en bewyswaarde van klagtes
in seksmisdade" 1980 Obiter 86 87ff; Labuschagne "Die klagte by seksmisdade" 1978 De Jure 18ff.
757 R v C 1955 4 SA 40 (N) 40G-H.
758S v T 1963 1 SA 484 (A) 486H.
759 R v Norcott 1971 KB 347; R v C 1955 4 SA 40 (N) 40G.
760 R v Osborne 1905 1 KB 551556; R v Gannon 1906 TS 114.
76119554 SA 40 (N).
76241D.
763 R v Osborne 1905 1 KB 551556.
7641905 1 KB 551.
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complaint would be admissible where the question merely anticipated a statement
that the complainant was about to make.765 The question of the voluntariness of a
complaint is therefore a factual question that depends solely on the circumstances
of the case.
The question of intimidation and its effect on the admissibility of evidence was
also raised in S v T.766 In T the accused, who had been convicted of the rape of a
child under the age of 12 years, appealed against the conviction. His main ground
for the appeal related to the admission in evidence of the complaint of the alleged
victim. On the facts it appeared that the complaint had been made only after the
mother of the complainant had threatened to hit her if she refused to tell the truth.
The court, per Hoexter JA, found that a complaint may not be admitted if made as
a result of inrimidation'" and that the evidence in casu should therefore not have
been admitted at the trial.768 The decision has not escaped criticism. It has, for
example, been noted that the court should have considered the fact that the accused
had allegedly threatened to kill the victim and her family if she reported the
incident, since this evidence has a bearing on the question of voluntariness of the
complaint. 769 Arguing that merely the voluntariness of the complaint and not the
questioning that precedes it, should be considered, LabuschagneÏ'' adds that there
may be circumstances where, despite the existence of an element of intimidation,
the voluntariness of the complaint is not affected. Where the risk of false
accusation has been eliminated, the complaint should be admissible despite the fact
that it may not have been made voluntarily.i"
The second requirement for the admissibility of previous consistent statements in
this context is that evidence regarding the complaint may only be admitted if the
victim testifies at the trial. InR v Kgaladi,772 the Appellate Division773 found that
"when the evidence of the complainant is not before the court, neither the
765 R v Osborne 1905 1 KB 551 556.
766 1963 1 SA 484 (A).
767487D.
768482E.
769 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 104.
770 Labuschagne 1978 De Jure 242247.
771 Ibid.
772 1943 AD 255 261.
773 As it then was.
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particulars of the complaint made by her. .. nor the mere fact that the complaint
was made, can be given in evidence". In coming to its decision, the court referred
to the judgement of Hawkins J in The Queen v Lillyman 774where is was said that
"[t]he complaint can only be used as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of the
prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness-box, and as being inconsistent
with her consent to that of which she complains."
The court in Kgaladi775 further found that the victim's whole statement containing
her alleged complaint should be submitted to the jury as part of the case for the
prosecution, in so far as it related to the charge against the accused.Ï" Where a
victim does not testify, neither the content of the complaint, nor the mere fact that a
complaint was made may be admitted as evidence.777
Since it would result in the inadmissibility of evidence of the complaint where the
child is found to be an incompetent witness,778 this requirement, combined with the
competency test applicable to youthful witnesses, presents a problem in the case of
child victims. In Smith v Ma/ete,779 for example, the court refused to admit the
evidence of the complainant's mother with regard to the particulars of the
complaint, finding that "[i]f a child of three years cannot give evidence in court,
how can she give evidence through her mother?" The only option available to the
prosecution would therefore be to attempt to persuade the court to receive the
hearsay evidence of the complaint in terms of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act780 on the grounds that it may be in the interests of
justice to admit the evidence. 781In S V R782, however, the court admitted evidence
relating to the complaint in a sexual case despite the fact that the victim suffered
from amnesia and could therefore not testify about the incident which gave rise to
the charge. This judgment creates the impression that it is sufficient for the victim
774 18962 QB 167 170.
715 1943 AD 255 26l.
776 This case was applied in R v Osborne 1905 1 KB 55l.
777 R v Wallwork 1958 2 Cr App Rep 153; The Queen v Lillyman 18962 QB 167.
778 For a discussion see § 5 2 above.
779 1907 TH 235.
780 45 of 1988.
781 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 104. This solution is not without its difficulties. For a
discussion on the admission of hearsay evidence in terms of s 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence
Amendment 45 of 1988 see § 5 5 above.
782 19652 SA 463 (W).
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to testify during the trial and not necessary for the victim to testify about the
statements or the content of the complaint.
The requirement that a complaint in sexual offences must have been made at the
first reasonable opportunity'P raises the question as to what a reasonable time
would amount to. Schmidt784 ascribes the answer to two factors. The first is the
presence or absence of a person to whom the victim could reasonably be expected
to have complained, and the second is the question whether the victim realised the
immoral nature of the act. 785 For example, in R v GOW,786 the court accepted that it
would not be unreasonable for a girl who had allegedly been assaulted on a train to
wait until she saw her mother before she complained instead of making the
complaint to the ticket examiner. Likewise, in S v S,787 the Zimbabwean Supreme
Court, per Ebrahim JA, was prepared to accept that it was reasonable for an 11-
year old rape victim not to report the incident at school. InRvS, 788 the court also
accepted that it was quite natural for a child not to make a complaint to his
stepfather when he saw him directly after the incident, but rather to wait until he
saw his mother.
A number of examples exist in case law where courts also considered various
lapses of time before the making of the complaint, especially if the complainant
was youthful. In R v C,789 the court accepted evidence of a complaint which had
been made five days after the incident. In R v Gannon 790 a lapse of ten days
between the incident and the making of the complaint was found to be reasonable,
while in R v T791 the court accepted that even after a lapse of six weeks the
complaint had been made at the first reasonable opportunity. InR v S792 the court
was required to decide on the admissibility of two complaints of two separate
incidents made by the same complainant. The complaint relating to the second
783 S v De Villiers 1999 1 SACR 297 (0).
784 Schmidt & Rademeyer Bewysreg 409.
785 See also Zeffertt et al Evidence 406.
786 19402 PH H148 (C).
787 1995 1 SACR 50 (ZS).
788 19484 SA 419 (GW).
789 19554 SA 40 (N).
790 1906 TS 114.
791 1937 TPD 389.
792 19484 SA 419 (GW).
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incident, which took place two months after the first, was made within an hour of
the incident and was, according to the court, made "timeously''I'" and was
therefore admissible. However, since the complaint relating to the first incident
was made only after the second incident, the court found that it was not
admissible.794
In S V S795 the accused was charged with the rape of an eleven year old girl. The
child did not report the rape to the first available sympathetic witness and when she
did report the incident to her mother, she merely reported that the accused had been
"'touching' her breasts, her buttocks and the front of her body".796 The court gave
the following reasons for its acceptance of the evidence: the child testified that she
had not reported the incident at school because she wanted to tell her mother first,
which the court found to be a natural reaction.Ï'" the reason given by the
complainant for her failure to report the incident to her mother in detail was found
to be plausible, and when the complainant had formed the intention to tell her
mother, she was bleeding from her vagina, although it had stopped by the time she
arrived home. 798The court also found that the child had not realised that the
actions of the accused had been unlawful and had regarded it merely as a form of
punishment.Ï" For these reasons, despite the fact that the complaint had been made
neither immediately nor in detail, the court admitted the evidence.
The fourth requirement set for the admissibility of a complaint in sexual offences is
that the complaint must have been made by the victim of such an offence.
Although the exception originally applied only to rape cases,800 it has been
extended to include indecent assault of both male and female victims.F" The exact
definition of the crime is not relevant, as long as the crime concerns some sort of
793423.
794423.
795 1995 1 SACR 50 (ZS).
79652!
79756d.
798 56g.
79956g_h.
800 Van der Merwe 1980 Obiter 8687 and the authority cited there.
801 Labuschagne 1978 De Jure 242 245. See also R v Burgess 1927 TPD 14; R v Komsane 1929
EDL 423; R v T 1937 TPD 389; R v Camerelli 1922 2 KB 122.
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physical sexual element. 802 In R vDral03 for example, the court held that although
the accused was charged merely with assault, the assault appeared to be of a sexual
nature and therefore the previous consistent statement was held to be admissible in
terms of this exception. It is important to note that the requirement refers to a
"victim" of a sexual offence. This includes persons who voluntarily participated in
the sexual offence, but who cannot in law give consent. 804 Despite the fact that they
purport to have consented to the sexual contact, children below the age of consent
will therefore qualify as victims of a sexual offence.
This exception relating to the admissibility of previous consistent statements
regarding a complaint in a sexual offence has not escaped criticism, both from the
bench and from academics. For example, Hiemstra CJ described the rule as one of
the less clear and haphazard rules inherited from the English law of evidence. 805
Arguing that exceptions to the general rule against previous consistent statements
have developed in order to admit evidence that is highly relevant but would be
excluded as a result of the rule, Miiller806 points out that the purpose of the
exceptions is frustrated by strict adherence to the rigid requirements set for the
admissibility of such evidence.807 On the other hand, however, the need to admit all
relevant evidence often forces the courts to strain the original ambit of the
requirements, despite the rigid requirements set for the admissibility of such
evidence.f'" In R v T,809 for example, the court was willing to accept that the
complaint of a five-year-old had been made at the first reasonable opportunity
despite the fact that a period of six weeks had lapsed between the incident and the
complaint, while in S v SlO several months had lapsed between the incident and the
802 Labuschagne 1978 De Jure 242 245. See also in general S v Thuys 1974 2 PH H82 (C); R v
Gloose 1936 PH F155 (SWA) and Westmeyer v R 1911 NLR 197.
803 1925 AD 553 554.
804 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 106.
805 S v M 1980 1 SA 586 (B) 587H. "[E]en van die minder duidelike en lukrake erfenisse uit die
Engelse bewysreg".
806 Muller Child Witness 311.
807 This point of criticism will be referred to in the evaluation of the rule.
808 Muller Child Witness 312.
809 1937 TPD 389.
810 1995 1 SACR 50 (ZS).
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making of a detailed complaint, despite which the court accepted that the
complaint had been made at the first reasonable opportunity.811
Further, since it is difficult to determine when the first reasonable opportunity
would be, strict adherence to this requirement is particularly problematic. The Law
Commission report indicates, for example, that it may be difficult to establish the
presence of a person to whom the victim can reasonably be expected to
complain.t''' The reason for this is two-fold. The first relates to psychological
factors,813while the other relates to the reality of modern life in which people often
have no confidant. 814
As far as psychological factors that influence the decision to complain are
concerned, Miiller815 notes that studies have shown that up to seventeen out of
nineteen rapes go unreported. This can be attributed to a number of psychological
and social factors.i'" The Law Commission's 1985 report817 indicates that many
victims of rape drum up the courage to make a complaint about an incident only
years later. According to this report,818 studies relating to the effects of rape have
shown that shock, feelings of guilt and depression are common effects of rape that
often disrupt the victim's life. Therefore, it is argued, the absence of a complaint or
the delay in making a complaint cannot be a reliable criterion in assessing
credibility of the complainant.i'" The court in Holtzhausen v Roodt820 gave some
recognition to these and other psychological factors that playa part in the non-
reporting of rape. In this case Satchwell J remarked that she doubted the ability of
judicial officers to comprehend fully "the kaleidoscope of emotion and experience
of both rapist and rape survivor".
811 For a discussion of the reasons given in support of the court's decision see supra.
812 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Project 45 Report (1985) 51.
813 Psychological factors will be discussed below.
814 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Report 51.
815 Muller Child Witness 312 and the authority cited there.
816 Schwikkard "A critical overview of the rules of evidence relevant to rape trials in South African
law" in Jagwanth, Schwikkard & Grant (eds) Women and the Law (1994) 201 and the authority
cited there.
817 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Report 51.
818 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Report 51 and the authority cited there.
819 Schwikkard in Jagwanth et al (eds) Women and the Law 201. See also Muller Child Witness 312.
820 19974 SA 766 (W) 778E.
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Tapper argues that since the accused is prohibited from leading similar evidence,
the admission of evidence relating to the complaint unfairly favours the
complainant.Y' This, in turn, would by necessary implication favour the
prosecution. However, the converse can also be argued: the exception prejudices
the complainant because it enables the defence to exploit the complainant's failure
to complain timeously. It has, for example, been argued that the court in R vM, 822
clearly established the rule that an adverse inference may be drawn from the fact
that the complaint had not been made within a reasonable time after the alleged
incident. 823This, Schwikkard argues,824 reflects attitudes "formulated in a time
when there was little understanding of the psychology of a rape victim".825 It is in
light of this realisation, as well as that of Satchwell J in Holtzhausen,826 that the
delay in the making of the complaint and the reasonableness of the delay must be
assessed.
In addition to these arguments, the Law Commission's 1985 report827indicates that
while the defence may use the fact that the complaint was not made within a
reasonable time to impeach the credibility of the complainant, the state may not use
the evidence relating to the complaint as corroboration for the evidence of the
complainant. 828The practical effect is that the state gains little from the fact that
821 Tapper Cross & Tapper on Evidence 9th ed (1999).
822 1959 1 SA 352 (A).
823 Schwikkard in Jagwanth et al (eds) Wamen and the Law 201. This interpretation of the court's
dictum is open to criticism. In R v M 1959 1 SA 352 (A) 358C-D the court expressed the view that
the "evidence [of the complainant] was certainly open to the major criticism arising out of the delay
in complaining and the positive deception practised by the complainant. The trial Court, however,
took the right factors into account in considering the issues. It appreciated the risks involved in
relying on a young girl complainant in a rape charge and it realised that those risks were heightened
by her subsequent behaviour. Having regard to the trial Court's findings and to the probabilities
appearing from the record it is impossible for this Court to say that the verdict was wrong."
(Emphasis added). It is submitted that the dictum does not indicate that a negative inference can be
drawn solely from the fact that there was a delay in the making of the complaint. What the court did
find, although not expressly, is that the fact that there was a delay in making the complaint is but
one of the factors that should have been considered in evaluating the evidence of the complainant.
The deception practised by the complainant being another factor. Therefore, it is submitted, that the
only rule that can be construed from this dictum is that where there has been a delay in the making
of the complaint and the complainant acted deceptively, these factors should be taken into account
in the assessment of the complainant's evidence.
824 R v M 19591 SA 352 (A) 358C-D.
825 Schwikkard in Jagwanth et al (eds) Wamen and the Law 201.
826 19974 SA 766 (W) 778E.
827 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Report 51.
828 It seems that the Law Commission's statement is based on a misunderstanding of the term
"corroboration". Skeen in Zeffertt, Paizes & Skeen The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 810
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the complaint was in fact made within a reasonable time, while the defence stands
to gain much if it was not. The Law Commission points out that it is unrealistic to
assume that the complaint can be used to prove consistency on the part of the
victim, while the fact-finder ignores the fact or the complaint or the content thereof
for "corroborative" purposes.829
The fact that the exception is limited to sexual offences, is also criticised by
Milller.83o Based on the cautionary rule that applies to the evidence of children,831
any evidence that assists in establishing the credibility of the child should therefore
be placed before the court, irrespective of the type of offence concerned.
As a general rule, previous consistent statements are inadmissible because of their
low probative value and the fact that such evidence is easy to manufacture.Y'
Muller argues that the law relating to previous consistent statements (and by
necessary implication the exception to the rule) must be repealed and that
"relevance", as it relates to the admissibility of all other evidence, should be the
only guiding principle.833 This, together with the argument that the absence of a
complaint is an unreliable criterion leads one to agree with Schwikkard: 834 it is
difficult to comprehend why the exception is retained in our law.
In Discussion Paper 102 the South African Law Commission considered the
complaint exception to the rule against previous consistent statements and opined
that the practical application of the rule is problematic since the defence often
succeeds with an argument that a negative inference should be drawn from a delay
in making the complaint. 835
defmes corroboration as "independent evidence which confirms the testimony if a witness". By its
very nature evidence of a previous consistent statement cannot be said to be independent evidence,
since it originates from the same source as the evidence being led, namely, the complainant. The
Law Commission's statement could be correct if "corroboration" is seen as any evidence which
supports the evidence sought to be corroborated. However, it is submitted that this is not correct.
829 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Report 52.
830 Muller Child Witness 313.
831 See § 542
832 See § 5 6.
833 Muller Child Witness 313.
834 Schwikkard in Jagwanth et al (eds) Wamen and the Law 201.
835 § 34.4.1.1.
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Despite the fact that the Law Commission in its 1985 report on Women and Sexual
Offencesr'" came to the conclusion that the application of the rule could in no way
prejudice the rape victim, the Commission came to the conclusion that this cannot
be correct. The Commission felt that the fact that courts are prepared to draw a
negative inference from the fact that the complaint was not made within a
"reasonable time" reflects certain assumptions about the psychological effects of
sexual offences, which assumptions are not borne out by empirical studies.837 The
Commission opined that studies that indicate that there are many psychological and
social factors which may inhibit the complainant from making a report "within a
reasonable time" militate against the theory that the absence of an earlier complaint
should, of necessity, have bearing on the credibility of the complainant. 838
The Commission was of the opinion that it is necessary to retain the requirement
that the complaint should have been made at the first reasonable opportunity, but
that the possibility of drawing a negative inference solely from the timing of the
complaint should be eliminated. In this way the timing of the complaint will only
have bearing on the question of admissibility of the complaint and not on the
question of credibility of the complainant.F" Therefore, the Commission
recommended that provisions that clearly state that a negative inference may not be
drawn only from the absence of a complaint or a delay in making the complaint
should be included in the Sexual Offences Bill.84o The fact that no complaint was
made or that there was a delay in making the complaint should, according to the
recommendation of the Commission, only be one of the factors the presiding
officer should consider in weighing the evidence.F"
Commenting on the recommendations in the Discussion Paper, Burchell &
Schwikkard recommended that the sexual offence matters exception to the rule
against admission of previous consistent statements be abolished while the
common law exception relating the rebuttal of an allegation of recent fabrication be
836 SA Law Commission Women and Sexual Offences Report § 3.50.
837 § 34.4.2.1.
838 § 34.4.2.1.
839 § 34.4.3.1.
840 § 34.4.3.2.
841 § 34.4.3.1.
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retained.842 Schwikkard opines that this would ensure that adjudicators are not
deprived of relevant evidence, while eliminating the possibility of an attack on the
credibility of the complainant. 843 The Law Commission, however, was of the
opinion that the recommendation of Burchell & Schwikkard would result in the
inadmissibility of a first report of a sexual offence during the leading of the
complainant's evidence.844
Although the Commission was prepared to concede that the origin of the sexual
offence matters exception is based on a perception that the evidence of a complaint
in sexual offence cases must be treated with suspicion and that this is unacceptable,
it was of the opinion that the rule has evolved and that evidence of the first
complaint is now routinely admitted during the state's case.845 Therefore, the
Commission recommended that in order to avoid confusion it was necessary to
include a provision stating that a negative inference cannot be drawn solely from
the fact that a previous consistent statement does not exist. The Commission
accordingly recommended the inclusion of the following provision in the draft
Sexual Offences Bill:
A court, in criminal proceedings involving the commission of a sexual offence, may
not draw any inference only from -
(a) the fact that no previous consistent statements have been made;
(b) the length of any delay between the alleged commission of such offence and the
reporting thereof.
In Namibia section 6 of the Combating of Rape Act846 provides that all previous
consistent statements by a complainant in a sexual offence matter are admissible.
However, the section contains a provisio: no inference may be drawn from the fact
that no previous consistent statements have been made. Section 6 of the Act
therefore dispenses with the requirement that the complaint should have been made
at the first reasonable opportunity as well as the requirement that the complainant
842 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 5.4.3.
843 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 5.4.3.
844 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 5.4.3.
845 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences § 5.4.3.
846 8 of 2000.
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testify at trial. Section 7 of the Combating of Rape Act847 further provides that no
inference may be drawn only from the length of the delay between the alleged
commission of the sexual offence and the laying of a complaint. In Namibia the
exception to the admissibility of previous consistent statements therefore still
applies, albeit without the further requirements set in South African law.
Evaluation
The exception to the rule against the admission of previously consistent statements
finds its roots in the medieval requirement that a woman who was raped, had to
raise "the hue and cry" immediately if a charge of rape was to succeed.848 By the
is" century, this was no longer essential to prove a charge of rape, but it was still a
strong presumption against a woman if she did not make a complaint within a
reasonable time.849 However, in the development of the modern rule, the medieval
"hue and cry" requirement is hardly recognisable.F'' The reasons for the admission
of this evidence can be found in the traditional suspicion with which the
complainant in sexual crimes was viewed. This suspicion was nothing less than a
veiled attack on the credibility of the victim.f" In light of this suspicion and the
cautionary rule that applied to the evidence of complainants in sexual crimes,
evidence relating to the making of the complaint and the content of the complaint
became relevant, since proof of consistency could rebut the suspicion cast on the
evidence of the victim. Therefore, it became a question of credibility and,
consequently, relevant to the matter before the court.
If this argument is accepted, it is clear that the values underlying the admission of
evidence relating to the complaint in sexual crimes are Victims' rights values
which seek to prevent re-victimisation inevitably caused by a credibility challenge.
However, the fact that a negative inference can be drawn from the fact that the
victim did not complain timeously reflects Due Process values which require a
conviction to be based on reliable evidence. In this instance the delay in the
847 8 of 2000.
848 Zeffertt et al Evidence 405. See also Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 103; Van der
Merwe 1980 Obiter 8687; Labuschagne 1978 De Jure 18ff.
849 Zeffertt et al Evidence 405.
850 Van der Merwe 1980 Obiter 8687.
851 Van der Merwe 1980 Obiter 86 89.
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making of the complaint is used to discredit the witness and therefore impeach the
reliability of the testimony.
The question arises whether, in light of the abolition of the cautionary rule which
applied to the evidence of the complainant in sexual offences and the reasoning of
the court in S v .r52 with regard to the traditional suspicion with which victims of
sexual offences are viewed, the continued existence of the exception relating to the
admission of the complaint in sexual offences can be justified. If the reasoning of
the court in SV.r53 is applied in this context, the exception should be abolished.
Abolition of the complaint exception would mean that failure on the part of the
complainant to complain timeously cannot be used to impeach the credibility of the
witness. This would give effect to Victims' rights values. Such a measure would
also eliminate the tension between Due Process values and Victims' rights values.
5 7 Conclusion
This chapter concentrated on the enhancement of victim participation during the
trial phase.
In this Chapter it was shown that the proposed legislative changes to the traditional
competency test and to the provisions relating to the taking of the oath will
enhance victim participation in the trial phase, while having no significant
influence on the fair trial rights of the accused. It was shown that the retention of
the discretion relating to the weight to be attached to evidence acts as a safeguard
for the fair trial rights of the accused.
Itwas also shown that effective victim participation is enhanced by the abolition of
the cautionary rule applicable to the victim of a sexual offence and the cautionary
rule relating to the evidence of the child victim. It was shown that abolition of the
cautionary rule applicable to the evidence of the victim of a sexual offence will
probably not have a significant impact on the fair trial rights of the accused. It was
also shown, firstly, that the retention of the cautionary rule applicable to the
852. S v J 19982 SA 984 (A). For a discussion see § 54 lsupra.
853. S v J 19982 SA 984 (A). For a discussion see § 54 lsupra.
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testimony of children cannot be justified and, secondly, that the abolition of this
rule of practice would not significantly impact on the rights of the accused, since
other measures, notably the cautionary rule which applies to the evidence of single
witnesses, provide sufficient protection for the fair trial rights of the accused.
Further, relating to the cautionary rule applicable to the evidence of a single
witness, it was shown that although there is tension between the rights of the
accused and the interests of society and the child-victim in this respect, there can
be no real objection to the rule, since the rule merely requires the court to seek
some kind of safeguard and to satisfy itself that the evidence of the single witness
is reliable. Therefore, there is no possibility of an infringement of the fair trial
rights of the accused. Neither is the practical application of the rule likely to impact
on the rights and interests of the child-victim negatively.
In the discussion of the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the exception
created in section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,854it was shown
that although the court has a wide discretion to admit hearsay evidence when it
would be in the interests of justice to do so, the admission of hearsay evidence is
not without problems. Firstly, although there is a possibility that the admission of
such evidence could infringe the fair trial rights of the accused, such an
infringement may, in normal circumstances, be justifiable in terms of section 36 of
the Constitution, owing to the safeguards built into section 3(1)(c). Secondly,
courts often exclude hearsay evidence that is necessary to secure a conviction
because they choose to follow a conservative approach in such matters. Here it was
argued that this provision can be used as a mechanism to promote indirect victim
participation in the criminal justice process.
With regard to the admission of previous consistent statements and the complaint
exception it was shown that there is much criticism of the exception, especially of
the fact that a negative inference can be drawn from a delay in the making of the
complaint. It was also argued that abolition of the first reasonable opportunity
requirement would give effect to Victims' rights values, since this would mean that
a delay in the making of the complaint could not be used to attack the credibility of
85445 of 1988.
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the victim and would therefore maximise the possibility of securing a conviction,
while minimising the re-victimisation of the victim. On the other hand, since the
rule against the admissibility of previous consistent statements in general would
promote Due Process values, it should be retained.
The next chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the provisions that are aimed at
providing protection for the victim of a sexual offence during the trial phase,
thereby enhancing victims' rights. The possible effect of these provisions on the
fair trial rights of the accused will be considered.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RlGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RlGHTS 138
6
CHAPTER 6: PROTECTION OF VICTIMS
6 1 Introduction 138
62 Vulnerable witnesses 139
6 3 Evidence by means of closed circuit television or other similar electronic
media 149
6 4 Evidence through an intermediary 164
65 In camera hearings 177
6 6 Prohibition of publication of certain information relating to criminal
proceedings 181
6 7 Other measures considered by the South African Law
Commission 183
671 Video-taped statements 183
672 Surrogate witness 185
6 7 3 Support persons 187
6 7 4 Legal representation 194
6 8 Conclusion 195
6 1 Introduction
The previous chapter dealt with provisions aimed at enhancing victim participation
in the trial phase of the criminal justice process. The present chapter investigates
provisions aimed at protection of the victim from secondary victimisation, caused
by the victim's involvement in the criminal justice process. Several provisions
aimed at providing such protection already exist in South African law. However,
the South African Law Commission has proposed changes to these provisions and
has investigated the possibility of providing increased protection for victims.
The existing provisions and the proposed changes are discussed in this chapter.
Attention is also drawn to similar provisions in other jurisdictions. Four additional
provisions considered by the South African Law Commission are also examined.
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Finally, these provisions are analysed with reference to the values identified in
Chapter 2 and the rights identified in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
6 2 Vulnerable witnesses
Despite the fact that certain categories of persons may, as a result of their personal
characteristics, be more vulnerable than others to the possibility of re-victimisation
by the criminal justice system, South African law does not automatically provide
protection for such categories of persons.855 Although a variety of protective
measures are available, each case is dealt with on an ad hoc basis and witnesses are
frequently not even aware of the protective measures at their disposa1.856
In light of this, the South African Law Commission investigated the possibility of
creating a special category of witnesses to whom protective measures should
automatically be made available.F" The Commission considered it necessary to
align itself with international trends that automatically make special protective
measures available to all victims of sexual offences who are required to testify at
tria1.858 This, according to the Commission, promotes the interests of justice.859 In
South Africa, the matter was taken further, with the Commission recommending
that such a category should be extended to include not only the victim of the sexual
offence, but also any other witness to a sexual offence.
Legislative identification of a special category of vulnerable witnesses would
require the court to formally consider the desirability of implementing special
measures. This, according to the Law Commission, would result in meeting the
needs of those persons identified as vulnerable witnesses.Y" Since decisions in this
regard would be binding judicial decisions, the witness would know in advance of
the trial what assistance he would receive and how he would be giving his
evidence.f" This, in tum, would significantly reduce the possibility of secondary
855 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Project 107 Discussion Paper 102 (??) § 20.2.5.
856 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.1.
857 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 §§ 20.1 and 20.2.
858 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.2.
859 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.2.
860 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.3
861 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.3.
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victimisation by the criminal justice process.862 The values underlying the
recommendation of the Law Commission are therefore clearly orientated towards
Victims'Rights.
After considering the position of the accused, the Commission concluded that since
numerous protective measures were already afforded to accused persons, both by
the Constitution'f'' and the Criminal Procedure Act,864 it was unnecessary to
include the accused as vulnerable witnesses.l'" This too reflects the Victims'
Rights approach.
In the light of this approach, the Commission recommended the inclusion of a
special provision relating to vulnerable witnesses in the draft Sexual Offences Bill.
In terms of section 15 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill,866
the court, in criminal proceedings involving the alleged commission of a sexual
offence, is required to issue a declaration of vulnerability in respect of a child
witness867 or the complainant in a sexual offence.868 This declaration must follow
automatically.
While section 15(1) deals with child witnesses and alleged victims of sexual
offences, section 15(2) deals with witnesses who are neither children nor
complainants in a sexual offence matter. In terms of this provision, a court may
declare such witnesses vulnerable if, in the opinion of the court, they are likely to
be vulnerable on account of (a) age; (b) intellectual, psychological or physical
impairment; (c) trauma; (d) cultural differences; (e) the possibility of intimidation;
(f) race; (g) religion; (h) language; (i) the relationship of the witness to any party to
the proceedings; or (j) the nature of the subject matter of the evidence.
862 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.3.
863 108 of 1996.
864 51 of 1977.
865 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 §§ 20.5.6 and 20.5.7.
866 B50-2003.
867 For purposes of this provision, s 2 of the Bill defines a "child" as a person below the age of 18
years.
868 S 15(1) Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50-2003. The Commission was of
the opinion that there is merit in investigating the possibility of extending this provision to all child
witnesses in criminal and not only those involved in sexual offence proceedings and recommended
as such in § 4.4.3 of the Report. This question, however, falls outside of the scope of this study.
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The Commission declined to define the factors of "age" and "trauma" further,
finding that the present formulation makes it possible for the court to consider any
trauma or aspect of the witness's age that could make the witness particularly
vulnerable. In this way, the Commission felt, the needs of the elderly or persons
with a pre-existing condition that makes them particularly vulnerable could be
accommodated.f'" Because of a reluctance of witnesses to testify in the presence
certain groups of people, such as family elders, the Commission considered the
relationship between the witness and other parties in the proceedings important.V''
Inclusion of the factor relating to the subject matter of the evidence was also
considered necessary since the graphic or incriminating nature of the evidence is
said to have the potential to render the witness particularly vulnerable.t"
Section 15(2)(k) empowers the court to take into account any other factor that it
considers relevant. This provision was considered necessary to ensure that the list
of factors to be taken into account was not limited. The reason is that a limitation
on the list factors would defeat the object of assisting persons who may not
necessarily have been entitled to protective measures in the past. 872 In cases where
there is doubt whether the witness should be declared vulnerable or not, the court is
empowered to summon "any knowledgeable person" to advise the court in this
regard.873
Section 15(4) reads as follows:
"Upon declaration of a witness as a vulnerable witness in terms of this section, the
court must, subject to the provisions of subsection (5), direct that such witness be
protected by one or more of the following measures -
(a) allowing that witness to give evidence by means of closed-circuit television as
provided for in section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of
1977), irrespective of any additional qualifying criteria prescribed by that section;
(b) directing that the witness must give evidence through an intermediary as provided
for in section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977),
irrespective of any additional qualifying criteria prescribed by that section;
869 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Project 107 Report (2002) § 4.4.3.
870 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.4.3.
871 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.4.3.
872 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.4.3.
873 S 15(3) Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50-2003.
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(c) directing that the proceedings may not take place in open court as provided for in
section 153 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), irrespective of
any additional qualifying criteria prescribed by that section;
(d) prohibiting the publication of the identity of the complainant as provided for in
section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), or of the
complainant's family, including the publication of information that may lead to the
identification of the complainant or the complainant's family; or
(e) any other measure which the court deems just and appropriate."
Despite submissions questioning the Commission's recommendation that the court
be empowered to direct that the witness be protected by measures listed in the
section without regard to the requirements inherent to the relevant provisions in the
Criminal Procedure Act,874 the clause "irrespective of any additional qualifying
criteria prescribed by that section" in sub-sections 16(1)(a)-(d) was included. No
coherent reason was advanced for the non-acceptance of the submissions.
In terms of section 15(5), the court will be obliged to appoint an intermediary in
respect of a child witness who has been declared vulnerable. Although this
provision is peremptory, the court is given a limited discretion to refuse the
appointment of an intermediary if the interests of justice justify such an action. In
these circumstances the court is required to record the reasons for its decision.
Section 15(6) lists a number of circumstances which must be taken into account by
the court when determining which one or more of the protective measure should be
applied to the witness. The provision states that the court must have regard to all
the circumstances of the case including (a) any views expressed by the witness; (b)
those expressed by a knowledgeable person who is acquainted with or has dealt
with the witness; (c) the need to protect the witness's dignity and sense of safety
and to protect the witness from traumatisation; and (d) the question whether any
protective measures are likely to prevent the evidence given by the witness from
being effectively tested by a party to the proceedings. Where the court considers
the views expressed by the witness, the court is required to accord such views the
weight it considers appropriate in view of the witness' age and maturity.
87451 of 1977.
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The Law Commission felt that it was important to direct the court's attention to the
listed considerations in view of the fact that the clause introduces what it calls "an
entirely different focus" and therefore the possibility exists that the object of the
clause could be defeated if a court did not do so. In terms of the proposed clause,
the court is therefore required to consider at least all the listed factors, but is also
empowered to consider factors which are not listed.
In terms of section 15(7), a court may mero motu875 or upon the request of the
prosecution revoke or vary a direction given in terms of section 15(4). In light of
the fact that not every child or adult victim or witness of a sexual offence will
necessarily be vulnerable if required to give evidence by conventional means, a
provision was included that makes it clear that the automatic provision of
protective measures can be waived.876
The section in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill877 that
contains the above recommendations is virtually a verbatim repetition of the
provision recommended by the Law Commission in its 2002 report. The omission
of the recommended provision relating to the appointment of a support person is
therefore interesting.F"
Section 14 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bi1l879 places an
obligation on the prosecutor to inform a potential witness (or his parents) of the
possibility that he may be declared a vulnerable witness in terms of section 15 and
that he can be protected by one or more of the measures provided for in that
section. This must be done before the witness commences his testimony. In several
other jurisdictions legislative provisions have been adopted in terms of which the
vulnerability of victims has been recognised and measures aimed at protecting such
persons, have been incorporated. For example, in England the Youth Justice and
Criminal Evidence Act880 acknowledges the vulnerability of certain witnesses. A
875 In these circumstances the court is required to furnish reasons for the revocation or variation of
the direction.
876 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 20.5.5.
877 B50-2003.
878 This is discussed in § 6 7 3below.
879 B50-2003.
880 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
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number of measures have also been identified to help these witnesses. In terms of
section 16 of this Act, a witness under the age of 17 years or who suffers from a
mental incapacity is eligible for assistance, while section 17 regulates the category
of vulnerable witnesses who, on grounds of fear or distress in connection with
testifying in the proceedings, are eligible for protection. It also describes who is
entitled to protection if the court is of the opinion that the quality of his evidence is
likely to be diminished for this reason.881 In determining whether a witness is
entitled to protection in terms of section 17, the court must take a number of factors
into account, including the nature and alleged circumstances of the offence,882 the
age of the witness,883 the social and cultural background and ethnic origins of the
witness,884 the domestic and employment circumstances of the witness,885 any
religious beliefs or political opinions of the witness.i'" the behaviour of the
accused,887 family members or associates of the accused888 or any other person
who is likely to be an accused or witness in the proceedings.t'" towards the
witness. The Court must also consider the views of the witness.89o In terms of
section 17(4), the complainant in respect of a sexual offence is automatically
entitled to protection in terms of the Act, unless he indicates that he does not wish
to be eligible for protection.
Sections 23 to 30 of the Youth Justice and Evidence Act891 provide for certain
protective measures. These include the following:
• That the witness be screened from the accused;
• That the evidence be given through live link via closed circuit television;
• That the evidence be given in private;
881 S 17(1).
882 S 17(2)( a).
883 S 17(2)(b).
884 S 17(2)(c)(i).
885 S 17(2)( c)(ii).
886 S 17(2)( c)(iii).
887 S 17(2)( d)(i).
888 S 17(2)( d)(ii).
889 S 17(2)( d)(iii).
890 S 17(3).
891 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
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• That the officers of the court remove their wigs and gowns while the
witness testifies;
• That the evidence in chief and/or cross-examination and/or re-examination
of the witness be given by way of a video recording;
• That the witness is examined through an intermediary and
• That the court may direct that the witness be provided with devices
necessary to enable questions or answers to be communicated to or by the
witness.
The provisions in Scotland are similar. Section 29 of the Crime and Punishment
(Scotland) Act892 makes special provision for vulnerable witnesses. In terms of
section 29(12), a child under the age of 16 years and persons suffering from
significant impairment of intelligence and social function inter alia qualify as
"vulnerable persons". In terms of section 29 of the Act, the court may direct that a
commissioner be appointed to take the evidence of the vulnerable witness,893 that
the witness testify via live television link894or that a screen be used to conceal the
accused from the sight of the witness.895 It is important to note, however, that the
witness is not automatically entitled to protection in one of these ways. A separate
application must be brought for an order in terms of which the witness is entitled to
such protection.
On 4 March 2004 the Scottish Parliament passed the Vulnerable Witnesses
(Scotland) Act 2004. In terms of this Act, provision is made for the use of special
measures for the purpose of taking the evidence of children and other vulnerable
witnesses in criminal and civil proceedings. Section 1(1) of the Act amends section
271896 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act897. In terms of the new section
271, a witness will be considered vulnerable if the person is under the age of 16
892 Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997.
893 S 29(1).
894 S 29(5).
895 S 29(6).
896 The rest of this discussion will make reference to the amended version of s 271 of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (c46).
8971995 (c. 46).
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years898 or where there is a significant risk that the quality of the evidence to be
given by a witness will be diminished by reason of mental disorder899 or by reason
of fear or distress in connection with giving evidence at tria1.900In determining
whether a witness, other than a child-witness, is vulnerable, the court must take
into account the nature and circumstances of the alleged offence.Y' the nature of
the evidence to be given,902 the relationship between the accused and the
witness.Ï'" the witness's age and maturity.Ï'" and any behaviour towards the
witness on the part of the accused,905 family members or associates of the
accused906 and any other person who is likely to be an accused or a witness in the
proceedings.Ï'" The court must also take into account the social and cultural
background and ethnic origins of the person,908 the person's sexual orientation.Ï'"
the domestic and employment circumstances of the person,910 any religious beliefs
or political opinions of the person'"! and any physical disability or other physical
impairment which the person may have.912 In addition, section 271(4) makes it
clear that the reference to the quality of evidence is a reference to quality in terms
of completeness, coherence and accuracy.
Regarding child witnesses, special measures are outlined in the ACt.913These
include the taking of evidence by a commissioner.I'" the use of a live television
link,915a screen,916or a supporter,917 giving evidence-in-chiefin the form of a prior
898 S 271(1)(a).
899 S 271(1)(b)(i).
900 S 271(1)(b)(ii).
901 S 271(2)(a).
902 S 271(2)(b).
903 S 271 (2)( c).
904 S 271(2)(d).
905 S 271(2)(e)(i).
906 S 271(2)(e)(ii).
907 S 271(2)(e)(iii).
908 S 271(2)(f)(i).
909 S 271(2)(f)(ii).
910 S 271(2)(f)(iii).
911 S 271(2)(f)(iv).
912 S 271(2)(f)(v).
913 S 271A(1).
914 S 27lH(1)(a) and S 2711.
915 S 27lH(1)(b) and s 2711.
916 S 27lH(1)(c) and s 271K.
917 S 271H(1)(d) and s 271L.
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statement,918 or any other legislatively prescribed measure.Ï'" The Act makes
further special provisions for child-witnesses under the age of 12.920Section 271B
applies where such a child is to give evidence at a trial in respect of certain
offences,921 which include murder, culpable homicide and a number of sexual
offences listed in section 288C of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act.922Sexual
offences include rape, sodomy, indecent assault, abduction with the intent to rape
and a number of statutory offences against children.
Where section 271B applies, a court may not make an order in terms of which the
child-witness is required to be present in the court room or the court building
where the trial is taking place unless the requirements of section 271B(3) have
been met. In terms of section 271B(3) the court must be satisfied that (a) the child
has expressed the wish to be present and it is appropriate for the child to do so, or
(b) that the absence of the child would give rise to a significant risk of prejudice to
the fairness of the trial or to the interests of justice and that the risk significantly
outweighs the risk of prejudice to the interests of the child witness.
In the United States of America, the vulnerable position of the child-victim of
sexual abuse is recognised. To address the issues raised by children's participation
in the criminal justice process, Congress has enacted the Victims of Child Abuse
Act923.The Act contains extensive amendments to the criminal code, which affect
the treatment of child victims and child witnesses by the federal criminal justice
system. lts objectives include the protection of the confidentiality of child victims
and the provision for alternatives to live in-court testimony for child victims.
The Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance 2000924 state
that Justice Department personnel should "be aware of the trauma child victims
and child witnesses experience when they are forced to relive the crime during the
918 S 27IH(1)(e) and S 271M.
919 S 271H(1)(f). This subsection may only be used if a draft of the statutory instrument containing
the order has been approved by the Scottish Parliament. S 271(H)(2).
920 S 271B.
921 S 271B(1)(a) and (b).
922 1995 (c. 46) as inserted by s 1 Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act 2002.
923 Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 (VCAA) (Pub.L. 101-647).
924 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance 2000, US Department of
Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Washington D.C. 2000.
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investigation and prosecution of a criminal case, particularly while testifying in
COurt".925Officials are therefore required to reduce the trauma caused by contact
with the criminal justice system.
In addition to these measures, the United States Code provides for the protection of
the privacy of child victims and witnesses.Ï" the appointment for a Guardian ad
litem,927 and for the use of multidisciplinary Child Abuse Teams to minimize the
number of interviews to which the child victim is subjected, to reduce the risk of
suggestibility in the interviewing process,928 to provide needed services to the
child929 and to monitor the child's safety and well-being.Ï''" By permitting the use
of two-way closed circuit television links931 and the admission of a videotaped
deposition of the child,932the Code further provides for alternatives to live in-court
testimony.r"
While it cannot be denied that protection of victims from secondary victimization
by the criminal justice process is an important objective and that the provisions in
section 15 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill934 seek to
achieve this objective, child victims cannot be protected at the expense of the fair
trial rights of the accused. In the following section four types of protective
measures in the Criminal Procedure Act,935which illustrate the tension between the
need to protect victims (and other witnesses) of sexual offences and the need to
uphold the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights of the accused, are discussed
in more detail.
925 Attorney General Guidelines Article VI § A.
926 18 U.S.c. § 3509(d).
927 18 U.S.c. § 3509(h).
928 Attorney General Guidelines Article VI § C.
929 Attorney General Guidelines Article VI § C.
930 Attorney General Guidelines Article VI § C.
931 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1).
932 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b )(2).
93318 U.S.C. § 3509(b).
934 B 50-2003.
93551 of 1977.
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6 3 Evidence by means of closed circuit television or other similar
electronic media
In terms of section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Acë36 all criminal proceedings
in any court must take place in the presence of the accused. This provision is
peremptory.Ï'" The accused must be present at all relevant times938 and absence
amounts to an irregularity.F" Where evidence is given in the absence of the
accused, it cannot simply be read back to the accuscd.Ï''"
There are however exceptions to this general rule,941 as indicated by section
158(2).942 In terms of this section a court may, on its own initiative or on
application by the public prosecutor, the accused or the witness, order that a
witness or an accused give evidence via closed circuit television or similar
electronic media. Section l58(2)(a) requires that the witness or accused with
respect to whom such an order is made must consent to it. Such an order may also
be made only if the facilities are readily available or obtainable, and if to do so
would:
(a) prevent unreasonable delay;
(b) save costs;
(c) be convenient;
(d) be in the interest of the security of the State or of public safety or of
justice or of the public; or
(e) prevent the likelihood that prejudice or harm might result to any
person ifhe or she testifies or is present at such proceedings.
93651 of 1977.
937 S v Roman 1994 1 SACR 436 (A) 442i; S v Eyden 19824 SA 141 (T) 146E.
938 S v Staggie 2003 1 SACR 232 (C) 248a. See also Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra Suid Afrikaanse
Strafproses 6th ed (2002) 415 and Muller & Tait "Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977: A potential weapon in the battle to protect child witnesses" 1999 SACJ 58 and the authority
cited there.
939 R v Blackbeard 1925 TPD 965.
940 R v Ntombela 19562 SA 127 (N).
941 S 158(1).
942 Ss 158(2)-(4) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 were inserted by s 7 Criminal Procedure
Amendment Act 86 of 1996.
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In addition, to ensure a fair and just trial, section 158(4) gives the court a wide
discretion to impose conditions on the giving of evidence in this manner. Although
the proviso contained in section 158(4) is that the prosecution and the defence may
not be deprived of their right to question the witness or the opportunity to observe
the demeanour of the witness, the court in S v F,943 per Albertus AJ, expressed the
opinion that "allowing a witness to testify outside the presence of the accused
might very well encroach upon [the accused's] rights in the sense that it could
diminish the forcefulness and effect of cross-examination".944 For this reason, the
court held that it was the intention of the legislature that the requirements set in
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) co-exist with each other and with either paragraph (d) or
paragraph (e).945 The court found that it was "wholly inconceivable" that the
legislature could have intended that anyone of the requirements set in paragraphs
(a)-(e) would be sufficient, since the result would be that the "obtaining of an order
in terms of section 158, and hence the potential encroachment upon the rights of
the accused [would be] far too easy".946
However, in S v Staggie,947 the court found, per Sarkin AJ, that the decision in F
was "clearly wrong".948 In this case the prosecution had brought an interlocutory
application for the evidence of a 19-year-old complainant in a rape case to be given
both in camera949 and via closed-circuit television.F" Having rejected the finding
in F, the court held that the paragraphs in section 158(3) must be read
disjunctively.f" In other words, in determining whether one or more of the various
requirements are present, the court is bound to consider all the circumstances. The
court therefore based its finding on the intention of the legislature, which provides
943 1999 1 SACR 571 (C).
944 577j-578a.
945578d_e.
946579b.
947 S v Staggie 2003 1 SACR 232 (C).
948248g.
949 In terms ofs 153 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
950 In terms of s 158(2) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
951248g.
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greater protection for complainants and witnesses in sensitive and difficult cases.952
The type of approach adopted in S v F would render this objective ineffective.953
After the decision of Sarkin AJ in Staggie, the courts were left with "diametrically
opposed interpretations" of section 158. In S v Domingo954 the court therefore
found it necessary to settle the matter authoritatively. In a full bench decision
delivered by Erasmus J,955the court found that the wording of section 158(3) made
it clear that the legislature had envisaged the application of the section in a variety
of circumstances aimed at serving the interests of justice.956 Further, section 158
complimented section 170A of the Act,957in that it provided greater protection for
complainants and witnesses in sensitive and difficult cases.958Keeping the purpose
of the enactment of section 158(2)-(4) in mind, the court concluded that
"[r]eading subsection (3) in the manner decided in S v F may result in potentially
thwarting the interests of justice and blunting one of the principle purposes of the
section, namely, to facilitate the evidence of persons involved in crimes of violence
and abuse".959
The court also pointed out that, despite the suggestion in S v F that the mere
existence of one of the five circumstances identified in section 158(3)(a)-(e) was,
in itself, "sufficient for the granting of an order in terms of section 158(2)",960 the
section was not peremptory, but created a discretion.Ï'" Although the existence of
at least one of the five circumstances empowered the court to exercise its
discretion, the court would still be required to satisfy itself that the application had
not been made on trivial grounds and that the particular circumstance relied upon
"was of sufficient seriousness to outweigh potential harm to the rights of the
accused.,,962 Section 158(2) had therefore been enacted for the potential benefit of
952250!
953250g.
95420032 BCLR 213 (C) 220E
955Louw J concurring.
956218A.
957S I70A of the Act provides for the giving of evidence through an intermediary. This aspect will
be discussed later.
9582I8E.
9592I8E_F.
960S v F 1999 1 SACR 571 (C) 579a.
96I218H.
962218J.
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all the participants in a criminal tria1.963A disjunctive reading of the relevant
paragraphs of section 158(3), along with proper emphasis on and the judicial
exercise of the discretion conferred by section 158(2) would have the effect of
making the potentially useful provisions available to both the prosecution and the
defence, while properly safeguarding their respective interests.Ï'"
With regard to the possibility of diminished effectiveness of cross-examination in
cases where the witness does not testify in the physical presence of the accused, the
court referred to section 158(4). This section expressly protects the right of both
the prosecution and the defence to question the witness and observe the reaction of
the witness. Here the court referred to K v The Regional Court Magistrate NO,965
where it was decided that even in cases where the witness could not be seen at all,
there was no infringement of the rights of the accused.966 Based on this reasoning,
the court found that the decision in S v F was clearly wrong and should be
overruled.967
In response to submissions relating to the conjunctive reading968 of the
requirements in section 158(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act,969the South African
Law Commission recommended that section 158(3) be amended to the effect that a
court may order the use of closed-circuit television where one or more of the
criteria exist.97o This recommendation was included in the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Amendment Bill.971
In England, section 51 of the Criminal Justice Acë72 provides that a witness may
testify via live television link if the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the
963219A.
964219D.
9651996 1 SACR 434 (E).
966 K v The Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 1 SACR 434 (E) concerned the constitutionality of
s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act. This aspect will be discussed later.
967219H.
968See S v F 1999 1 SACR 571 (C). It is important to note that the SA Law Commission Sexual
Offences Project 107 Report (2002) was published before the decision in S v Staggie 2003 1 SACR
232 (C) where the Sarkin, AJ accepted that the requirements should be read disjunctively.
96951 of 1977.
970SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.3.3 and § 4.5.3.4.
971B50-2003.
972Criminal Justice Act 1988.
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efficient or effective administration of justice to do S0973and the necessary
facilities are availablc.Y" In deciding whether to give an order allowing the witness
to testify via live television link, the court must consider all the circumstances of
the case,975 in particular the availability of the witness,976 the need for the witness
to attend in person,977 the importance of the witness's evidence to the
proceedings.f" the views of the witness,979 the suitability of the available
facilities,980 and whether the direction might tend to inhibit any party from
effectively testing the witness' evidence.981 When a witness testifies via live
television link the witness must be seen and heard by the accused,982 the judge and
jury,983 the legal representatives acting in the matter,984 and any interpreter or other
person appointed by the court to assist the witness.985
In terms of section 24 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act,986the court
may, as a special measure to protect a vulnerable person, order that the witness
testify via live link. In terms of section 24(8) of the Act, the presiding officer, jury,
legal representatives and interpreter or any other person appointed to assist the
witness must be able to see the witness via the live link.
Section 29(5) of Scotland's Crime and Punishment Act (Scotland)987 provides that
the court may, on application, authorise the giving of evidence of a vulnerable
person via live television link. In deciding whether to grant such an order, the court
may consider the possible effect on the vulnerable witness if such an order was not
made,988whether the vulnerable person would be better able to give evidence if the
973 S 51(4)(a).
974 S 51(4)(b).
975 S 51(6).
976 S 51(7)(a).
977 S 51(7)(b).
978 S 51(7)( c).
979 S 51(7)( d).
980 S 51(7)( e).
981 S 51(7)(t).
982 S 56(3)(a).
983 S 56(3)(b).
984 S 56(3)(c).
985 S 56(3)( d).
986 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
987 Crime and Punishment Act (Scotland) 1997.
988 S 29(7)(a).
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order was made,989 and the views of the vulnerable person.990 The court may also
take into account the nature of the alleged offence.Ï" the nature of the evidence the
person will give,992 the relationship between the vulnerable witness and the
accused993and, where the witness is a child, the age and maturity of the child.994
Although statutes providing for closed-circuit television differ from state to
state,995more than half of the states in the United States of America currently have
statutory provisions that authorise the use of closed-circuit television for child
victims who are required to give evidence in sexual offence matters.Ï" In some
states one-way close circuit television is used, while others make use of two-way
closed-circuit television. In the former case the child can be seen by the judge and
jury, while in the latter the child can also be seen by the defendant. 997
In terms of section 486(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code,998 all criminal
proceedings must be held in open court unless the court is of the opinion that it is
in the interest of the public morale, the maintenance of order or the proper
administration of justice to exclude all or any members of the public from the court
room. Section 486(1.1) clearly states that the "proper administration of justice"
includes ensuring that the interests of witnesses under the age of 18 years are
properly safeguarded in proceedings in which the accused is charged inter alia
with a sexual offence, including sexual assault. In terms of section 486(2.1), the
court is empowered to order that the complainant or any witness who is under the
age of 18 years or who suffers from a mental or physical disability that may
influence his ability to communicate evidence, testify outside the court room or
behind a screen or other device that would allow the witness not to see the accused.
This procedure can be used if the court is of the opinion that the exclusion is
989 S 29(7)(b).
990 S 29(7)(c).
991 S 29(8)(a).
992 S 29(8)(b).
993 S 29(8)(c).
994 S 29(8)(d).
995 Myers Child Witness: Law and Practice (1987) 395.
996 Bjerregaard "Televised testimony as an alternative in child sexual abuse cases" 1989 Criminal
Law Bul/etin 164 168.
997 Myers Law and Practice 395.
998 R.S. 1985, c. C-46.
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necessary to obtain a full and candid account of the Acts that led to the
complaint. 999
In terms of section 486(2.2), the procedure created in section 486(2.1) may not be
used unless arrangements have been made for the accused, the judge or justices and
the jury to watch the testimony of the complainant or witness by means of closed-
circuit television or otherwise. The accused must also be allowed to communicate
with his legal representative during the testimony.1000
These provisions show that South Africa is not unique in its endeavour to protect
witnesses from trauma caused by their participation in the criminal justice process,
nor are the provisions relating to the giving of evidence via closed-circuit
television unique. Similarly, the tension between the protection of witnesses and, in
particular, complainants in sexual offence matters is not a problem peculiar to the
South African criminal justice process. What does make the South African
situation unique is the Law Commission's recommendation that where a witness
has been declared a vulnerable witness, the provisions of section 158 should be
applicable "irrespective of any additional qualifying criteria prescribed by the
section".
Three questions arise. The first is whether the provisions of section 158 of the
Criminal Procedure ActlOOI are consistent with the right to a fair trial and
particularly the confrontation right which is inherent in the right to a fair trial. If
not, can an infringement of the right to a fair trial be justified based on the need to
protect the witness - and particularly the victim - in sexual offence cases? Thirdly,
what effect - if any - will the recommendations of the Law Commission have on
the fair trial rights of the accused?
999 S 486(2.1).
1000 S 486(2.2).
100151 of 1977.
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Evaluation
The right to confront is generally deemed to be essential for a fair triallOO2 and is
clearly based on Due Process values. On the other hand, the values that underlie
sections 158(2)-(3) are Victims' rights values as they concern the protection of
witnesses from possible further traumatisation.
An analysis of section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Actl003 raises important
questions with regard to the constitutionality of the provision. In S v
Makwanyanel004 the Constitutional Court laid down the approach to be followed
when considering the constitutionality of a legislative or common law provision. In
this respect a two-stage approach is used. The first stage concerns the question
whether there is an infringement or a denial of a constitutional right, while the
second stage is an enquiry into the constitutional validity of the provision and the
limitation issue. In the first stage the burden is on the party alleging an
infringement of a constitutional right.I005 During this stage the court is required to
determine the essential content and ambit of the constitutional right in the
abstractl006 and the accused is required to show that an infringement of his right
has indeed occurred.1oo7 Once this has been established, the second stage of the
enquiry is reached. During this stage, the party alleging that the infringement of the
right is permissible in light of the limitations clause IS required to prove this
allegation.loo8 It is only in the second stage that the court is required to consider the
purpose and proportionality of the offending provision.T'"
1002 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2nd ed (2003) 353.
100351 of 1977.
1004 19953 SA 391 (CC).
lOOS Van der Merwe "Cross-examination of the (sexually abused) child witness in a
constitutionalized adversarial trial system: is the South African intermediary the solution?" 1995
Obiter 194 208.
1006 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 208.
1007 During this stage the right should be interpreted in its widest adversarial context. See Van der
Merwe 1995 Obiter 194209.
1008 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194208.
1009 Schwikkard & Jagwanth "K v The Regional Court Magistrates NO 1996 1 SACR 434 (E): the
constitutionality of S170A of the Criminal Procedure Act" 1996 SACJ 215 218.
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As was shown in Chapter 3, the right to a fair trial is a comprehensive and
integrated right that embraces the concept of substantive fairness.lolo It therefore
encompasses more than the rights listed in sections 35(3)(a)-(0). On the basis of
this it can be argued that although not listed, the right to a fair trial must, as the
essential element of the right to challenge evidence and the right to be present
when being tried, lOll include the right of an accused person to confront his
accusers.1012 In fact, it is generally accepted that the right to confront is an essential
element of the right to a fair tria1.I013
It can also be argued that the right to challenge and adduce evidence includes, by
necessary implication, not only the right to cross-examine, but also the right to
meaningful and effective cross-examination.l'l'" It is generally accepted that the
most effective cross-examination is when there is a face-to-face confrontation
between the cross-examiner and the witness. lOIS Therefore, if one interprets the
right to challenge evidence in its widest adversarial context it should include the
right to face-to-face confrontation between the accused (and his legal
representative) and the witness.1016 The right of an accused to confront his accusers
is obviously also an essential element of the right to be present when being
tried.I017
1010 S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 2004 4 SA 1078 (CC).
1011 See for example R vMolatla 1975 1 SA 814 (T).
1012 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 208.
1013 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 353.
1014 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 208.
1015 Pretroius Cross-examination in South African law (1997) 80, 88 and 99 and the authority cited
there.
1016 See also Watney "Aspkte van getuienisaflegging deur kindergetuies deur bemiddeling van
tussengangers" 1998 THRHR 423439.
1017 In S v Manzi 2004 2 SA 133 (N) the prosecution applied for consent for a 14-year-old
complainant to give evidence by way of closed-circuit television throught an intermediary. It was
agreed between the state and the accused that the complainant would testify in camera and that the
accused would be removed from the court room. The accused would take up position in the room
where the witness and intermediary would have been seated. The accused would hear the evidence
via the headphones provided. The accused could not see the complainant (142I-143A). On appeal it
was argued that, in these circumstances, the accused was deprived of a fair trial. The argument on
behalf of the appellant was based on s 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and s 35(3)(e)
of the Constitution (143B-D). However, the court held that the representative of the accused was
able to observe the demeanour of the complainant and to subject her to extensive cross-examination
(144F-G). Itwas also found that the trial judge had been aware of the rights of the accused and had
indeed drawn the attention of the defence to the appellant's right to be present during the testimony
of the complainant (144H-145C). Further, in light of the fact that the accused is not a lay person, the
court concluded that he was well aware of his right to be present (145D). The court also noted that
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Valuable guidance can be found in foreign case law. The Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States of AmericalO18guarantees the accused the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him". This provision formed the basis
of the challenge in Coy v Iowa.I019 In this case, the accused was charged with the
sexual assault of two thirteen-year-old girls. In accordance with the Iowa statute,
the trial court allowed the victims to testify behind a screen that was erected
between the witness box and the accused. The accused could "dimly perceive" the
two complainants, while the complainants could not see the accused at all. The
accused was convicted, but on appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was
argued that the Sixth Amendment right to confront of the accused had been
violated. The majority of the court, per Scalia J, found that the right to confront
confers "at least a right to meet face-to-face with all those who appear and give
evidence at trial".I020 Since the screens had achieved their purpose of enabling the
complainants to testify without viewing the accused, this right was found to have
been violated. Despite the State's argument that the erection of screens was
necessary to protect victims of sexual offences from trauma, the court found that
the statute in question created a "legislative presumption of trauma".I021 In the
absence of a specific finding that the complainants indeed needed special
protection, the court was not prepared to limit the right to confrontation. The
majority therefore decided that the conviction could not be upheld.
By providing for the giving of evidence via closed circuit television, the provisions
of section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Actl022 clearly deprive the accused of his
right to a face-to-face confrontation with the witness. Therefore there is an
the issue of non-compliance with s 158(1) was not raised during the trial (145H). Based on these
considerations the appeal was dismissed. Although the accused therefore has the right to be present
when being tried, the court was prepared to fmd that the accused may waive his right to be present.
Cf S v Roman 1994 1 SACR 436 (A)
1018 There is an obvious difference between the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America and the fair trial right in the South African Constitution in that the Sixth
Amendment expressly guarantees the right of an accused to confront his accusers, while s 35(3)
does not contain such an express guarantee. However, in light of the Constitutional Court's
interpretation of the fair trial right in S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 2004 4 SA 1078 (CC) this difference
in wording does not present any real problems.
1019487 US 1012, 101 Led 2d 857 (1988).
1020487 US 1016.
1021487 US 1020.
102251 of 1977.
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infringement of the right to a fair trial. The first part of the Makwanyane-test has
therefore been satisfied. Only now does the question arise whether the
infringement can be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.
In terms of section 36, the court must decide whether a limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom. Here the court must take into account the nature of the right, the
importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation,
the relationship between the limitation and its purpose and the possibility of less
restrictive means to achieve the same purpose. Only if, after taking all these factors
into account, the court is satisfied that the limitation is justifiable, can the
infringement of the right be allowed.
The right to challenge and adduce evidence lies at the heart of criminal trial I023 and
in view of its importance few limitations are readily accepted.1024 Therefore, the
limitation must serve a particularly important purpose before such limitation can be
justified.
Section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Actl025 seeks to protect a witness at a
criminal trial from the possibility of trauma which will be caused by his testifying
in the physical presence of the accused. The purpose of the provision is particularly
important in the context of evidence given by a victim of a sexual offence where
the victim is required to recount the details of a particularly embarrassing trauma
suffered at the hands of the accused. A face-to-face confrontation in these
circumstances significantly increases the risk of secondary trauma. Where the
victim is youthful this risk is increased even more. Therefore, it can be said that the
objective sought to be achieved by the provision in the context of sexual offences
is of cardinal importance.
1023 See for example Chambers vMississippi 410 US 284 294 (1973) where Powell J remarked that
"to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses on one's own behalf have long been
recognized as essential to due process".
1024 Steytier Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Commentary on the Constitution of thr Republic
of South Africa (1998) 346.
102551 of 1977.
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The provisions of section 158 may have the result that the witness is unable to see
the accused at all times. The accused, his legal representative, the prosecution and
the presiding officer are, however, able to see the witness and his demeanour while
he testifies. The prosecution and defence counsel question the witness directly.
Therefore, the extent of the infringement is limited to the fact that there is no face-
to- face confrontation between the witness and the accused. This may have an effect
on the effectiveness of cross-examination.l'f" However, the effect will be limited
since the cross-examiner can still use voice inflections as a tool in cross-
examination. Further, such a "virtual reality" trial via electronic media can only be
held either with the consent of the accused or pursuant to a court order.1027
When considering the relationship between the limitation and its purpose the court
is required to consider whether there is a rational connection between the purpose
sought to be achieved by the provision and the way in which the provision seeks to
achieve this purpose. In the case of section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Actl028
the provision seeks to reduce the possibility of trauma caused by a face-to-face
confrontation by removing the witness from a situation where the face-to-face
confrontation will take place. Therefore, there is a rational connection between the
provision and its purpose.
In Coy v Iowa1029 O'Connor J, in a separate judgement in which she concurred
with the majority decision, pointed out that the right to face-to-face confrontation
is not absolute and that the right may have to give way to other competing interests
in suitable cases. This would be allowed where an important public policy, such as
1026 In S v Ndhlovu 2002 6 SA 305 (A) 321A the Supreme Court of Appeal expressed the view that
the right to challenge evidence does not guarantee "an entitlement to subject all evidence to cross-
examination", (cf S v Van der Sandt 1997 2 SACR 116 (W) 132b-j) but that it merely contains the
right to "challenge" evidence. According to the court evidence can be challenged in ways other than
cross-examination. (§ [24] 321A) The court did, however, qualify this dictum when it held that
"where the interests of justice require that hearsay evidence be admitted, the right to 'challenge
evidence' does not encompass the right to cross-examine the original declarant. (§ [24] 321B) It
can, therefore, be argued that this narrow interpretation of the right to challenge evidence only
applies to hearsay evidence and that the right to challenge evidence does encompass the right to
cross-examination in the normal course of events.
1027 Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure 295.
102851 of 1977.
1029487 US 1012, 101 Led 2d 857 (1988).
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the protection of child witnesses, required the adoption of a procedure where there
was no face- to- face confrontation.Y'"
In a dissenting judgement in the same case Blackmun J concluded, however, that
the screening procedure did not violate the confrontation clause. Finding that the
provision in terms of which the screen had been erected did indeed serve an
important public policy, namely the protection of child witnesses, he argued that
this outweighed the "preference'v?" for face-to-face confrontation in the
Confrontation Clause.1032 The child witness had testified under oath and in full
view of the jury and had been subjected to unrestricted cross-exeminationF" He
also found that the procedure had not been "inherently prejudicial" and therefore
had not violated due process.1034
InMaryland v Craig1035 the United States Supreme Court had a second opportunity
to consider the effect of the physical separation of victims and accused persons.
Here a Maryland statute, which allowed for witnesses to testify via one-way closed
circuit television if the judge came to the conclusion that testifying in the
courtroom would have resulted in serious emotional stress that would hamper the
communication ability of the child, came under scrutiny. O'Connor J wrote the
majority decision, in which the court found that while the procedure prevents the
child from seeing the accused, it preserves all the other elements of the
confrontation right. So, for example, the child must be competent to testify and
must testify under oath. The accused also retains full opportunity for
contemporaneous cross-examination and the judge, jury and accused are able to
view the demeanour of the witness, albeit via video monitor.1036 The court
concluded that these elements of confrontation adequately ensure that the
testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing.1037 Therefore,
1030 487 US 1022-1023. This argument would in South African law only come up in the second,
limitations, phase of constitutional interpretation.
1031487 US 1028 and 1031.
1032 487 US 1031. As is the case with O'Connor's fmding, this question only arises in the
limitations phase of interpretation.
1033487 US 1033-1034.
1034487 US 1034.
1035 497 US 836, 111 Led 2d 666.
1036497 US 851.
1037497 US 857.
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the majority of the court found that where it is necessary to protect a child witness
from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the
accused and would impair the child's ability to communicate, the confrontation
clause does not prohibit the use of procedures such as the one in the relevant
statute.1038
In the Canadian case of R v Levogiannis,1039 the Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether the accused's right to a fair trial1040was infringed by a provision
which allows the testimony of a complainant to be given from behind a screen. The
court, per L'Heureux-Dubé J, found that neither the section 7 right nor the section
11(b) right of the accused was violated by the provision authorising the use of
screens. Referring to R v Sea boyer, 1041the court found that the fundamental
principles of justice provided by section 7 must reflect a diversity of interests,
which include the rights of the accused as well as the interests of society.l042 The
court concluded that the purpose of the provision was to assist the trier of fact to
"get at the truth,,1043and that the right to face one's accuser is not an absolute right,
but is subject to the interests of justice.1044 It found that the procedure merely
blocks the complainant's view of the accused and not vice versa and, since the
accused's right to cross-examine the witness remains intact, the section 7 right is
not violated. The court expressed the opinion that, since that application of the
provision is limited and the provision may only be invoked if it is necessary to
obtain a "full and candid account of the act complained of', 1045it does provide a
certain measure of protection for the rights of the accused. 1046The court also found
that the use of a screen does not infringe the presumption of innocence in section
1038497 US 857.
1039 (1993) 18 C.R.R (2d) 242.
1040 Ss 7 and 11(d) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution Act 1982. S 7
reads: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". S 11(d) reads:
"Any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal".
1041 (1991) 6 C.R.R 3548.
1042 249-250.
1043250.
1044249.
1045 S 486(2.1) Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
1046254.
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11.1047 L'Heureux-Dubé J stressed that the provision therefore does not require the
presiding officer to be satisfied that exceptional or inordinate stress will be caused
if the provision is not invoked. 1048
In view of the decisions in S v Staggiel049 and S v Damingal050 relating to the
disjunctive reading of the provisions in section 158 as well as the Law
Commission's acceptance of such an approach, the question arises whether the
discretion of the court is not too wide and, therefore, whether the provisions could
be invoked too readily. It must be pointed out that the requirements set for
invoking the provision are low in comparison with other jurisdictions. For
example, in England it is required that court must consider whether a direction that
a witness testify via closed circuit television might tend to inhibit any party from
effectively testing the witness's evidence; and in Scotland the court must consider,
amongst other things, the nature of the evidence which will be given and whether
the witness will be able to give better evidence if the order was made. However, as
the court in S v Damingal051 pointed out, the mere existence of one of the factors
listed in the section is not in itself sufficient justification for invoking the section. It
is a matter of discretion which must be exercised judicially after consideration of
all the circumstances of the case. Therefore, provided that the court applies its
mind to all the circumstances of the case, there should be no increased risk in a
disjunctive reading of the provisions. The Law Commission's recommendation that
the provisions of section 158 can be invoked "irrespective of any additional
qualifying criteria prescribed by [the] section" where a witness has been declared
vulnerable may, however, increase the risk of abuse of the section. Based on the
dictum in Coy v Iawa1052 relating to the need for a specific fmding that trauma
would result, it can be argued that the amendments proposed by the Law
Commission will constitute an unjustifiable infringement of the fair trial rights of
the accused. However, in light of the fact that the accused retains full opportunity
1047255.
1048254
1049 S v Staggie 2003 1 SACR 232 (C).
10502003 1 SACR 232 (C).
1051 2003 1 SACR 232 (C).
1052487 US 1012, 101 Led 2d 857 (1988).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RlGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RlGHTS 164
of challenging the evidence of the witness, the infringement should pass
constitutional scrutiny.
6 4 Evidence through an intermediary
Having had regard to the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings lil South
Africa and the fact that the exercising of the accused's right to a fair trial
(including the right to confront the witness) often traumatises children, the South
African Law Commission recommended almost a decade and a half ago, that
provision be made for children to testify through an intermediary.1053
Consequently, section 170A was inserted in the Criminal Procedure Act1054by
section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment ACt.1055
Section 170A provides:
"( 1) Whenever criminal proceedings are pending before any Court and it appears to
such court that it would expose any witness under the age of eighteen years to undue
mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such proceedings, the court may,
subject to subsection (4), appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order to
enable such witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary ..."
Section 170A(2) further provides that no examination, cross-examination or re-
examination of such a witness may take place other than through the intermediary
and that the intermediary may convey the general purport of the question to the
witness. The court is empowered to direct the intermediary to convey the ipsissima
verba of the question to the witness where either one of the parties or the court
itself deems it necessary. The court may directly communicate with the witness
where it finds it necessary to do so. The court must, however, "guard against
descending into the arena of examination or cross-examination" of the witness.1056
In order to further protect the child witness from secondary trauma, a child in
respect of whom an intermediary has been appointed testifies in a separate room,
which is often informally arranged to set the witness at ease.1057It is important to
note that the presiding officer and the parties must be able to see and hear both the
1053 SA Law Commission Protection of Child Witnesses Project 71 Report (1991).
105451 of 1977. S 170A came into operation on 30 July 1993.
1055 135 of 1991.
1056 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles p 351.
1057 S 170A(3)(a) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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intermediary as well as the witness, either directly or through electronic media or
other devices.l058
The use of the word "may" in section 170A(1) implies that the court has a
discretion to appoint an intermediary. This means that appointment of an
intermediary in cases involving witnesses under the age of 18 years is not
automatic.l059 Section 170A sets certain requirements which must be met. Kriegler
and Krugerl060 list them as follows: (1) the witness must be below the age of 18
years, (2) enough information must be made available for the court to come to a
decision, (3) that testifying according to the ordinary process will have the result
that (4) the witness is subjected to (5) undue (6) mental stress or suffering. It is
clear that the mere youthfulness of a witness is not sufficient to invoke the
provision.l''?' What is required is that the court must be satisfied that the youthful
witness would suffer undue mental stress if an intermediary were not appointed.
The question is: What is meant by the term "undue mental stress or suffering"?
Muller and Tait argue that the wording of the section indicates that the mental
stress or suffering experienced by the child must be more than the ordinary stress
experienced by witnesses.l062 From case law, it is clear that the courts approach the
construction of the section in the same way. For example, in S v Stefaansl063 the
court expressed the opinion that the use of the word "undue" "connotes a degree of
stress greater that the ordinary stress to which witnesses, including witnesses in
complaints of a sexual nature, are subject".lo64 Likewise, in S v Mathebula,1065
where the magistrate allowed the witness in respect of whom an intermediary was
appointed, to sit in the court room after the state had closed its case, it was held
that, in the appointment of an intermediary, the magistrate had not heeded the
1058 S 170A(3)(c). In S v T 2000 2 SACR 658 (CkH) § [24] 664g-h the court, per Ebrahim J,
remarked that where the record of trial proceedings does not indicate that the magistrate,
prosecution and defence could personally observe the demeanour and hand gestures of the witness
testifying through an intermediary, the situation does not lend itself to justice being seen to be done.
1059 Muller & Tait "Little witnesses: A suggestion for improving the lot of children in court" 1999
THRHR244.
1060 Kriegler & Kruger Hiemstra 445.
1061 See for example S vMathebula 1996 2 SACR 231 (T).
1062 Muller & Tait 1999 THRHR 245.
1063 1999 1 SACR 182 (C).
1064 187c.
1065 1996 2 SACR 231 (T).
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requirement of "undue mental stress or suffering" as required by section l70A.
Stafford J remarked that it was difficult to understand why she was allowed to
attend the rest of the case, if the mere presence of the accused would have upset
her to such an extent as to cause undue mental stress. I066
In S V FI067 the prosecution applied for consent for a 17 year old rape victim to give
evidence through an intermediary and by means of closed circuit television. The
court held that section l70A could only be applied if it appeared to the court that
the witness would otherwise have been exposed to undue mental stress or
suffering. The court was of the opinion that the words "if .. .it appears to the court"
in section l70A(1) should be interpreted as meaning "nothing less than proof on a
balance of probabilities".1068 On the facts, therefore, the court held that since there
was no indication that the witness would have been spared undue mental stress if
an intermediary were to be appointed,1069 it was therefore impossible for the court
to find on a balance of probabilities that testifying in the normal course would
expose the witness to undue mental stress or suffering.l07o This "no difference,,1071
approach has been criticised as being too strict.lon
In S v Stefaans,1073 the court, per Mitchell AJ, found that it would be advisable to
lay down some guidelines as to how and in what circumstances section l70A
should be invoked.l074 However, it was emphasised that despite the guidelines,
each case must be dealt with on its own merits.'?" Adherence to these guidelines,
it was believed, would reduce the risk of the accused not receiving a fair trial.1076
The following were stated: Firstly, the court should be mindful of the "inherent
dangers" in the use of an intermediary which might prejudice the fair trial rights of
1066234f
10671999 1 SACR 571 (C).
1068583h.
1069584d.
1070584c.
1071Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 361.
1072Schwikkard "Evidence" 1999 SA C! 259 262.
10731999 1 SACR 182 (C).
1074 Schwikkard reviewed these guidelines in "Evidence" 1999 SAC! 259. She points out that
although some of the guidelines may be useful, "others seem to be based on that mysterious type of
judicial experience that justified invoking the cautionary rule applicable to complainants in sexual
offence cases".
1075 187i.
1076l88i.
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the accused. 1077 These include the fact that cross-examination through an
intermediary may be less effective than direct cross-examination, that the accused
has a prima facie right to confront his accusers and to be confronted by them, and
that human experience has shown that it is easier to lie about someone behind his
back than to his face.I078 Secondly, the provisions of the section should more
readily find application in cases involving physical or mental trauma or insult to
the witness than in any other cases.1079Next, although giving evidence in court is
inevitably a stressful experience, the court should be satisfied that the stress would
be in excess of the normal stress involved in testifying. This finding was based on
the view that the younger and more emotionally immature the witness, the greater
the likelihood that testifying would lead to undue stress.1080In the fourth place, it is
less likely that a witness who knows the accused and is known by him will
experience undue stress than would a witness who is unknown to the accused,
although this factor needs to be balanced by the age of the witness.1081The next
general principle is that unopposed applications are more likely to be granted than
opposed applications.1082 Sixthly, the right to oppose the application must be
carefully explained to the unrepresented accused and in cases where there is doubt
as to whether the accused understands this right, the matter should be treated as
opposed.1083 The seventh general principle is that in opposed applications all
appropriate evidence should be brought before the court to enable the judicial
officer to exercise proper discretion.1084 Lastly, where the section is invoked, the
judicial officer should be aware that the efficiency of cross-examination may be
reduced by the intervention of the intermediary and should therefore be prepared to
1077 See Schwikkard 1999 SACJ 259 260 where this guideline is criticized. Schwikkard points out
that Mitchell AJ does not balance the possible prejudicial effect of the use of an intermediary on the
rights of the accused with "a judicial reminder as to the purpose of s 170A, namely to facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth and further the Constitutional right of equality before the law".
1078 188a-b.
1079 188b.
1080 188c.
1081 188d. CfSchwikkard 1999 SAC! 259261 where she points out that the view of Mitchell AJ
does not appear to be supported by research, but that research rather suggests that children are
frequently intimidated by persons whom they know.
1082 188e.
1083 188e-f
1084 188f-g.
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intervene to insist that the exact question rather than the intermediary's translation
be conveyed to the witness.108S
It is clear that courts insist on strict compliance with the requirements set in section
170A. From the judgement in S v F,1086 it appears that in cases where there is doubt
as to the need for the appointment of an intermediary the court should follow a
conservative approach and refuse the application.
In England section 29 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Actl087makes
provision for the appointment of an intermediary for a person in respect of whom
an order of vulnerability was issued in terms of section 19 of the Act. Before
granting such an order the court must determine whether the measure would be
likely to improve the witness's testimony. The court must also consider whether
the measure would be likely to inhibit the effective testing of the evidence.
Therefore there is a certain amount of protection for the rights of the accused, since
the court would have to refuse such an order if the testing of the evidence would be
inhibited.
In Discussion Paper 102 the South African Law Commission identified a number
of problem areas relating to the use of intermediaries. Although the majority of the
submissions made to the Commission were in favour of the use of an intermediary,
it became resoundingly clear that the system is not working effectively.l088 The
problems mentioned include the fact that many courts do not have a system in
place to deal with the giving of evidence through an intermediary and those that do
have the facilities are frequently beset with practical problems. It also seems that
courts often refuse an application for the appointment of an intermediary on the
grounds that the procedural rights of the accused will be infringed. This, according
to the submissions, causes the needs and rights of the child to be negated. In
addition, persons that are competent to act as intermediaries are often not available,
or where an intermediary is appointed, the person often does not arrive at court
promptly and sometimes does not arrive at all, which results in delays that can be
1085 188h.
1086 1999 1 SACR 571 (C).
1087 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
1088 § 26.3.2.
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distressing to the child. The child may also not be comfortable with the appointed
intermediary, especially if the intermediary belongs to a different racial group.
Other reasons given for the ineffective functioning of the system relate to the
criteria for the appointment of intermediaries and to ineffective counsel on the part
of the prosecution. Harsh cross-examination by defence counsel is also blamed for
the ineffectiveness of the system.
After taking the submissions into account, the Commission therefore made the
following recommendations:
1. That courts be empowered to call for expert input into the question whether
it is necessary, beneficial or appropriate to appoint an intermediary to assist
the witness, and that the court have the capacity to do this mero motu, or at
the request of the prosecution or the witness concemed.I089
2. That an intermediary should automatically be appointed for a child witness
in criminal proceedings involving a sexual offence, unless exceptional
circumstances justify not appointing an intermediary, in which case such
exceptional circumstances must be specified by the COurt.I090
3. That the intermediary should act as facilitator and, as such, should be in a
position to convey to the court when a witness is tired, fatigued or stressed
and to request a recess.'?"
4. That the prosecutor or the intermediary should be required to explain to the
court the reasons for the failure of an intermediary to be available or to
appear and that a warrant of arrest should be issued when such an
intermediary has been subpoenaed.P'"
5. That, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the non-
appointment of an intermediary, a court must, subject to certain provisions,
1089 § 26.5.2.4.
1090 § 26.5.3.5.
1091 § 26.5.6.1.
1092 § 26.5.7.1.
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appoint an intermediary where the court has declared a witness below the
age of 18 years a vulnerable witness.
6. That certain issues, such as the criteria to assess competence for
appointment as an intermediary.l'f" be referred to the Department of Justice
and Constitutional Development for secondary legislation: 1094
The Commission therefore recommended that section 170A of the Criminal
Procedure Actl095 be amended by the addition of the following sections.
"(5) If a court has directed that a vulnerable witness as referred to in section 13
of the Sexual Offences Act, 20 .. (Act No. xx of 20 ..), should be allowed to give
evidence through an intermediary, such intermediary may -
(a) convey the general purport of any question to the relevant witness;
(b) inform the court at any time that the witness is fatigued or stressed; and
(c) request the court for a recess.
(6) An intermediary referred to in subsection (5) shall be summoned to appear
in court on a specified date and at a specified place and time to act as an intermediary
and shall, upon failure to appear as directed, appear before the court to advance
reasons for such failure, upon which the court may act as it deems fit."
This recommendation was included in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences)
Amendment Bill.1096
Despite these attempts to enhance victims' rights, acceptance of the
recommendations do not seem likely to address the questions raised earlier. Are the
provisions of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure Actl097 consistent with the
right to a fair trial? Can an infringement of the right to a fair trial be justified?
What effect will these recommendations have on the fair trial rights of the
accused?
1093 In this respect the Commission recommended certain criteria to be considered.
1094 § 26.6.
109551 of 1977.
1096 B50-2003.
109751 of 1977.
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Evaluation
An investigation into provisions such as section 170A clearly indicates the conflict
between Due Process values Victims' Rights values. While Victims' Rights values
require that the victim of crime be protected from further victimisation, Due
Process values and the concomitant right to a fair trial demand that the accused
have the right to challenge and adduce evidence.1098 The question is whether the
infringement of the Due Process constitutional right to challenge and adduce
evidence can be justified in favour of Victims' Rights Values.
The question of the constitutionality of section 170A was raised in K v Regional
Court Magistrate.1099 In this case an 18-year-old was charged with the rape of a
16-year-old complainant. The prosecution's application in terms of section170A
was opposed by the defence. A clinical psychologist testified that the complainant
was in a fragile state and that making her testify in open court might precipitate a
complete breakdown. Despite the opposition by the defence, an intermediary was
appointed and the matter was postponed to enable the defendant to bring an
application challenging the constitutional validity of section 170A.
The challenge was not based on the physical separation between the witness and
the defence, but rather on the fact that she would have to testify through an
intermediary. It was argued that the appointment of an intermediary "impaired,
limited - or even excluded - proper cross-examination of the witness and therefore
impaired the right of an accused to a fair trial as guaranteed by section 25 of the
Interim Constitution".lloo The physical separation of the witness from the accused
was raised merely in support of this contention.
The question before the court therefore was
"[w]hether s 170A of the Criminal Procedure Act, in attempting to achieve its
laudable purpose - the protection of child witnesses in certain types of criminal trials
- overshoots the mark and has resulted in an unreasonable and unnecessary limitation
of the fundamental right of an accused person to a fair trial."IIOI
1098 S 35(3)(i) Constitution.
1099 K v The Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 1 SACR 434 (E).
1100 200 of 1993.
1101440e.
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The court purported to follow the two-staged approach as adopted by the
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane,1102 in terms of which the applicant bears
the initial onus to establish that a constitutionally guaranteed right is infringed,
while the party seeking to uphold the limitation of the right bears the onus of
establishing the justification for the limitation of the right.
Considering section 25 of the Interim Constitution,1103 the court found that
although the section does not mention the right to cross-examine, the right to
challenge and adduce evidence includes the right to cross-examine.i'" Even at
common law, the right to cross-examine was regarded as so fundamental that a
denial of the right would almost invariably lead to prejudice. IIDSThe provisions of
section l70A do not exclude the right to cross-examine; they expressly permit such
a right.1106However, the argument advanced on behalf of the applicant was that
questioning through an intermediary could destroy its effectiveness, particularly in
light of subsection (2)(b), which provides that the intermediary may convey the
general purport of the questions, unless the court directs otherwise. II07
Despite finding that the right to cross-examination was "a powerful weapon", II08
the court retained the discretion to disallow questioning which was irrelevant,
unduly repetitive, oppressive or otherwise improper and therefore not an absolute
right.1109The purpose of cross-examination, according to the court, is first to elicit
favourable information and second, to cast doubt on the accuracy of evidence-in-
chief against the cross-examining party.IIIO The question whether or not the
curtailment or limitation of cross-examination has resulted in a negation of the
right to a fair trial depends on the circumstances of the case. IIII
IlO2 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 410B and 4351 - 436A.
1103200 of 1993.
1104441i.
1105441i-j.
1106442a.
1107442c.
1108442c.
1109442c.
1110442fg·
1111442h.
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With regard to section 170A, the court found that nothing precludes an accused
from representing himself or from being represented by legal counsel,1112and that
neither is prevented from asking questions in cross-examination.i'I'' When the
section is applied, questions are put through the intermediary and the intermediary
acts, in a sense, as an interpreter, 1114which, according to the court, does not appear
to be a limitation of the right to cross-examination.U" It was therefore accepted
that to achieve his goal, the "armoury of the cross-examiner" not only consisted of
the content of the questions, 1116but also of intonations of voice and nuances. It was
also accepted that it is possible for the forcefulness and effect of cross-examination
to be blunted by the use of the intermediary.
However, since the court was of the opinion that it was required to take account of
the proportionality of the provision in the first stage of the enquiry into its
constitutionality, it did not view the impact of section 170A on cross-examination
as depriving the accused of his right to a fair tria1.1117It was therefore required to
take account of the interest of the child witness at this stage.1118
The court went on to find that although the principles of fundamental justice
require that criminal trials should be unscrupulously fair, a modification of the
accepted rules of evidence is not necessarily open to objection.l '!" Referring to R v
Levogiannis,1120 the court found that the criminal justice process must enable the
trier of fact to get at the truth of the case, while at the same time allowing the
accused to make a full defence. It argued that rules of evidence and procedure are
1112444b_c.
1113444c.
1114 444d. This is, however, a false analogy. Although both the interpreter and the intermediary
convey questions and answers between the examiner or cross-examiner and the witness, there is a
fundamental difference between their functions. The interpreter is required to convey the ipssisima
verba of the question to the witness, albeit in a different language. Although the questions are
conveyed to the witness by the interpreter, the witness hears the original question and sees the
examiner or cross-examiner. The negative impact of the use of an interpreter is therefore limited. In
contrast, the intermediary need only convey the general thrust of the question to the witness. The
witness does not hear the original question, nor does he see the examiner or cross-examiner. The
negative impact on the effectiveness of cross-examination is therefore increased.
1115444e.
1116 444d-e.
1117 444e-f.
1118444e-f
1119444g.
1120 (1993) 18 eRR 242 (2d).
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designed to assist the trier of fact in getting to the truth of the case and at the same
time ensuring fairness of the tria1.1121Based on these considerations, the court
found that the use of the intermediary, in itself, neither affects the fundamental
fairness of the trial nor impairs the right to challenge evidence.1122 It also found
that the intermediary may play an important role in balancing the interests of the
accused with those of the child witness by allowing the witness to form part of the
criminal justice process without disturbing the fundamental fairness of the
process.1123
Based on the same considerations, the court found that the fact that the
intermediary need only convey the general purport of the questions to the child
witness, does not infringe the right to a fair trial, since the intermediary may not
change the content of the question, but may merely phrase it in such a way that the
witness can understand it.1124As the court acknowledged that the application of
section 170A may give rise to unfairness in certain situations, it warned that courts
should be on their guard to ensure that no unfairness results.1125
The right to confront is generally deemed to be essential for a fair triall126 and is
clearly based on Due Process values. On the other hand, the values that underlie
section 170A are Victims' rights values as they concern the protection of witnesses
from possible further traumatisation. An analysis of section 170A raises three
important questions: Does the provision infringe the accused's right to a fair trial?
If so, can an infringement of the fair trial rights be justified by the Victims' Rights
values served by the provision? And what will the effect of the South African Law
Commission's recommendations be?
As was argued in the context of section 158 of the Criminal Procedure Act,1127the
right to a fair trial must, as the essential element of the right to challenge evidence
1121444h.
1122 444i - 445a.
1123 444j-445a.
l124445c.
l125445i.
1126Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 353.
112751 of 1977.
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and the right to be present when being tried,1128include the right of an accused
person to confront his accusers.1129 It was also argued that the right to challenge
and adduce evidence includes, by necessary implication, not only the right to cross-
examine, 1130 but also the right to meaningful and effective cross-examination. ll31 It
is generally accepted that the most effective cross-examination is when there is a
face-to-face confrontation between the cross-examiner and the witness.1132
Therefore, if one interprets the right to challenge evidence in its widest adversarial
context it should include the right to face-to-face confrontation between the
accused (and his legal representative) and the witness.ll33 The right of an accused
to confront his accusers is also an essential element of the right to be present when
being tried.
Although the court in K v Regional Court Magistrate'P" was prepared to accept
that the forcefulness and effect of cross-examination may be limited by the use of
an intermediary, the court found that there was no infringement of the right to a fair
trial. This decision cannot be correct. The measures provided for in section 170A
of the Criminal Procedure Actl135 have the result that where an intermediary is
appointed there is a physical separation between the accused and the witness and
no examination or cross-examination of the child may take place other than
through the intermediary. As long as he conveys the general purport of the question
to the witness, the intermediary need not convey the ipssisima verba of the
question. Despite the fact that the court can order that the original question be put
to the witness verbatim the right to the opportunity of attempting meaningful and
effective cross-examination is infringed by the fact that the intermediary may
generally convey the general purport of the questions to the witness.I136 Describing
the intermediary as a "true or a psychological barrier" between the cross-examiner
1128 See for example R vMolatla 1975 1 SA 814 (T).
1129 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194 208.
1130 See fn 1026.
1131 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194208.
1132 Pretorius Cross-examination in South African law 80, 88 and 99 and the authority cited there.
1133 See also Watney 1998 THRHR 423 439.
1134 1996 1 SACR 434 (E).
113551 of 1977.
1136 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194208.
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and the witness, 1137 Vander Merwe argues that the intervention of the intermediary
can ultimately impact adversely on the effectiveness of cross-examination.Tf
Further, despite the fact that the provision makes it clear that the court,
prosecution, defence and accused must be able to observe the child and the
intermediary during the testimony of the child, the provision which makes it
possible for the witness to testify in a different room infringes the right to a face-
to-face confrontation.U'" The fair trial rights of the accused are clearly infringed by
section 170A.1140 It is here that the limitations question arises. Is section 170A a
constitutionally permissible limitation?
While an argument in favour of limitation in the context of section 158 of the
Criminal Procedure Actl141 was relatively easy to make, the provisions of section
170A create more problems. The reason is that the provision not only allows for a
physical separation between the accused and the victim, but also for the
appointment of an intermediary through whom all examination and cross-
examination must take place. Therefore, not only is the right to confront infringed,
but also the right to meaningful and effective cross-examination. The extent of the
limitation is therefore greater than in the case of section 158. Although the
arguments that were advanced in support of justification of the limitation in the
context of section 158 apply mutatis mutandis in this context, it is important to
note that in light of the difference in the extent to which the provisions infringe the
right to a fair trial, more emphasis must be placed on this factor during the
balancing process in the limitations phase. It is submitted that it is for this reason
that the legislation requires more stringent requirements to be met before the
provisions of section 170A can be invoked. As a result of these stricter
requirements, the limitation of the fair trial right by the mechanism created in
section 170A will pass constitutional scrutinyl142 in the same way as will the
provisions of section 158.
1137 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194208.
1138 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194208.
1139 Van der Merwe 1995 Obiter 194209.
1140 Schwikkard & Jagwanth 1996 SAC/215 218. Watney 1998 THRHR 423439.
114151 of 1977.
1142 See Schwikkard & Jagwanth 1996 SAC/215 218ffand Watney 1998 THRHR 423 440ff.
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The South African Law Commission recommended that unless exceptional
circumstances justify the non-appointment of an intermediary, an intermediary
should automatically be appointed for a child witness in criminal proceedings
involving a sexual offence. It also recommended that the role of the intermediary
be extended so that the intermediary could act as a facilitator between the court and
the witness. Therefore the intermediary's role would no longer be limited to merely
conveying questions to the witness.
Due to the nature of sexual offences the victim of the offence is often the only
witness who can directly testify about the events. It is therefore crucial for the
defence to be able to test the version of the victim. Where the effect of cross-
examination is blunted by the use of an intermediary, this becomes increasingly
difficult. Therefore, strict requirements are set by section 170A for the appointment
of an intermediary; and therefore intermediaries are usually appointed only in
exceptional circumstances. However, the Law Commission's recommendation will
result in the automatic appointment of an intermediary. Therefore, although the
presiding officer still retains the discretion not to appoint an intermediary this
discretion can only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.
Based on the dictum in Cay v Iawa"43 relating to the need for a specific finding
that trauma would result, it can be argued that the amendments proposed by the
Law Commission increases the risk of an unjustifiable infringement of the fair trial
rights of the accused. Along with this comes the increased risk of constitutional
challenges based on the provision and the increased risk of convicted sexual
offenders being acquitted on appeal. This, is it submitted, is not in the interests of
justice.
65 In camera hearings
All criminal proceedings must, in terms of section 152 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, 1144 be conducted in an open court. Section 153 of the Act creates an exception
to this rule by providing that a court may, in certain circumstances, order that the
1143487 US 1012, 101 Led 2d 857 (1988).
114451 of 1977.
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proceedings take place in camera. Section 153(2) empowers the court to allow a
witness to testify in camera and to order that the witness's idêntity be protected
where there is a likelihood that the witness will suffer harm as a result of his
involvement in the criminal justice process.1145Witnesses should be free to testify
without fear of retaliation 1146and this provision is aimed at ensuring that this can
happen. The onus of satisfying the court that such special circumstances are
present rests upon the party who alleges such circumstances and who brings an
application that the basic rule be dispensed with.1147Where the prosecution seeks
to invoke the measures contained in this provision it is necessary to bring a
separate application in respect of each witness.1148The application must be brought
in open court and reasons must be fumished.1149 The court must be convinced that
there is a reasonable likelihood of harm and not merely a "remote far-fetched or
fantastic one".1150However, it must be stressed that the test is whether there is a
reasonable possibility and not whether there is a probability that harm will
result.1151The court has a discretion to grant or refuse the application. The harm
may take any form and the nature thereof is one of the considerations which would
be considered in exercising the discretion conferred by the section.1152
Section 153(3) provides a measure of protection for the complainant in sexual
offences."53 In terms of this section the court may, at the request of the
complainant or the parents or guardian of a minor complainant, order that the
proceedings take place in camera or that certain persons be excluded from the
proceedings. However, the judgement and sentence must still be delivered in open
court.
In terms of section 153(3A), the court is compelled to exclude all persons whose
presence is not necessary at the proceedings while the complainant in a sexual
offence testifies, unless the complainant or his parents, guardian or a person acting
1145 S v Mothopeng 19784 SA 874 (T).
1146 S v Mothopeng 19784 SA 874 (T).
1147 S v Pastoors 1986 4 SA 222 (W) 224C. See also S v Sekete 1980 1 SA 171 (N).
1148 S v Sekete 1980 1 SA 171 (N).
1149 S v Sekete 1980 1 SA 171 (N).
1150 S v Madlavu 1978 4 218 (E) 222G.
1151 S v Madlavu 19784218 (E) 222G; S v Pastoors 19864222 (W) 224E.
1152 S v Pastoors 19864222 (W) 224D.
1153 S 153(3)(a) and (b).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 179
in loco parentis requests otherwise. Section 153(3A) therefore differs from the
other provisions in the sense that the court is not given a discretion. This provision
is aimed at protecting the complainant from secondary victimisation which may be
caused by testifying in public.
The South African Law Commission considered the provisions relating to in
camera hearings and found that although the provisions as such were adequate, the
enforcement thereof was problematic.U'" However, no legislative intervention was
recommended. I ISS
Although a public trial in an open court is the norm, provision is made for in
camera hearings in most other jurisdictions. For example in England section 37 of
the Children and Young Persons Actl156 makes provision for a child to testify in
camera where the case relates to of offence against decency or morality. This
provision applies to children below the age of 18 years.
Section 14 of the Namibian Combating of Rape Act1l57 amends section 153 of the
Criminal Procedure ACt.1158The amended version of section 153 largely resembles
section 153 in the South African Criminal Procedure ACt.1159
Evaluation
Section 153(2) is aimed at protecting witnesses from possible harm that may result
from their involvement in the criminal justice system. Sections 153(3) and 153(3A)
are specifically aimed at protecting the victim of a sexual offence. Therefore, these
provisions in the Criminal Procedure Actl160 reflect Victims' Rights values.
However, the question is whether the provisions infringe the constitutional right to
a "public trial before an ordinary court".1161
1154 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.5.2.
1155 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.5.4.
1156 Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
1157 8 of 2000.
115851 of 1977.
115951 of 1977.
116051 of 1977.
1161 S 35(3)( c).
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In the first stage of the constitutional enquiry it is necessary to establish the
essential content of the right. In Chapter 3 it was shown that a public trial serves
two purposes. As American Chief Justice Burger stated in Press-Enterprises Co v
Superior Court II 1162 the right to an open trial is "a shared right of the accused and
the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness". In other words,
an open trial protects the accused from secret trialsl163 while enhancing public
confidence in the administration of justice.l'" Therefore, it can be argued that the
essential content of the right must include all that is necessary to realise this
purpose. In this way it can be argued that the right must therefore include access to
the court by all parties who have a direct interest in the trial and as large a portion
of the public as is necessary to ensure that the public can be made aware of the
conduct and outcome of the trial. Where there is a total exclusion of members of
the public from the trial, the right to a public trial must certainly be infringed.
It is therefore necessary to move on to the limitations phase. Here the court must
consider the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the
nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its
purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. As
was stated, the right to a public trial serves two purposes, namely protection of the
accused from secret trials and enhancing the public perception of the criminal
justice process. Despite the importance of these interests, the right to a public trial
cannot be absolute. The provisions relating to in camera trials seek to protect the
victims' of sexual offences and other witnesses from harm that may result from
their involvement in the criminal justice process and it does so by excluding the
public (or part thereof) from the trial. Since the infringement of the right is
relatively limited, it is constitutionally justifiable.
1162478 US 17(1986).
1163 K v Regional Court Magistrate NO 1996 1 SACR 434 (E) 414g.
1164 Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 19982 SA 38 (CC).
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6 6 Prohibition of publication of certain information relating to criminal
proceedings
Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Actl165 prohibits the publication of certain
information relating to criminal proceedings. The provision is aimed at protecting
not only the accused, but also witnesses and victims. For example, in terms of
section 154(1) no information relating to an in camera trial may be published. This
prohibition, however, does not apply to information relating to name and personal
particulars of the accused, the charge against him, the plea, the verdict or the
sentence. However, the court is empowered to prohibit publication of this
information ifit will defeat the object of an order made in terms of section 153(1)
of the Act.
In the case of in camera trials relating to sexual offences or testimony of the
complainant in a sexual offence publication of any information that may reveal the
identity of the complainant is prohibited in terms of section 154(2). Section 154(3)
prohibits the publication of information which may reveal the identity of an
accused or a witness under the age of 18 years. However, where it would be just
and equitable to do so, the presiding officer may authorise publication of this
information.
Section 335A of the Criminal Procedure Actl166 prohibits the publication of
information which would reveal the identity of a person towards or in connection
with whom an indecent act has been committed. This section applies prior to the
commencement of criminal proceedings.
The South African Law Commission considered the effectiveness of these
provisions and came to the conclusion that while the provisions as such are
generally adequate, the problem lies in their effective enforcement.J'" The
Commission therefore recommended that the penalties for transgression of the
provisions be increased. In addition, it recommended that where information was
published in conflict with the provisions, the penalty should be higher in cases
116551 of 1977.
116651 of 1977.
1167 SA Law Conunission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.6.2.
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where the person to whom the information related was below the age of 18 years as
opposed to where the person is over 18. It was also recommended that section 154
be amended to provide that where the case that gave rise to the publication of
information in contravention of the provisions related to a sexual offence, and the
person in respect of whom information was published suffered physical,
psychological or other injury or loss of income, the provisions of section 300 of the
Criminal Procedure Actl168should app1y.1169
Section 15 of the Namibian Combating of Rape Act 1170amends section 154 of the
Criminal Procedure ACt.1171The amended version of section 154 largely resembles
section 154 in the South African Criminal Procedure Act. 1172
Evaluation
The provisions of section 154(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Actl173 are
aimed at protecting the identity of the complainant in a sexual offence. This serves
to uphold the complainant's right to privacyl174 and human dignity.1175 As was
stated above, one of the purposes of the right to a public trial is the enhancement of
public confidence in the criminal justice process. However, a prohibition on the
publication of information that will reveal the identity of the complainant does not
affect the right to a public trial and therefore does not infringe on the fair trial
rights of the accused.
116851 of 1977.
1169 In terms of s 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 the court may order damages to be
paid to the complainant by the convicted accused.
1170 8 of 2000.
117151 of 1977.
1172 51 of 1977.
117351 of 1977.
1174 S 14 Constitution.
1175 SlOConstitution.
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6 7 Other measures considered by the South African Law
Commission 1176
The South African Law Commission considered a number of other measures aimed
at protecting the victim of sexual offences. However, these measures were, with
the exception of the support person, rejected by the Commission. Despite the
recommendation of the Law Commission, the proposed measures relating to the
appointment of a support person were not included in the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Amendment Bill.ll77 Due to the fact that none of these provisions were
included in the Bill, the discussion will be limited to an outline of the Law
Commission's finding. No evaluation of these provisions will be done, since the
reasons for the rejection of these measures by the Commission are evident from the
discussion.
6 7 1 Video-taped statements
Mindful of the fact that courtroom testimony is a frightening experience and that
ways should be found to make this process less traumatizing, the Law Commission
investigated the possibility of admitting video taped testimony of child victims of
sexual offences at trial. In Discussion Paper 102 the Law Commission stated that
although section 158(2) of the Criminal Procedure Actll78 provides for the use of
closed-circuit television "or other similar electronic media", it does not specifically
provide that a video of an examination may be used at a later date in place of the
witness testifying in court. Therefore, this is not an option in the South African
Law.
Video-taped evidence, in principle, offers the potential of using the videotape in
the place of live testimony, thereby, theoretically, limiting the potential of
secondary traumatisation by limiting the child's exposure to cross-examination.
However, the Commission noted that video-taping the testimony of the child
victim will not necessarily prevent the child from being subject to cross-
1176 In light of the fact that none of the following measures have been included in the Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50-2003 these provisions will be evaluated as a whole. The
evaluation will be limited.
1177 B 50-2003.
117851 of 1977.
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examination. In this respect the Commission considered three possibilities. Firstly,
if cross-examination of the victim is recorded at the same time as the examination-
in-chief and the child's testimony does not stand up to the cross-examination, the
videotaped evidence could be submitted by the defence to secure an acquittal.I179
Secondly, if the victim is not cross-examined at the time of making the video-
recording, the witness will in all likelihood be called for cross-examination by the
defence. This presents two difficulties: (a) the videotaped evidence could be used
to discredit the victim in the event that, as a result of a lapse of time, the victim's
testimony under cross-examination differs from his video-taped testimony and (b)
the victim will in any event suffer the trauma associated with giving evidence in
court.1180Thirdly, the manner in and the circumstances under which the recording
was made could become the subject of dispute.1181
Further, it was suggested that child witnesses should not be exposed to multiple
interviews as this serves to increase the child's emotional distress.1182However,
experience has shown that it is best to videotape later rather than earlier
interviews,1183 and therefore the option of videotaping the evidence of the child
does not serve to decrease the number of interviews the child must endure.1184
Furthermore, the Commission considered the impact that videotaping the evidence
of the child victim will have on him.1185First, the Commission noted that the
quality of the videotaped account may negatively affect the credibility of the
child's testimony.1186 Further, there is a potential risk of the focus being shifted
away from what the child said to the manner in which the questions were asked,
thereby undermining the prosecution of sexual offences.1187 The possibility that
contradictory statements, which occur in the nature of explaining an event, will be
1179 § 25.5.1.2.
1180 § 25.5.1.2.
1181 § 25.5.1.2.
1182 § 25.5.2.2.
1183 § 25.5.1.3.
1184 § 25.5.1.4.
1185 § 25.5.3.
1186 § 25.5.3.1.
1187 § 25.5.3.1.
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used by the defence to its advantage also undermines prosecution of sexual
offences.1188
The Commission was also mindful of the fact that personnel resources with the
necessary skill to conduct interviews of a sufficiently high standard to secure a
conviction are lacking. 1189Therefore, the Commission recommended that resources
should be allocated to improving basic interviewing skills.1190
Other practical issues considered by the Commission include the substantial risk of
the witness contradicting himself should he be called to clarify certain issues,1191
the risk that challenges will be made to the authenticity of the videosl192 and the
fact that there are problems with the technology already in use.1193
Therefore, the Commission was not convinced that the current circumstances allow
for the introduction of pre-recorded videotaped testimony as evidence at trial,1I94
nor that videotaped evidence would succeed in protecting victims in South
Africa.1195 The Commission recommended that the Department of Justice and
Constitutional Development should take the steps necessary to ensure that the
protective measures already provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act are
properly implemented.U'"
6 7 2 Surrogate witness
In 1955 the "surrogate witness" approach was adopted in Israell197 with the aim of
protecting the child victim from the trauma of testifying. In essence the "surrogate
witness" approach entails that a child victim of a sexual offence is interviewed by a
1188 § 25.5.3.1.
1189 § 25.5.3.3.
1190 § 25.5.4.3.
1191 § 25.5.4.1.
1192 § 25.5.4.2.
1193 § 25.5.4.4.
1194 A problem that was not addressed by the Law Commission relates to the rule against the
admissibility of previous consistent statements. Where an interview has been video-taped, the
staments made by the child during the interview will amount to a previous consstent statement and
therefore the child cannot, as a general rule, refer to such statements during his testimony at trial.
Therefore, the video-taped statements will serve little purpose.
1195 § 25.6.
1196 § 25.6.
1197 For a general discussion on the approach, see Hamon "Examination of children in Sexual
Offences - the Isreali law and practice" 1988 Criminal Law Review 263.
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"youth interrogator". The interrogator decides whether or not the child should
testify at the trial and, should the child testify, the interrogator may indicate that
continuation of the examination may cause emotional harm to the child, in which
case the court may excuse the child. Should the interrogator decide that the child
must not testify, the interrogator testifies in his place and may be cross-examined
by the defence. If the child does not testify, the accused may not be convicted on
the evidence of the interrogator alone and corroborating evidence is required.l'"
The South African Law Commission considered the possibility of including a
provision to this effect in the Sexual Offences Act. In Discussion Paper 102 the
Commission considered the advantages of this approach and came to the
conclusion that the major advantage would be that it generally restricts the
exposure of the child to proceedings which may be harmful, that the courts do not
directly supervise the examination of the child and that the courts have to rely on
the interrogator for interpretation and assessment of the evidence.I''"
Disadvantages of this approach include the fact that it appears to have impeded
prosecution of perpetrators and that the rights of defendants were seriously
compromised which lead to them not receiving fair trials.1200
Despite the obvious advantages of the surrogate witness system, the Commission
came to the conclusion that the implementation of such a system in South Africa
would result in the infringement of the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights
of accused persons.1201This infringement could, in the opinion of the Commission,
not be justified in an open and democratic society.1202The reasons advanced by the
Commission for this conclusion are the following: that the court will not be able to
asses the demeanour of the complainant, that the interrogator may not have put to
the child all the questions that the defence may wish to cover, that such an option
1198 Hamon 1988 Criminal Law Review 263ff.
1199 § 28.4.1.
1200 § 28.4.2.
1201 § 28.4.4.
1202 § 28.4.4.
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would be costly and that there are other less drastic and more workable alternatives
which can be used to protect the child witness.1203
Therefore, the Commission recommended that the surrogate witness system not be
included in the draft Sexual Offences Bill. Here, clearly, Due Process values
outweighed Victims' Rights values.
6 7 3 Support persons
In Discussion Paper 102 the Law Commission defined a "support person" as
"someone who accompanies either a witness or the accused through the criminal
justice process".1204 The purpose of the appointment of such a support person
would be to "strengthen and encourage the witness emotionally" by his physical
presence.1205
Although the Criminal Procedure Actl206makes provision for the support of certain
witnesses,1207 no specific provision is made for a support person for witnesses not
falling into those specific categories. On the basis that a support person mat render
a service to both the witness and the court, the Commission considered it necessary
to investigate the possibility of introducing specific primary legislative provisions
that establishes the court's power to authorise the presence of a support person.
After evaluation of submissions made to the Commission, the Commission
recommended that provision be made in the new Sexual Offences Act for the use
of support persons by all witnesses.1208
1203 § 28.4.4.
1204 § 29.1.1.
1205 § 29.1.1.
120651 Of 1977.
1207 S 153(3A) which provides that a complainant may request that certain persons remain in court
in cases where the court orders the in camera hearing of the evidence of a complainant in a sexual
offence matter; s 73(3) which provides for the support of an accused under the age of 18 years by
his parent or guardian or any other accused who, in the opinion of the court requires assistance; s 74
which provides for the warning of the parent or guardian of an accused under the age of 18 years to
be present at criminal proceedings and s 191A which authorises the Minister of Justice to make
regulations relating to the assistance of and support to witnesses in court. No such regulations have
been made as yet.
1208 § 29.6.3. The Commission was mindful of the fact that it is important to reduce secondary
trauma not only for the victim of a sexual offence, but also for all other witnesses in sexual offence
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The Commission was of the opinion that the obvious advantage of the support
person system would be that it would reduce the trauma to the witness without
placing any additional financial burden on the criminal justice system.1209
As far as the qualification of the person to be appointed as support person is
concerned, the Commission noted that since the purpose of the support person is to
put the witness at ease, it would defeat the object of the section if a list of
qualifying criteria were set.l2lO Furthermore, the setting of a list of qualifying
criteria would, in the opinion of the Commission, result in an unreasonable delay in
the trial process owing to the compliance with regulations and tests for competence
to act as a support person.1211 However, the Commission felt that the court should
retain a discretion to disapprove of a support person if it is satisfied that it would
not be in the interests of justice to appoint such person.1212
The role of the support person should, according to the recommendations by the
Commission, be limited to providing emotional support to the witness and
therefore the support person should not be allowed to speak: to the witness either in
or outside court while the witness is still under oath.1213 In addition, the support
person should not be allowed to interfere with the witness while the latter is giving
cvidcnce.V'" The Commission recommended that the court should explain the role
of the support person to him.l2l5
The Commission recognised that the entire process, from reporting of the offence
through to the finalisation of the trial, is difficult for a witness. For this reason the
Commission recommended that the support person be able to accompany the
witness at all relevant times in this process.1216
matters and therefore recommended that the provisions relating to the appointment of support
persons not be limited to the victim only.
1209 § 29.6.4.
1210 § 29.6.5.
1211 § 29.6.5.
1212 § 29.6.5.
1213 § 29.6.6.
1214 § 29.6.6.
1215 § 29.6.6.
1216 § 29.6.7.
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In relation to child witnesses the Commission considered it important that the
child's input should be heard and therefore recommended that a provision should
be included affording the child the opportunity the express his opinion on whether
or not he wants a support person present in court and who that person should
be.1217
Owing to the limited mandate of the Commission, it clearly stated that the
recommendations made relate only to the appointment of support persons in sexual
offence matters and that it does not propose to extend the proposed provision to all
witnesses.1218
Lastly, the Commission recognised the fact that transport costs to and from court
may be prohibitive and therefore recommended that the State bear the transport
costs, in the form of a transport allowance, for one support person per witness who
is giving evidence in court.1219
After considering submissions, the Commission recommended that the following
clause be included in the draft Bill:
"17. (1) The police official responsible for the investigation of a charge relating
to the alleged commission of a sexual offence shall, at the connnencement of such an
investigation, inform the complainant in such charge and any child witness or his or
her parent, guardian or a person in loco parentis, of their right to be accompanied by
a support person of the complainant's or witness's choice while making any
statement, undergoing any examination, medical or otherwise, being interviewed or
being questioned.
(2) A support person referred to in subsection (1) is not appointed by the
court and may accompany the complainant or witness during any of the investigative
steps contemplated in that subsection.
(3) Whenever criminal proceedings involving the alleged commission of a
sexual offence are pending before any court and a child witness, including any
complainant, is to give evidence in such court, the court may at any time on its own
initiative or upon request by
the prosecutor direct that such witness be accompanied by a support person of the
witness's choice when giving evidence in court.
(4) If the court has appointed a support person in respect of a witness in
terms of subsection (3) on its own initiative, such witness may waive the appointment
1217 § 29.6.9.
1218 § 26.6.11.
1219 § 29.6.12.
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of such support person: Provided that the court shall accord such waiver the weight it
considers appropriate in view of the witness's age and maturity.
(5) The court may, notwithstanding a request in terms of this section,
refuse the appointment of a support person of the witness's choice if the court is of
opinion that the appointment of such person will not be in the interests of justice, and
may, after consultation with such witness and upon furnishing reasons for its refusal,
appoint another person as support person.
(6) A support person appointed in terms of this section may accompany
and be seated with the relevant witness while such witness is making statements to
any person, being interviewed or giving evidence in court.
(7) The court may, if it deerns it to be in the interests of justice and in the
best interests of the witness, at any time revoke the appointment of a support person
and may appoint another person in his or her place.
(8) Whenever a witness in respect of whom a support person has been
appointed is to give evidence in court, such person shall affirm to the court prior to
giving support that he or she will -
(a) assist the witness to the best of his or her ability; and
(b) not in any manner interfere with the witness or the evidence being given.
(9) The State shall pay to a support person appointed in terms of this
section the prescribed witness fees for the duration of the period that such person is
required to assist a witness giving evidence in court."
Section 17 does not specifically list the witnesses who are entitled to be
accompanied by a support person. However, section 16(1) of the draft Billl220
requires the court to declare certain witnesses vulnerable witnesses,1221 while
section 16(2) gives the court a discretion to declare any other witness other than the
accused, the complainant and a child witness, a vulnerable witness. In terms of
section 16(4)(a) of the draft Sexual Offences Bill1222a court may, after declaring a
witness a vulnerable witness direct that such a witness be accompanied by a
support person. Therefore, the appointment of a support person as contemplated in
section 17 is not limited to specific witnesses, but is determined with reference to
declaration as a vulnerable witness.1223
Section 17(1) refers to the right to be accompanied by a support person while
making any statement, undergoing any examination, medical or otherwise, being
interviewed or being questioned. Section 17(2) makes it clear that no formal
1220 S 15 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B50-003.
1221 The complainant and a child must be declared vulnerable.
1222 For a discussion see § 62 above.
1223 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.2.3.
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application needs to be made for the appointment of a support person in the pre-
trial phase. 1224
Section 17(1) furthermore places a duty on the investigating officer to inform the
complainant, or in the case of a child witness him or his parent, guardian or person
in loco parentis, of this right. Although the application of section 17 is not limited
to complainants and children, the wording of section 17(1) suggests that only
complainants and child witnesses have the right to be accompanied by a support
person during the pre-trial phase. This is borne out by the fact that any other
witness must first be formally declared a vulnerable witness in terms of section 16
before a support person can be appointed for such a witness. 1225
In terms of section 17(3) a court may mero motu or upon request of the prosecution
appoint a support person for a child, including the complainant. Section 17(3)
makes no mention of the appointment of a support person for a witness other than a
child and it must therefore be assumed that irrespective of any provision in section
16, this provision would apply only to the appointment of a support person for a
child witness.
Section 17(4) empowers a child in respect of whom a support person was
appointed in terms of section 17(3) to waive the appointment of such a support
person, but provides that the court must accord the waiver the weight it considers
appropriate in view of the witness's age and maturity. Therefore, in principle the
child is empowered to waive such an appointment, but the court is not necessarily
required to accept such a waiver.
In terms of section 17(3) a support person of the witness's choice must be
appointed. But section 17(5) provides that the court may refuse to appoint the
1224 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.2.3.
1225 The question is whether a witness other than the complainant or a child witness has the right to
be accompanied by a support person during the pre-trial phase and if not, whether such a witness
can during the pre-trial phase bring an application to be declared a vulnerable witness. It is
subirnitted that this should not be possible. Considering that there is technically no sexual offence
matter before a court during the pre-trial phase and any person being interviewed at that stage is not
yet a witness in a sexual offence matter, but merely a potential witness in such a matter, it would be
difficult to argue that such a person could, at that stage, be declared a vulnerable witness. This,
however, falls outside of the scope of this study.
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support person of the witness's choice ifit is of the opinion that the appointment of
such person will not be in the interests of justice. In this case the court may, after
consultation with the witness, appoint another person as support person. This is to
prevent the possibility of alleged offenders abusing their position in relation to a
child victim to exert pressure on the child and to be appointed as the support
person of the child they allegedly abused.1226
Section 17(6) provides that the support person may accompany and be seated with
the witness in respect of whom he was appointed while the witness is making
statements to any person, being interviewed or giving evidence. In terms of section
17(1) certain witnesses have the right to be accompanied by a support person
during the pre-trial phase. Section 17(6) reiterates this and merely adds that the
support person may be present while the witness is giving evidence.
The court may revoke the appointment of a support person and appoint another
person in his place if it is in the interests of justice to do SO.1227 Although the
provision is silent on the issue, it must be assumed that the court, in the
appointment of a replacement support person, should consult with the witness as is
required in section 17(5). Should this not be required, the provision in section
17(5) can be subverted by the initial appointment of the support person of the
witness's choice and a subsequent revocation of the appointment and appointment
of a replacement support person.
In an indirect manner, section 17(8) defines the role of the support person. Section
17(8) requires the support person to make an affirmation (before giving support to
the witness is respect of whom he has been appointed) that he will assist the
witness to the best of his ability and that he will not in any manner interfere with
the witness or the evidence being given.
Section 17(9) places a duty on the State to pay the prescribed witness fees to a
support person for the duration of the period that such a person is required to assist
the witness. Itmust be noted that the Law Commission recommended the inclusion
1226 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.2.3.
1227 S 17(7).
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of the provisions relating to support persons on the basis that they do not place a
financial burden on the State.1228 However, this provision could result in a
substantial financial burden being placed on the State.
The wording of the proposed section is problematic. On the one hand, section 16 of
the draft Bill refers to the possibility of the appointment, in terms of section 17 of
the draft Bill, of a support person for any witness who has been declared a
vulnerable witness, while on the other hand section 17 only mentions two possible
categories of witnesses for whom a support person may be appointed, namely the
complainant'<" and a child witness.l23O Therefore, despite the provisions of section
16, appointment of a support person is limited by the wording of section 17 to
children and complainants. This is so despite the fact that the Law Commission
indicated that it did not wish to limit the group of witnesses in respect of whom a
support person could be appointed.V"
It is interesting to note that the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment
Billl232 does not mention the possibility of appointing a support person for any
category of witnesses. It must therefore be assumed that this recommendation of
the Law Commission was rejected when the Bill was drafted. However, in terms of
section 15(4)(e) the court is empowered to direct that a witness who has been
declared a vulnerable witness in terms of section 15(1) be protected by any
measure that the court deems just and appropriate. The question is whether the
court is empowered, in the absence of a specific provision creating a support
person system, to appoint a support person in respect a vulnerable witness. In light
of the fact that the Criminal Procedure Actl233 makes only limited provision for
support for certain witnesses, it is submitted that the court does not have the
authority to do so. It is submitted that if the legislature intends otherwise, it would
in this regard have to include a specific empowering provision.
1228 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102.
1229 Only for the pre-trail phase in terms of s 17( 1).
1230 S 17(3).
1231 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Report § 4.5.2.3.
1232 B50-2003.
123351 of 1977.
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6 7 4 Legal representation
The South African legal system considers sexual offences to be crimes against the
State and not crimes against the victim.1234 Therefore, despite the personal nature
of the crime, the victim is no more than a State witness who forms part of the
"chain of evidence" and is, accordingly, not entitled to actively participate or have
legal representation at the trial. In practice the victim is seldom given information
about the investigation, trial dates, bail conditions and so forth1235 and, due to the
workload of the prosecutors, victims are seldom given the opportunity to meet with
the prosecutor before the trial.1236 As a result, the victim is not informed about
what is expected of him and what he should expect during the trial. 1237 Further, the
witness is often exposed to harsh cross-examination and, while the presiding
officer is empowered to intervene to limit excessive questioning, such questioning
is frequently allowed to continue.1238
It is for these reasons that the South African Law Commission decided to
investigate the possibility of allowing the victim to actively participate during the
trial and to allow legal representation for the victim at the trial. The legal
representative could then explain the process to the victim, bring pressure on the
State and defence to meet the time frames set and generally advise the victim of
remedies he would be entitled to should, for example, the accused attempt to
intimidate him.1239 Furthermore, the legal representative could act to protect the
interests of the victim during the trial by, for example, objecting to excessive cross-
examination. 1240
In Discussion Paper 102 the Commission noted that with regard to the
investigation and prosecution of sexual offences the interests of the State differ
from those of the victim.1241 While the State's objective is to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the victim's interest lies in the obtaining of
1234 Snyman Criminal Law 4th ed (2002) 6.
1235 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.5.2.
1236 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 §§ 16.6.1 and 16.5.4.
1237 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.5.4
1238 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.6.3.
1239 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.5.5.
1240 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.6.3.
1241 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.1.
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satisfaction for the personal suffering that resulted from the sexual offence and to
be protected from further trauma during the trial process. Therefore, the
Commission opined, it is necessary to ensure that the interests of the victim are
properly protected.1242 However, the Commission was of the opinion that active
participation by and legal representation for the victim at the trial is not the only
way in which to protect the victim and accordingly improve the quality and
experience of testimony in sexual matters.1243 In the Commission's view it would
be sounder to introduce measures aimed directly at the harmful and often unhelpful
rules and regulations that present obstacles in the protection of the victim's
interests at the criminal trial.1244 Furthermore, the Commission was of the opinion
that the recommendations in the Discussion Paper would go a long way to
achieving this goal.1245
Although the Commission accepted that victims of crime suffer individual harm,
crimes are committed against society as a whole and therefore it is fitting that it is
the State and not the victim who prosecutes the crime.1246 On this basis the
Commission declined to recommend the introduction of complainants as ancillary
prosecutors in sexual offence trials.1247 This implies that not only is the victim not
entitled to actively participate in the prosecution, but also that the victim is not
entitled to be represented by counsel.
6 8 Conclusion
This chapter concentrated on those measures aimed at protecting the victim of
sexual offences against the possibility of secondary victimisation which may result
from their involvement in the criminal justice process. It was shown that while
measures designed to achieve this purpose have already been implemented, the
South African Law Commission recommended that requirements for the
application of certain of these measures be reviewed in an attempt to provide
increased protection for such victims.
1242 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.1.
1243 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.4.
1244 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.4.
1245 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.4.
1246 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.10.
1247 SA Law Commission Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 102 § 16.9.11.
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It was shown that while the existing measures provided for in section 158 and
170A of the Criminal Procedure Act1248 infringe the fair trial rights of the accused,
the infringement can be justified on the basis of the purpose served by the
infringement. It was, however, also argued that the requirements inherent in the
respective sections are aimed at providing protection for the fair trial rights of the
accused and that strict adherence to these requirements is therefore essential. It was
pointed out that the recommendations of the Law Commission will reduce the
protection of the fair trial rights of the accused and will therefore increase the
possibility of acquittal based on a successful constitutional challenge.
As far as in camera hearings are concerned, it was shown that where there is a total
exclusion of the public from the trial, the right to a fair trial is infringed. However,
in light of the purpose of the infringement, namely the protection of the victim, the
infringement should pass constitutional scrutiny. The prohibition placed on the
publication of certain information relating to criminal justice proceedings does not
affect the fair trial rights of the accused.
It is submitted that the Law Commission quite rightly rejected measures such as
video-taped statements, surrogate witnesses and the appointment of legal
representation for the victim of a sexual offence, since the prejudicial effect of
these measures outweighs their potential value. Despite the Law Commission's
recommendation relating to the appointment of support persons, this measure was
not included in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill.1249 In light
of this, it is urmecessary to consider the possible constitutional implications of this
measure.
124851 of 1977.
1249 B50-2003.
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7
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
7 1 Conclusion
Underlying the research question was the concern that although the existing
framework within which alleged child abuse offenders are prosecuted is
insufficient, particularly in so far as the rights of the child victim and the interests
of society as a whole in the prosecution of alleged offenders are concerned, the
amendments proposed in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bi111250
might not have the desired effect, namely the effective prosecution of alleged child
abuse offenders. It may, quite possibly, rather have the effect of infringing on the
rights of the accused to a fair trial and consequently be contrary to the interests of
society.
The aim of this study was to identify threats to the fair trial rights of the accused
posed by measures aimed at enhancing victim participation and protection of
victims' of sexual offences against children and to propose ways of balancing the
rights of the accused person with those of the child victim. The effect of measures
aimed at enhancing Victims' Rights on the fair trial rights of the accused was
therefore investigated. The study departed from the view that neither of the two
possible extremes, viz upholding the fair trial rights of the accused at all costs and
upholding Victims' Rights at the expense of fair trial rights, posed a solution to the
problems encountered in the prosecution of sexual offences against children.
In the introductory chapter, attention was drawn to the possible competing rights of
sexual offenders and child victims. A number of internal tensions that exist in any
criminal justice processl251were identified and it was argued that the outcome of
the balancing process of these tensions depends on the values that underlie the
particular criminal justice system.1252
1250 Supra.
1251 § 1 2.
1252 § 1 3.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ENHANCEMENT OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS VS PROTECTION OF FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS 198
In Chapter Two attention was given to two different models of criminal procedure
that represent different value systems, namely the Due Process Model1253and the
Punitive Victims' Rights Mode11254.It was shown that although the South African
criminal justice system is largely based on Due Process values, values that underlie
the Punitive Victims' rights Model can be identified in the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Amendment Bill.1255 The Chapter served as a background to the
evaluation of the rules of procedure and evidence that followed in Chapters Five
and Six. The significance of Chapter Two was that the values identified were used
to clearly define the tension between the constitutionally guaranteed fair trial rights
of the accused and the interests of society and the child-victim of the sexual
offence. This assisted in finding a balance between these rights and interests.
Chapter Three was dedicated to an exposition of a selection of the constitutionally
guaranteed fair trial rights of the accused in South Africa and provided information
regarding the content of the fair trial rights of the accused. This information is
necessary when the question of constitutional validity is judged. It was also argued
that the integrity of the criminal justice system lies in the upholding of these rights.
In Chapter Four the focus was shifted to Victims' Rights. Victims' Rights were
divided into two groups1256based on the level at which they operate, namely Extra-
trial Level and Trial Level. Both groups were the subdivided into categories based
on the purpose sought to be achieved by the rights. Important for this study are
Victims' Rights which operate at trial level. These rights can be divided into two
categories, namely those aimed at enhancing victim participation'F" at trial level
and those aimed at protecting'F" the victim from secondary victimisation during
their participation in the criminal justice process. In this chapter it was shown that
there have been increased calls for enhancement of Victims' Rights in the criminal
justice process. Itwas argued that although it is important to recognise that victims
of crime have an interest in the prosecution of the alleged offender and that it is
1253 § 24.
1254 § 2 5.
1255 See the discussion above.
1256 § 4 3.
1257 § 4 3 3 1.
1258 § 4 3 3 2.
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important to provide protection for such victims, it is equally important to ensure
that the integrity of the criminal justice process is not undermined by measures
aimed to achieve this goal. It was shown that there has been increased recognition
of Victims' Rights and that such recognition does not necessarily infringe fair trial
rights. The question that was posed, however, is whether the measures envisaged
by the South African Law Commission would infringe the fair trial rights of the
accused. The following two chapters consisted of a discussion and an evaluation of
measures aimed at enhancing victim participation at trial level and measures aimed
at providing protection for the victim of a sexual offence at the same level.
Chapter 5 considered measures aimed at enhancing victim participation at trial
level. It was shown that the proposed legislative changes to the traditional
competency test1259 and to the provisions relating to the taking of the oath1260 will
enhance victim participation in the trial phase, while having no significant
influence of the fair trial rights of the accused. Effective victim participation was
shown to have been enhanced by the abolition of the cautionary rule applicable to
the victim of a sexual offence1261 and the cautionary rule relating to the evidence of
the child victim.1262 Neither of these measures would have a significant impact on
the fair trial rights of the accused.
As far as the cautionary rule applicable to the evidence of a single witness1263 is
concerned, Chapter Five showed that although there is tension between the rights
of the accused and the interests of society and the child-victim in this respect, there
can be no real objection to the rule, since the rule merely requires the court to seek
some kind of safeguard and to satisfy itself that the evidence of the single witness
is reliable. Proofbeyond reasonable doubt controls the situation. Therefore, there is
no possibility of an infringement of the fair trial rights of the accused. Neither is
the practical application of the rule likely to impact negatively on the rights and
interests of the child-victim.
1259 § 5 2.
1260 § 5 3.
1261 § 5 4 1.
1262 § 542.
1263 § 543.
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Chapter Five also included a discussion of the admissibility of hearsay
evidence.V'" In this discussion it was shown that although the court has a wide
discretion in terms of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act1265
to admit hearsay evidence when it would be in the interests of justice to do so, the
admission of hearsay evidence is not without problems. The first problem
identified related to the possibility of an infringement of the constitutional rights of
the accused, while the second related to the conservative approach generally
followed by courts in the admission of hearsay evidence. It was argued that the
provision in section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act1266 could be
used as a mechanism to promote indirect victim participation in the criminal justice
process. However, care should be taken to safeguard the fair trial rights of the
accused.
With regard to the admission of previous consistent statements and the complaint
exception.V'" Chapter Five indicated that there is much criticism of the exception,
especially of the fact that a negative inference can be drawn from a delay in the
making of the complaint. It was also argued that abolition of the first reasonable
opportunity requirement would give effect to Victims' rights values. However, it
was also argued that since the rule against the admissibility of previous consistent
statements in general would promote Due Process values, it should be retained.
While Chapter Five dealt with provisions aimed at enhancing victim participation
in the trial phase of the criminal justice process, Chapter Six investigated
provisions aimed at protection of the victim from secondary victimisation which
could be caused by the victim's involvement in the criminal justice process. A
number of provisions that are aimed at providing such protection already exist in
South African law. However, the South African Law Commission has proposed
changes to these provisions and has investigated the possibility of providing
increased protection for victims. In the course of the Chapter is was shown that
while measures designed to achieve this purpose have already been implemented,
1264 § 5 5.
1265 45 of 1988.
126645 of 1988.
1267 § 5 6.
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the South African Law Commission recommended that requirements for the
application of certain of these measures be reviewed in an attempt to provide
increased protection for such victims. A discussion of sections 1581268 and
170A1269 of the Criminal Procedure Act1270 indicated that these provisions
undoubtedly infringe the fair trial rights of the accused. However, in light of the
purpose served by the provisions, the infringement is constitutionally justifiable. It
was argued that the requirements inherent in the respective sections are aimed at
providing protection for the fair trial rights of the accused and that strict adherence
to these requirements is therefore essential. It was pointed out that the
recommendations of the Law Commission will reduce the protection of the fair
trial rights of the accused and will therefore increase the possibility of acquittal
based on a constitutional challenge.
As far as in camera hearingsl271 are concerned, it was argued that where there is a
total exclusion of the public from the trial, the right to a fair trial is infringed.
However, in light of the purpose of the infringement, viz the protection of the
victim, the infringement should pass constitutional scrutiny. The prohibition placed
on the publication of certain information relating to criminal justice proceedings 1272
does not affect the fair trial rights of the accused.
It is submitted that the Law Commission quite rightly rejected measures such as
video-taped statements,1273 surrogate witnesses1274 and the appointment of legal
representation for the victim of a sexual offence,1275since the prejudicial effect of
these measures outweighs their potential value. Despite the Law Commission's
recommendation relating to the appointment of support persons,1276 this measure
was not included in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill.1277
1268 § 63.
1269 § 64.
127051 of 1977.
1271 § 65.
1272 § 6 6.
1273 § 67 1.
1274 § 672.
1275 § 674.
1276 § 673.
1277 B50-2003.
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This study showed that while the enhancement of victims' rights is an important
consideration, the effect of such measures on the fair trial rights of the accused
should always be investigated before the implementation of the measures.
Equilibrium between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victim is vital.
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